/*
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/async.h>
#include <openssl/ct.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/refcount.h"
const char SSL_version_str[] = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
static int ssl_undefined_function_1(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t s, int t)
{
(void)r;
(void)s;
(void)t;
return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
}
static int ssl_undefined_function_2(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned char *s,
int t)
{
(void)r;
(void)s;
(void)t;
return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
}
static int ssl_undefined_function_3(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r,
unsigned char *s, size_t t, size_t *u)
{
(void)r;
(void)s;
(void)t;
(void)u;
return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
}
static int ssl_undefined_function_4(SSL *ssl, int r)
{
(void)r;
return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
}
static size_t ssl_undefined_function_5(SSL *ssl, const char *r, size_t s,
unsigned char *t)
{
(void)r;
(void)s;
(void)t;
return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
}
static int ssl_undefined_function_6(int r)
{
(void)r;
return ssl_undefined_function(NULL);
}
static int ssl_undefined_function_7(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r, size_t s,
const char *t, size_t u,
const unsigned char *v, size_t w, int x)
{
(void)r;
(void)s;
(void)t;
(void)u;
(void)v;
(void)w;
(void)x;
return ssl_undefined_function(ssl);
}
SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
ssl_undefined_function_1,
ssl_undefined_function_2,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl_undefined_function_3,
ssl_undefined_function_4,
ssl_undefined_function_5,
NULL, /* client_finished_label */
0, /* client_finished_label_len */
NULL, /* server_finished_label */
0, /* server_finished_label_len */
ssl_undefined_function_6,
ssl_undefined_function_7,
};
struct ssl_async_args {
SSL *s;
void *buf;
size_t num;
enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC } type;
union {
int (*func_read) (SSL *, void *, size_t, size_t *);
int (*func_write) (SSL *, const void *, size_t, size_t *);
int (*func_other) (SSL *);
} f;
};
static const struct {
uint8_t mtype;
uint8_t ord;
int nid;
} dane_mds[] = {
{
DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef
},
{
DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256
},
{
DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512
},
};
static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
{
const EVP_MD **mdevp;
uint8_t *mdord;
uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST;
int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */
size_t i;
if (dctx->mdevp != NULL)
return 1;
mdevp = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdevp));
mdord = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdord));
if (mdord == NULL || mdevp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(mdord);
OPENSSL_free(mdevp);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Install default entries */
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(dane_mds); ++i) {
const EVP_MD *md;
if (dane_mds[i].nid == NID_undef ||
(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dane_mds[i].nid)) == NULL)
continue;
mdevp[dane_mds[i].mtype] = md;
mdord[dane_mds[i].mtype] = dane_mds[i].ord;
}
dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
dctx->mdord = mdord;
dctx->mdmax = mdmax;
return 1;
}
static void dane_ctx_final(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
{
OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdevp);
dctx->mdevp = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdord);
dctx->mdord = NULL;
dctx->mdmax = 0;
}
static void tlsa_free(danetls_record *t)
{
if (t == NULL)
return;
OPENSSL_free(t->data);
EVP_PKEY_free(t->spki);
OPENSSL_free(t);
}
static void dane_final(SSL_DANE *dane)
{
sk_danetls_record_pop_free(dane->trecs, tlsa_free);
dane->trecs = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(dane->certs, X509_free);
dane->certs = NULL;
X509_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = NULL;
dane->mtlsa = NULL;
dane->mdpth = -1;
dane->pdpth = -1;
}
/*
* dane_copy - Copy dane configuration, sans verification state.
*/
static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from)
{
int num;
int i;
if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(&from->dane))
return 1;
num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs);
dane_final(&to->dane);
to->dane.flags = from->dane.flags;
to->dane.dctx = &to->ctx->dane;
to->dane.trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_reserve(NULL, num);
if (to->dane.trecs == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i);
if (SSL_dane_tlsa_add(to, t->usage, t->selector, t->mtype,
t->data, t->dlen) <= 0)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx,
const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord)
{
int i;
if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL);
return 0;
}
if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) {
const EVP_MD **mdevp;
uint8_t *mdord;
int n = ((int)mtype) + 1;
mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp));
if (mdevp == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
mdord = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdord, n * sizeof(*mdord));
if (mdord == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
dctx->mdord = mdord;
/* Zero-fill any gaps */
for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) {
mdevp[i] = NULL;
mdord[i] = 0;
}
dctx->mdmax = mtype;
}
dctx->mdevp[mtype] = md;
/* Coerce ordinal of disabled matching types to 0 */
dctx->mdord[mtype] = (md == NULL) ? 0 : ord;
return 1;
}
static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype)
{
if (mtype > dane->dctx->mdmax)
return NULL;
return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype];
}
static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane,
uint8_t usage,
uint8_t selector,
uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen)
{
danetls_record *t;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
int ilen = (int)dlen;
int i;
int num;
if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED);
return -1;
}
if (ilen < 0 || dlen != (size_t)ilen) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (usage > DANETLS_USAGE_LAST) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE);
return 0;
}
if (selector > DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR);
return 0;
}
if (mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
md = tlsa_md_get(dane, mtype);
if (md == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE);
return 0;
}
}
if (md != NULL && dlen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (!data) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA);
return 0;
}
if ((t = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*t))) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
t->usage = usage;
t->selector = selector;
t->mtype = mtype;
t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(dlen);
if (t->data == NULL) {
tlsa_free(t);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
memcpy(t->data, data, dlen);
t->dlen = dlen;
/* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */
if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
const unsigned char *p = data;
X509 *cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
switch (selector) {
case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, ilen) || p < data ||
dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
tlsa_free(t);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
if (X509_get0_pubkey(cert) == NULL) {
tlsa_free(t);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_TA_MASK) == 0) {
X509_free(cert);
break;
}
/*
* For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 0 0" TLSA
* records that contain full certificates of trust-anchors that are
* not present in the wire chain. For usage PKIX-TA(0), we augment
* the chain with untrusted Full(0) certificates from DNS, in case
* they are missing from the chain.
*/
if ((dane->certs == NULL &&
(dane->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
!sk_X509_push(dane->certs, cert)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
X509_free(cert);
tlsa_free(t);
return -1;
}
break;
case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, ilen) || p < data ||
dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
tlsa_free(t);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY);
return 0;
}
/*
* For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 1 0" TLSA
* records that contain full bare keys of trust-anchors that are
* not present in the wire chain.
*/
if (usage == DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA)
t->spki = pkey;
else
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
break;
}
}
/*-
* Find the right insertion point for the new record.
*
* See crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. We sort DANE-EE(3) records first, so that
* they can be processed first, as they require no chain building, and no
* expiration or hostname checks. Because DANE-EE(3) is numerically
* largest, this is accomplished via descending sort by "usage".
*
* We also sort in descending order by matching ordinal to simplify
* the implementation of digest agility in the verification code.
*
* The choice of order for the selector is not significant, so we
* use the same descending order for consistency.
*/
num = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
danetls_record *rec = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
if (rec->usage > usage)
continue;
if (rec->usage < usage)
break;
if (rec->selector > selector)
continue;
if (rec->selector < selector)
break;
if (dane->dctx->mdord[rec->mtype] > dane->dctx->mdord[mtype])
continue;
break;
}
if (!sk_danetls_record_insert(dane->trecs, t, i)) {
tlsa_free(t);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
dane->umask |= DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage);
return 1;
}
/*
* Return 0 if there is only one version configured and it was disabled
* at configure time. Return 1 otherwise.
*/
static int ssl_check_allowed_versions(int min_version, int max_version)
{
int minisdtls = 0, maxisdtls = 0;
/* Figure out if we're doing DTLS versions or TLS versions */
if (min_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
|| min_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR)
minisdtls = 1;
if (max_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
|| max_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR)
maxisdtls = 1;
/* A wildcard version of 0 could be DTLS or TLS. */
if ((minisdtls && !maxisdtls && max_version != 0)
|| (maxisdtls && !minisdtls && min_version != 0)) {
/* Mixing DTLS and TLS versions will lead to sadness; deny it. */
return 0;
}
if (minisdtls || maxisdtls) {
/* Do DTLS version checks. */
if (min_version == 0)
/* Ignore DTLS1_BAD_VER */
min_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
if (max_version == 0)
max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
if (max_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
max_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
if (min_version == DTLS1_VERSION)
min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
#endif
/* Done massaging versions; do the check. */
if (0
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
|| (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_VERSION)
&& DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_VERSION, max_version))
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
|| (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)
&& DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_2_VERSION, max_version))
#endif
)
return 0;
} else {
/* Regular TLS version checks. */
if (min_version == 0)
min_version = SSL3_VERSION;
if (max_version == 0)
max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
if (max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
if (max_version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
if (max_version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
max_version = TLS1_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
if (max_version == TLS1_VERSION)
max_version = SSL3_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (min_version == SSL3_VERSION)
min_version = TLS1_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
if (min_version == TLS1_VERSION)
min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
if (min_version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
if (min_version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
#endif
/* Done massaging versions; do the check. */
if (0
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
|| (min_version <= SSL3_VERSION && SSL3_VERSION <= max_version)
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
|| (min_version <= TLS1_VERSION && TLS1_VERSION <= max_version)
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
|| (min_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION && TLS1_1_VERSION <= max_version)
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
|| (min_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION && TLS1_2_VERSION <= max_version)
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
|| (min_version <= TLS1_3_VERSION && TLS1_3_VERSION <= max_version)
#endif
)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void clear_ciphers(SSL *s)
{
/* clear the current cipher */
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
}
int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
{
if (s->method == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
return 0;
}
if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
s->psksession = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
s->psksession_id = NULL;
s->psksession_id_len = 0;
s->hello_retry_request = 0;
s->sent_tickets = 0;
s->error = 0;
s->hit = 0;
s->shutdown = 0;
if (s->renegotiate) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ossl_statem_clear(s);
s->version = s->method->version;
s->client_version = s->version;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
clear_ciphers(s);
s->first_packet = 0;
s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
s->pha_dgst = NULL;
/* Reset DANE verification result state */
s->dane.mdpth = -1;
s->dane.pdpth = -1;
X509_free(s->dane.mcert);
s->dane.mcert = NULL;
s->dane.mtlsa = NULL;
/* Clear the verification result peername */
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, NULL);
/* Clear any shared connection state */
OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
/*
* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
* back.
*/
if (s->method != s->ctx->method) {
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method = s->ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
return 0;
} else {
if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
return 0;
}
RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
return 1;
}
/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
ctx->method = meth;
if (!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return 0;
}
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,
ctx->tls13_ciphersuites,
&(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
SSL *s;
if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
return NULL;
}
if (ctx->method == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
return NULL;
}
s = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s));
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
s->references = 1;
s->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (s->lock == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s);
s = NULL;
goto err;
}
RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s);
s->options = ctx->options;
s->dane.flags = ctx->dane.flags;
s->min_proto_version = ctx->min_proto_version;
s->max_proto_version = ctx->max_proto_version;
s->mode = ctx->mode;
s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
s->max_early_data = ctx->max_early_data;
s->recv_max_early_data = ctx->recv_max_early_data;
s->num_tickets = ctx->num_tickets;
s->pha_enabled = ctx->pha_enabled;
/* Shallow copy of the ciphersuites stack */
s->tls13_ciphersuites = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites);
if (s->tls13_ciphersuites == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
* its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
* copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
* the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
* indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
* used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
* SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
*/
s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (s->cert == NULL)
goto err;
RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, ctx->read_ahead);
s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
s->not_resumable_session_cb = ctx->not_resumable_session_cb;
s->record_padding_cb = ctx->record_padding_cb;
s->record_padding_arg = ctx->record_padding_arg;
s->block_padding = ctx->block_padding;
s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
if (!ossl_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(s->sid_ctx)))
goto err;
memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (s->param == NULL)
goto err;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
s->split_send_fragment = ctx->split_send_fragment;
s->max_pipelines = ctx->max_pipelines;
if (s->max_pipelines > 1)
RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1);
if (ctx->default_read_buf_len > 0)
SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(s, ctx->default_read_buf_len);
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
s->ctx = ctx;
s->ext.debug_cb = 0;
s->ext.debug_arg = NULL;
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
s->ext.status_type = ctx->ext.status_type;
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
s->ext.ocsp.exts = NULL;
s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
s->session_ctx = ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (ctx->ext.ecpointformats) {
s->ext.ecpointformats =
OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.ecpointformats,
ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len);
if (!s->ext.ecpointformats)
goto err;
s->ext.ecpointformats_len =
ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len;
}
if (ctx->ext.supportedgroups) {
s->ext.supportedgroups =
OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.supportedgroups,
ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len
* sizeof(*ctx->ext.supportedgroups));
if (!s->ext.supportedgroups)
goto err;
s->ext.supportedgroups_len = ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->ext.npn = NULL;
#endif
if (s->ctx->ext.alpn) {
s->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->ext.alpn_len);
if (s->ext.alpn == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(s->ext.alpn, s->ctx->ext.alpn, s->ctx->ext.alpn_len);
s->ext.alpn_len = s->ctx->ext.alpn_len;
}
s->verified_chain = NULL;
s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
s->default_passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback;
s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
s->method = ctx->method;
s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
s->allow_early_data_cb = ctx->allow_early_data_cb;
s->allow_early_data_cb_data = ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
if (!SSL_clear(s))
goto err;
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data))
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
#endif
s->psk_find_session_cb = ctx->psk_find_session_cb;
s->psk_use_session_cb = ctx->psk_use_session_cb;
s->job = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ctx->ct_validation_callback,
ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg))
goto err;
#endif
return s;
err:
SSL_free(s);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s)
{
return SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? 1 : 0;
}
int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s)
{
int i;
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock) <= 0)
return 0;
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s);
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ssl->lock);
ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock);
return 1;
}
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
unsigned int id_len)
{
/*
* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to
* find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
* by this SSL.
*/
SSL_SESSION r, *p;
if (id_len > sizeof(r.session_id))
return 0;
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
r.session_id_length = id_len;
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->session_ctx->lock);
p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &r);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->session_ctx->lock);
return (p != NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
}
int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
}
int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
}
void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(s->param, flags);
}
const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(s->param);
}
int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane);
}
unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags;
ctx->dane.flags |= flags;
return orig;
}
unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags;
ctx->dane.flags &= ~flags;
return orig;
}
int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
if (s->ctx->dane.mdmax == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED);
return 0;
}
if (dane->trecs != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED);
return 0;
}
/*
* Default SNI name. This rejects empty names, while set1_host below
* accepts them and disables host name checks. To avoid side-effects with
* invalid input, set the SNI name first.
*/
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN);
return -1;
}
}
/* Primary RFC6125 reference identifier */
if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, basedomain, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN);
return -1;
}
dane->mdpth = -1;
dane->pdpth = -1;
dane->dctx = &s->ctx->dane;
dane->trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null();
if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags;
ssl->dane.flags |= flags;
return orig;
}
unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags;
ssl->dane.flags &= ~flags;
return orig;
}
int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
return -1;
if (dane->mtlsa) {
if (mcert)
*mcert = dane->mcert;
if (mspki)
*mspki = (dane->mcert == NULL) ? dane->mtlsa->spki : NULL;
}
return dane->mdpth;
}
int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
return -1;
if (dane->mtlsa) {
if (usage)
*usage = dane->mtlsa->usage;
if (selector)
*selector = dane->mtlsa->selector;
if (mtype)
*mtype = dane->mtlsa->mtype;
if (data)
*data = dane->mtlsa->data;
if (dlen)
*dlen = dane->mtlsa->dlen;
}
return dane->mdpth;
}
SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s)
{
return &s->dane;
}
int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen)
{
return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen);
}
int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype,
uint8_t ord)
{
return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord);
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
}
int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->param;
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
{
return ssl->param;
}
void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s)
{
ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert);
}
void SSL_free(SSL *s)
{
int i;
if (s == NULL)
return;
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s);
if (i > 0)
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
dane_final(&s->dane);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
/* Ignore return value */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
/* add extra stuff */
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->tls13_ciphersuites);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
/* Make the next call work :-) */
if (s->session != NULL) {
ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
clear_ciphers(s);
ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
/* Free up if allocated */
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
SSL_CTX_free(s->session_ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ecpointformats);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.supportedgroups);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
SCT_LIST_free(s->scts);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
if (s->method != NULL)
s->method->ssl_free(s);
RECORD_LAYER_release(&s->rlayer);
SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(s->waitctx);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(s->lock);
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
{
BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
s->rbio = rbio;
}
void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio)
{
/*
* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
*/
if (s->bbio != NULL)
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
s->wbio = wbio;
/* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */
if (s->bbio != NULL)
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
}
void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
{
/*
* For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in
* ownership handling.
*/
/* If nothing has changed, do nothing */
if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s))
return;
/*
* If the two arguments are equal then one fewer reference is granted by the
* caller than we want to take
*/
if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio)
BIO_up_ref(rbio);
/*
* If only the wbio is changed only adopt one reference.
*/
if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s)) {
SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio);
return;
}
/*
* There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is
* changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only
* adopt one reference.
*/
if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s) && SSL_get_rbio(s) != SSL_get_wbio(s)) {
SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio);
return;
}
/* Otherwise, adopt both references. */
SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio);
SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio);
}
BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
{
return s->rbio;
}
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->bbio != NULL) {
/*
* If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its
* |next_bio|.
*/
return BIO_next(s->bbio);
}
return s->wbio;
}
int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
{
return SSL_get_rfd(s);
}
int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret = -1;
BIO *b, *r;
b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
return ret;
}
int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
{
int ret = -1;
BIO *b, *r;
b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
if (r != NULL)
BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
int ret = 0;
BIO *bio = NULL;
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
}
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET
|| (int)BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) {
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set0_wbio(s, bio);
} else {
BIO_up_ref(rbio);
SSL_set0_wbio(s, rbio);
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
{
BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET
|| ((int)BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
if (bio == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set0_rbio(s, bio);
} else {
BIO_up_ref(wbio);
SSL_set0_rbio(s, wbio);
}
return 1;
}
#endif
/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL) {
ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL) {
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
}
int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
{
return s->verify_mode;
}
int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
}
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
return s->verify_callback;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->verify_mode;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
return ctx->default_verify_callback;
}
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
{
s->verify_mode = mode;
if (callback != NULL)
s->verify_callback = callback;
}
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
}
void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
{
RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, yes);
}
int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
{
return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer);
}
int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
{
size_t pending = s->method->ssl_pending(s);
/*
* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
* (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
* impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
* observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
* often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
*
* SSL_pending also cannot work properly if the value >INT_MAX. In that case
* we just return INT_MAX.
*/
return pending < INT_MAX ? (int)pending : INT_MAX;
}
int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s)
{
/*
* Similar to SSL_pending() but returns a 1 to indicate that we have
* unprocessed data available or 0 otherwise (as opposed to the number of
* bytes available). Unlike SSL_pending() this will take into account
* read_ahead data. A 1 return simply indicates that we have unprocessed
* data. That data may not result in any application data, or we may fail
* to parse the records for some reason.
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer))
return 1;
return RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer);
}
X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
X509 *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
r = NULL;
else
r = s->session->peer;
if (r == NULL)
return r;
X509_up_ref(r);
return r;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *r;
if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
r = NULL;
else
r = s->session->peer_chain;
/*
* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
* we are a server, it does not.
*/
return r;
}
/*
* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
* modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled
*/
int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
{
int i;
/* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
if (!SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f))) {
return 0;
}
/*
* what if we are setup for one protocol version but want to talk another
*/
if (t->method != f->method) {
t->method->ssl_free(t);
t->method = f->method;
if (t->method->ssl_new(t) == 0)
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_UP_REF(&f->cert->references, &i, f->cert->lock);
ssl_cert_free(t->cert);
t->cert = f->cert;
if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, (int)f->sid_ctx_length)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
return X509_check_private_key
(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey);
}
/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
{
if (ssl == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
return X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
ssl->cert->key->privatekey);
}
int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s)
{
if (s->job)
return 1;
return 0;
}
int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds)
{
ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx;
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, fds, numfds);
}
int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds,
OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds)
{
ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx;
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ctx, addfd, numaddfds, delfd,
numdelfds);
}
int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_accept_state(s);
}
return SSL_do_handshake(s);
}
int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
{
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
/* Not properly initialized yet */
SSL_set_connect_state(s);
}
return SSL_do_handshake(s);
}
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
{
return s->method->get_timeout();
}
static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args,
int (*func) (void *))
{
int ret;
if (s->waitctx == NULL) {
s->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new();
if (s->waitctx == NULL)
return -1;
}
switch (ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args,
sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) {
case ASYNC_ERR:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC);
return -1;
case ASYNC_PAUSE:
s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED;
return -1;
case ASYNC_NO_JOBS:
s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS;
return -1;
case ASYNC_FINISH:
s->job = NULL;
return ret;
default:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
/* Shouldn't happen */
return -1;
}
}
static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs)
{
struct ssl_async_args *args;
SSL *s;
void *buf;
size_t num;
args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs;
s = args->s;
buf = args->buf;
num = args->num;
switch (args->type) {
case READFUNC:
return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num, &s->asyncrw);
case WRITEFUNC:
return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num, &s->asyncrw);
case OTHERFUNC:
return args->f.func_other(s);
}
return -1;
}
int ssl_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes)
{
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_INTERNAL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return 0;
}
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_INTERNAL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we are a client and haven't received the ServerHello etc then we
* better do that
*/
ossl_statem_check_finish_init(s, 0);
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
struct ssl_async_args args;
int ret;
args.s = s;
args.buf = buf;
args.num = num;
args.type = READFUNC;
args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_read;
ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
*readbytes = s->asyncrw;
return ret;
} else {
return s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num, readbytes);
}
}
int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
{
int ret;
size_t readbytes;
if (num < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
ret = ssl_read_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes);
/*
* The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is
* <= INT_MAX
*/
if (ret > 0)
ret = (int)readbytes;
return ret;
}
int SSL_read_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes)
{
int ret = ssl_read_internal(s, buf, num, readbytes);
if (ret < 0)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
int SSL_read_early_data(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes)
{
int ret;
if (!s->server) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR;
}
switch (s->early_data_state) {
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE:
if (!SSL_in_before(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR;
}
/* fall through */
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY:
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING;
ret = SSL_accept(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
/* NBIO or error */
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY;
return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR;
}
/* fall through */
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY:
if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING;
ret = SSL_read_ex(s, buf, num, readbytes);
/*
* State machine will update early_data_state to
* SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING if we get an EndOfEarlyData
* message
*/
if (ret > 0 || (ret <= 0 && s->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING)) {
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY;
return ret > 0 ? SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS
: SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR;
}
} else {
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
}
*readbytes = 0;
return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH;
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR;
}
}
int SSL_get_early_data_status(const SSL *s)
{
return s->ext.early_data;
}
static int ssl_peek_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes)
{
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK_INTERNAL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
return 0;
}
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
struct ssl_async_args args;
int ret;
args.s = s;
args.buf = buf;
args.num = num;
args.type = READFUNC;
args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_peek;
ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
*readbytes = s->asyncrw;
return ret;
} else {
return s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num, readbytes);
}
}
int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
{
int ret;
size_t readbytes;
if (num < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
ret = ssl_peek_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes);
/*
* The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is
* <= INT_MAX
*/
if (ret > 0)
ret = (int)readbytes;
return ret;
}
int SSL_peek_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes)
{
int ret = ssl_peek_internal(s, buf, num, readbytes);
if (ret < 0)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
int ssl_write_internal(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written)
{
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_INTERNAL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_INTERNAL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return -1;
}
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_INTERNAL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
/* If we are a client and haven't sent the Finished we better do that */
ossl_statem_check_finish_init(s, 1);
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
int ret;
struct ssl_async_args args;
args.s = s;
args.buf = (void *)buf;
args.num = num;
args.type = WRITEFUNC;
args.f.func_write = s->method->ssl_write;
ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
*written = s->asyncrw;
return ret;
} else {
return s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num, written);
}
}
int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
{
int ret;
size_t written;
if (num < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
ret = ssl_write_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &written);
/*
* The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is
* <= INT_MAX
*/
if (ret > 0)
ret = (int)written;
return ret;
}
int SSL_write_ex(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written)
{
int ret = ssl_write_internal(s, buf, num, written);
if (ret < 0)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
int SSL_write_early_data(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written)
{
int ret, early_data_state;
size_t writtmp;
uint32_t partialwrite;
switch (s->early_data_state) {
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE:
if (s->server
|| !SSL_in_before(s)
|| ((s->session == NULL || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
&& (s->psk_use_session_cb == NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_EARLY_DATA,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
/* fall through */
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY:
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING;
ret = SSL_connect(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
/* NBIO or error */
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY;
return 0;
}
/* fall through */
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY:
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING;
/*
* We disable partial write for early data because we don't keep track
* of how many bytes we've written between the SSL_write_ex() call and
* the flush if the flush needs to be retried)
*/
partialwrite = s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE;
s->mode &= ~SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE;
ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, num, &writtmp);
s->mode |= partialwrite;
if (!ret) {
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY;
return ret;
}
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH;
/* fall through */
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH:
/* The buffering BIO is still in place so we need to flush it */
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return 0;
*written = num;
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY;
return 1;
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING:
case SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY:
early_data_state = s->early_data_state;
/* We are a server writing to an unauthenticated client */
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING;
ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, num, written);
/* The buffering BIO is still in place */
if (ret)
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
s->early_data_state = early_data_state;
return ret;
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
}
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
/*
* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
* expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
* calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
* (see ssl3_shutdown).
*/
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (!SSL_in_init(s)) {
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
struct ssl_async_args args;
args.s = s;
args.type = OTHERFUNC;
args.f.func_other = s->method->ssl_shutdown;
return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
} else {
return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s);
}
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
return -1;
}
}
int SSL_key_update(SSL *s, int updatetype)
{
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): How will applications know whether TLSv1.3 has been
* negotiated, and that it is appropriate to call SSL_key_update() instead
* of SSL_renegotiate().
*/
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
&& updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_INVALID_KEY_UPDATE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT);
return 0;
}
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
s->key_update = updatetype;
return 1;
}
int SSL_get_key_update_type(const SSL *s)
{
return s->key_update;
}
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
return 0;
}
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
return s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s);
}
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
{
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_ABBREVIATED, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_ABBREVIATED, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
return 0;
}
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 0;
return s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s);
}
int SSL_renegotiate_pending(const SSL *s)
{
/*
* becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
* handshake has finished
*/
return (s->renegotiate != 0);
}
long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
long l;
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer);
RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, larg);
return l;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return (s->mode |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return (s->mode &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return (long)s->max_cert_list;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
if (larg < 0)
return 0;
l = (long)s->max_cert_list;
s->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg;
return l;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
s->max_send_fragment = larg;
if (s->max_send_fragment < s->split_send_fragment)
s->split_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if ((size_t)larg > s->max_send_fragment || larg == 0)
return 0;
s->split_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES:
if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
return 0;
s->max_pipelines = larg;
if (larg > 1)
RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1);
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
if (s->s3)
return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
else
return 0;
case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST:
if (parg) {
if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL)
return 0;
*(unsigned char **)parg = s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw;
return (int)s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen;
} else {
return TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
}
case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT:
if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))
return -1;
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
return 1;
else
return 0;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, s->max_proto_version)
&& ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
&s->min_proto_version);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
return s->min_proto_version;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
return ssl_check_allowed_versions(s->min_proto_version, larg)
&& ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
&s->max_proto_version);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
return s->max_proto_version;
default:
return s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
}
}
long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
{
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
s->msg_callback = (void (*)
(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp);
}
}
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->sessions;
}
long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
long l;
/* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */
if (ctx == NULL) {
switch (cmd) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST:
return tls1_set_groups_list(NULL, NULL, parg);
#endif
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0);
default:
return 0;
}
}
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
return ctx->read_ahead;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
l = ctx->read_ahead;
ctx->read_ahead = larg;
return l;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
return (long)ctx->max_cert_list;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
if (larg < 0)
return 0;
l = (long)ctx->max_cert_list;
ctx->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg;
return l;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
if (larg < 0)
return 0;
l = (long)ctx->session_cache_size;
ctx->session_cache_size = (size_t)larg;
return l;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
return (long)ctx->session_cache_size;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
return l;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
return ctx->session_cache_mode;
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_connect);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_accept);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_miss);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
return (ctx->mode |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
if (ctx->max_send_fragment < ctx->split_send_fragment)
ctx->split_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if ((size_t)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0)
return 0;
ctx->split_send_fragment = larg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES:
if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
return 0;
ctx->max_pipelines = larg;
return 1;
case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, ctx->max_proto_version)
&& ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
&ctx->min_proto_version);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
return ctx->min_proto_version;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
return ssl_check_allowed_versions(ctx->min_proto_version, larg)
&& ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
&ctx->max_proto_version);
case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
return ctx->max_proto_version;
default:
return ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg);
}
}
long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
{
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
void *arg))(fp);
return 1;
default:
return ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp);
}
}
int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
{
if (a->id > b->id)
return 1;
if (a->id < b->id)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
{
if ((*ap)->id > (*bp)->id)
return 1;
if ((*ap)->id < (*bp)->id)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* preference */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
return s->cipher_list;
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
return s->ctx->cipher_list;
}
}
return NULL;
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *s)
{
if ((s == NULL) || !s->server)
return NULL;
return s->peer_ciphers;
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL, *ciphers;
int i;
ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if (!ciphers)
return NULL;
if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s))
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
if (!ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) {
if (!sk)
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
if (!sk)
return NULL;
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
return NULL;
}
}
}
return sk;
}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
* algorithm id */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
return s->cipher_list_by_id;
} else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
return s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
if (s == NULL)
return NULL;
sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
return NULL;
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
if (c == NULL)
return NULL;
return c->name;
}
/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL_CTX and in order of
* preference */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL)
return ctx->cipher_list;
return NULL;
}
/*
* Distinguish between ciphers controlled by set_ciphersuite() and
* set_cipher_list() when counting.
*/
static int cipher_list_tls12_num(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
{
int i, num = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); ++i) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
if (c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
continue;
num++;
}
return num;
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, ctx->tls13_ciphersuites,
&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str,
ctx->cert);
/*
* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
* find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
* string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
* error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
* ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
*/
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (cipher_list_tls12_num(sk) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, s->tls13_ciphersuites,
&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, str,
s->cert);
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
else if (cipher_list_tls12_num(sk) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size)
{
char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
if (!s->server
|| s->peer_ciphers == NULL
|| size < 2)
return NULL;
p = buf;
clntsk = s->peer_ciphers;
srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
if (clntsk == NULL || srvrsk == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) {
int n;
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0)
continue;
n = strlen(c->name);
if (n + 1 > size) {
if (p != buf)
--p;
*p = '\0';
return buf;
}
strcpy(p, c->name);
p += n;
*(p++) = ':';
size -= n + 1;
}
p[-1] = '\0';
return buf;
}
/**
* Return the requested servername (SNI) value. Note that the behaviour varies
* depending on:
* - whether this is called by the client or the server,
* - if we are before or during/after the handshake,
* - if a resumption or normal handshake is being attempted/has occurred
* - whether we have negotiated TLSv1.2 (or below) or TLSv1.3
*
* Note that only the host_name type is defined (RFC 3546).
*/
const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
{
/*
* If we don't know if we are the client or the server yet then we assume
* client.
*/
int server = s->handshake_func == NULL ? 0 : s->server;
if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
return NULL;
if (server) {
/**
* Server side
* In TLSv1.3 on the server SNI is not associated with the session
* but in TLSv1.2 or below it is.
*
* Before the handshake:
* - return NULL
*
* During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption occurred):
* - If a servername was accepted by the server in the original
* handshake then it will return that servername, or NULL otherwise.
*
* During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption did not occur):
* - The function will return the servername requested by the client in
* this handshake or NULL if none was requested.
*/
if (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return s->session->ext.hostname;
} else {
/**
* Client side
*
* Before the handshake:
* - If a servername has been set via a call to
* SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() then it will return that servername
* - If one has not been set, but a TLSv1.2 resumption is being
* attempted and the session from the original handshake had a
* servername accepted by the server then it will return that
* servername
* - Otherwise it returns NULL
*
* During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption occurred):
* - If the session from the orignal handshake had a servername accepted
* by the server then it will return that servername.
* - Otherwise it returns the servername set via
* SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() (or NULL if it was not called).
*
* During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption did not occur):
* - It will return the servername set via SSL_set_tlsext_host_name()
* (or NULL if it was not called).
*/
if (SSL_in_before(s)) {
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
&& s->session != NULL
&& s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION)
return s->session->ext.hostname;
} else {
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
return s->session->ext.hostname;
}
}
return s->ext.hostname;
}
int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
{
if (SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) != NULL)
return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
return -1;
}
/*
* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
* expected that this function is called from the callback set by
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
* vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
* not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
* string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
* selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
* is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
* abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
* the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
* selects the first protocol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
* fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
* protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
* This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
* which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
* of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
* case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
* found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
*/
int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *server,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
{
unsigned int i, j;
const unsigned char *result;
int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
if (server[i] == client[j] &&
memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
/* We found a match */
result = &server[i];
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
goto found;
}
j += client[j];
j++;
}
i += server[i];
i++;
}
/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
result = client;
status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
found:
*out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
*outlen = result[0];
return status;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
* client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
* client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
* the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
* this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
* provided by the callback.
*/
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned *len)
{
*data = s->ext.npn;
if (!*data) {
*len = 0;
} else {
*len = (unsigned int)s->ext.npn_len;
}
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
* a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
* Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is
* returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
* memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
* reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
* wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
* ServerHello.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_CTX_npn_advertised_cb_func cb,
void *arg)
{
ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb = cb;
ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
* client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
* must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
* The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
* server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
* callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
* select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
* a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_npn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_CTX_npn_select_cb_func cb,
void *arg)
{
ctx->ext.npn_select_cb = cb;
ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
#endif
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
* |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
* length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
*/
int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
unsigned int protos_len)
{
OPENSSL_free(ctx->ext.alpn);
ctx->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len);
if (ctx->ext.alpn == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 1;
}
ctx->ext.alpn_len = protos_len;
return 0;
}
/*
* SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
* |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
* length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
*/
int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
unsigned int protos_len)
{
OPENSSL_free(ssl->ext.alpn);
ssl->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len);
if (ssl->ext.alpn == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 1;
}
ssl->ext.alpn_len = protos_len;
return 0;
}
/*
* SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is
* called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol
* from the client's list of offered protocols.
*/
void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_CTX_alpn_select_cb_func cb,
void *arg)
{
ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb = cb;
ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
}
/*
* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|.
* On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name
* (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't
* respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero.
*/
void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *len)
{
*data = NULL;
if (ssl->s3)
*data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
if (*data == NULL)
*len = 0;
else
*len = (unsigned int)ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
}
int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen,
int use_context)
{
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return -1;
return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
llen, context,
contextlen, use_context);
}
int SSL_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
const char *label, size_t llen,
const unsigned char *context,
size_t contextlen)
{
if (s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION)
return 0;
return tls13_export_keying_material_early(s, out, olen, label, llen,
context, contextlen);
}
static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
{
const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id;
unsigned long l;
unsigned char tmp_storage[4];
if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length);
session_id = tmp_storage;
}
l = (unsigned long)
((unsigned long)session_id[0]) |
((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) |
((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L);
return l;
}
/*
* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
* coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
* SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
* being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
* session with a matching session ID.
*/
static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
{
if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
return 1;
if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
return 1;
return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length);
}
/*
* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
* SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
* variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
* via ssl.h.
*/
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
if (meth == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
return NULL;
}
if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL))
return NULL;
if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return NULL;
}
if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
goto err;
}
ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
ret->method = meth;
ret->min_proto_version = 0;
ret->max_proto_version = 0;
ret->mode = SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY;
ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
/* We take the system default. */
ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
ret->references = 1;
ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (ret->lock == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
if (ret->sessions == NULL)
goto err;
ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
ret->ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new();
if (ret->ctlog_store == NULL)
goto err;
#endif
if (!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ret, TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES))
goto err;
if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
ret->tls13_ciphersuites,
&ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
|| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
goto err2;
}
ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (ret->param == NULL)
goto err;
if (!FIPS_mode()) {
if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
goto err2;
}
} else {
ret->min_proto_version = TLS1_VERSION;
}
if ((ret->ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ret->client_ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data))
goto err;
if ((ret->ext.secure = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->ext.secure))) == NULL)
goto err;
/* No compression for DTLS */
if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS))
ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
/* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */
if ((RAND_bytes(ret->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(ret->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0)
|| (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key)) <= 0)
|| (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key)) <= 0))
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
if (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
sizeof(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key)) <= 0)
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret))
goto err;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
# define eng_strx(x) #x
# define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
/* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
{
ENGINE *eng;
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
if (!eng) {
ERR_clear_error();
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
}
if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
ERR_clear_error();
}
# endif
#endif
/*
* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
* deployed might change this.
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
/*
* Disable compression by default to prevent CRIME. Applications can
* re-enable compression by configuring
* SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
* or by using the SSL_CONF library. Similarly we also enable TLSv1.3
* middlebox compatibility by default. This may be disabled by default in
* a later OpenSSL version.
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION | SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT;
ret->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
/*
* We cannot usefully set a default max_early_data here (which gets
* propagated in SSL_new(), for the following reason: setting the
* SSL field causes tls_construct_stoc_early_data() to tell the
* client that early data will be accepted when constructing a TLS 1.3
* session ticket, and the client will accordingly send us early data
* when using that ticket (if the client has early data to send).
* However, in order for the early data to actually be consumed by
* the application, the application must also have calls to
* SSL_read_early_data(); otherwise we'll just skip past the early data
* and ignore it. So, since the application must add calls to
* SSL_read_early_data(), we also require them to add
* calls to SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() in order to use early data,
* eliminating the bandwidth-wasting early data in the case described
* above.
*/
ret->max_early_data = 0;
/*
* Default recv_max_early_data is a fully loaded single record. Could be
* split across multiple records in practice. We set this differently to
* max_early_data so that, in the default case, we do not advertise any
* support for early_data, but if a client were to send us some (e.g.
* because of an old, stale ticket) then we will tolerate it and skip over
* it.
*/
ret->recv_max_early_data = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
/* By default we send two session tickets automatically in TLSv1.3 */
ret->num_tickets = 2;
ssl_ctx_system_config(ret);
return ret;
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err2:
SSL_CTX_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&ctx->references, &i, ctx->lock) <= 0)
return 0;
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", ctx);
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
}
void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
{
int i;
if (a == NULL)
return;
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&a->references, &i, a->lock);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", a);
if (i > 0)
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
dane_ctx_final(&a->dane);
/*
* Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
* the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
* after the sessions were flushed.
* As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
* the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
* free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
* (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
*/
if (a->sessions != NULL)
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
CTLOG_STORE_free(a->ctlog_store);
#endif
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->tls13_ciphersuites);
ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
a->comp_methods = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(a->ext.ecpointformats);
OPENSSL_free(a->ext.supportedgroups);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(a->ext.alpn);
OPENSSL_secure_free(a->ext.secure);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock);
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
{
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
}
pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->default_passwd_callback;
}
void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
}
void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb)
{
s->default_passwd_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u)
{
s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
}
pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s)
{
return s->default_passwd_callback;
}
void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s)
{
return s->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
void *arg)
{
ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_mode = mode;
ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
{
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
}
void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
{
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
}
void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign;
unsigned long mask_k, mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
#endif
if (c == NULL)
return;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->dh_tmp_auto);
#else
dh_tmp = 0;
#endif
rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
dsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
have_ecc_cert = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
#endif
mask_k = 0;
mask_a = 0;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "dht=%d re=%d rs=%d ds=%d\n",
dh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dsa_sign);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12;
}
if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12;
}
if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
}
#endif
if (rsa_enc)
mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
if (dh_tmp)
mask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
/*
* If we only have an RSA-PSS certificate allow RSA authentication
* if TLS 1.2 and peer supports it.
*/
if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN)
&& pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
&& TLS1_get_version(s) == TLS1_2_VERSION))
mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
if (dsa_sign) {
mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
}
mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
/*
* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
* depending on the key usage extension.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (have_ecc_cert) {
uint32_t ex_kusage;
ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
ecdsa_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
if (!(pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
ecdsa_ok = 0;
if (ecdsa_ok)
mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
}
/* Allow Ed25519 for TLS 1.2 if peer supports it */
if (!(mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) && ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_ED25519)
&& pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED25519] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
&& TLS1_get_version(s) == TLS1_2_VERSION)
mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
/* Allow Ed448 for TLS 1.2 if peer supports it */
if (!(mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) && ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_ED448)
&& pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED448] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
&& TLS1_get_version(s) == TLS1_2_VERSION)
mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
if (mask_k & SSL_kRSA)
mask_k |= SSL_kRSAPSK;
if (mask_k & SSL_kDHE)
mask_k |= SSL_kDHEPSK;
if (mask_k & SSL_kECDHE)
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHEPSK;
#endif
s->s3->tmp.mask_k = mask_k;
s->s3->tmp.mask_a = mask_a;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) {
/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
if (!(X509_get_key_usage(x) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
return 0;
}
}
return 1; /* all checks are ok */
}
#endif
int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo,
size_t *serverinfo_length)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
*serverinfo_length = 0;
if (cpk == NULL || cpk->serverinfo == NULL)
return 0;
*serverinfo = cpk->serverinfo;
*serverinfo_length = cpk->serverinfo_length;
return 1;
}
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
{
int i;
/*
* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
* would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
return;
/*
* If sid_ctx_length is 0 there is no specific application context
* associated with this session, so when we try to resume it and
* SSL_VERIFY_PEER is requested to verify the client identity, we have no
* indication that this is actually a session for the proper application
* context, and the *handshake* will fail, not just the resumption attempt.
* Do not cache (on the server) these sessions that are not resumable
* (clients can set SSL_VERIFY_PEER without needing a sid_ctx set).
*/
if (s->server && s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) != 0)
return;
i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
if ((i & mode) != 0
&& (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
/*
* Add the session to the internal cache. In server side TLSv1.3 we
* normally don't do this because by default it's a full stateless ticket
* with only a dummy session id so there is no reason to cache it,
* unless:
* - we are doing early_data, in which case we cache so that we can
* detect replays
* - the application has set a remove_session_cb so needs to know about
* session timeout events
* - SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set in which case it is a stateful ticket
*/
if ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) == 0
&& (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|| !s->server
|| (s->max_early_data > 0
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0)
|| s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL
|| (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0))
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
/*
* Add the session to the external cache. We do this even in server side
* TLSv1.3 without early data because some applications just want to
* know about the creation of a session and aren't doing a full cache.
*/
if (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session);
if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
}
}
/* auto flush every 255 connections */
if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
TSAN_QUALIFIER int *stat;
if (mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
stat = &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good;
else
stat = &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good;
if ((tsan_load(stat) & 0xff) == 0xff)
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
}
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->method;
}
const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(const SSL *s)
{
return s->method;
}
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
int ret = 1;
if (s->method != meth) {
const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method;
int (*hf) (SSL *) = s->handshake_func;
if (sm->version == meth->version)
s->method = meth;
else {
sm->ssl_free(s);
s->method = meth;
ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
}
if (hf == sm->ssl_connect)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
else if (hf == sm->ssl_accept)
s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
}
return ret;
}
int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
{
int reason;
unsigned long l;
BIO *bio;
if (i > 0)
return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
/*
* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
* where we do encode the error
*/
if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
else
return SSL_ERROR_SSL;
}
if (SSL_want_read(s)) {
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
if (BIO_should_read(bio))
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
/*
* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
* to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
* are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
* However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
* SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
* wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
* might be safer to keep it.
*/
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT;
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT;
else
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */
}
}
if (SSL_want_write(s)) {
/* Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if present */
bio = s->wbio;
if (BIO_should_write(bio))
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
/*
* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
*/
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT;
else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT;
else
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
}
}
if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
if (SSL_want_async(s))
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC;
if (SSL_want_async_job(s))
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB;
if (SSL_want_client_hello_cb(s))
return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
(s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN;
return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL;
}
static int ssl_do_handshake_intern(void *vargs)
{
struct ssl_async_args *args;
SSL *s;
args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs;
s = args->s;
return s->handshake_func(s);
}
int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
{
int ret = 1;
if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
ossl_statem_check_finish_init(s, -1);
s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s, 0);
if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
struct ssl_async_args args;
args.s = s;
ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_do_handshake_intern);
} else {
ret = s->handshake_func(s);
}
}
return ret;
}
void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server = 1;
s->shutdown = 0;
ossl_statem_clear(s);
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
clear_ciphers(s);
}
void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
{
s->server = 0;
s->shutdown = 0;
ossl_statem_clear(s);
s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
clear_ciphers(s);
}
int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
{
return 0;
}
const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return NULL;
}
const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version)
{
switch(version)
{
case TLS1_3_VERSION:
return "TLSv1.3";
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
return "TLSv1.2";
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
return "TLSv1.1";
case TLS1_VERSION:
return "TLSv1";
case SSL3_VERSION:
return "SSLv3";
case DTLS1_BAD_VER:
return "DTLSv0.9";
case DTLS1_VERSION:
return "DTLSv1";
case DTLS1_2_VERSION:
return "DTLSv1.2";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
{
return ssl_protocol_to_string(s->version);
}
static int dup_ca_names(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **dst, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *src)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
X509_NAME *xn;
int i;
if (src == NULL) {
*dst = NULL;
return 1;
}
if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(src); i++) {
xn = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(src, i));
if (xn == NULL) {
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free);
return 0;
}
if (sk_X509_NAME_insert(sk, xn, i) == 0) {
X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free);
return 0;
}
}
*dst = sk;
return 1;
}
SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
{
SSL *ret;
int i;
/* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) {
CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock);
return s;
}
/*
* Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set.
*/
if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (s->session != NULL) {
/*
* Arranges to share the same session via up_ref. This "copies"
* session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert'
*/
if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s))
goto err;
} else {
/*
* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
* s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
* point to the same object, and thus we can't use
* SSL_copy_session_id.
*/
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ret, s->method))
goto err;
if (s->cert != NULL) {
ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
if (ret->cert == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx,
(int)s->sid_ctx_length))
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_dane_dup(ret, s))
goto err;
ret->version = s->version;
ret->options = s->options;
ret->mode = s->mode;
SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
/* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
goto err;
/* setup rbio, and wbio */
if (s->rbio != NULL) {
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
goto err;
}
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
goto err;
} else {
BIO_up_ref(ret->rbio);
ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
}
}
ret->server = s->server;
if (s->handshake_func) {
if (s->server)
SSL_set_accept_state(ret);
else
SSL_set_connect_state(ret);
}
ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
ret->hit = s->hit;
ret->default_passwd_callback = s->default_passwd_callback;
ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = s->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
/* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
== NULL)
goto err;
/* Dup the client_CA list */
if (!dup_ca_names(&ret->ca_names, s->ca_names)
|| !dup_ca_names(&ret->client_ca_names, s->client_ca_names))
goto err;
return ret;
err:
SSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
{
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
}
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
s->expand = NULL;
COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
s->compress = NULL;
#endif
}
X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return s->cert->key->x509;
else
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->cert != NULL)
return s->cert->key->privatekey;
else
return NULL;
}
X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
return ctx->cert->key->x509;
else
return NULL;
}
EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cert != NULL)
return ctx->cert->key->privatekey;
else
return NULL;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
{
if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
return s->session->cipher;
return NULL;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *s)
{
return s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(const SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
return s->compress ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->compress) : NULL;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(const SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
return s->expand ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->expand) : NULL;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
{
BIO *bbio;
if (s->bbio != NULL) {
/* Already buffered. */
return 1;
}
bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
if (bbio == NULL || !BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
BIO_free(bbio);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
s->bbio = bbio;
s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
return 1;
}
int ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
{
/* callers ensure s is never null */
if (s->bbio == NULL)
return 1;
s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
BIO_free(s->bbio);
s->bbio = NULL;
return 1;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
{
ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->quiet_shutdown;
}
void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
{
s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
}
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return s->quiet_shutdown;
}
void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
{
s->shutdown = mode;
}
int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
{
return s->shutdown;
}
int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
{
return s->version;
}
int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s)
{
return s->client_version;
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
{
return ssl->ctx;
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
CERT *new_cert;
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
return ssl->ctx;
if (ctx == NULL)
ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (new_cert == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (!custom_exts_copy_flags(&new_cert->custext, &ssl->cert->custext)) {
ssl_cert_free(new_cert);
return NULL;
}
ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
ssl->cert = new_cert;
/*
* Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
* so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)))
return NULL;
/*
* If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
* inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
* not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
* leave it unchanged.
*/
if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
(ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
(memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
}
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
ssl->ctx = ctx;
return ssl->ctx;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
if (lookup == NULL)
return 0;
X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
/* Clear any errors if the default directory does not exist */
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
if (lookup == NULL)
return 0;
X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
/* Clear any errors if the default file does not exist */
ERR_clear_error();
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
const char *CApath)
{
return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath);
}
void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
{
ssl->info_callback = cb;
}
/*
* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
* pointer.
*/
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
int /* type */ ,
int /* val */ ) {
return ssl->info_callback;
}
void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
{
ssl->verify_result = arg;
}
long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
{
return ssl->verify_result;
}
size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
if (outlen == 0)
return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))
outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random);
memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, outlen);
return outlen;
}
size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
if (outlen == 0)
return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random))
outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random);
memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, outlen);
return outlen;
}
size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
if (outlen == 0)
return session->master_key_length;
if (outlen > session->master_key_length)
outlen = session->master_key_length;
memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen);
return outlen;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(SSL_SESSION *sess, const unsigned char *in,
size_t len)
{
if (len > sizeof(sess->master_key))
return 0;
memcpy(sess->master_key, in, len);
sess->master_key_length = len;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx);
}
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->cert_store;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
{
X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
ctx->cert_store = store;
}
void SSL_CTX_set1_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
{
if (store != NULL)
X509_STORE_up_ref(store);
SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, store);
}
int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
{
return s->rwstate;
}
/**
* \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
* \param ctx the SSL context.
* \param dh the callback
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
}
void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
int keylength))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint);
if (ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
} else
ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
if (identity_hint != NULL) {
s->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint);
if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
return 0;
} else
s->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
return 1;
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return s->session->psk_identity_hint;
}
const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
{
if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
return NULL;
return s->session->psk_identity;
}
void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb)
{
s->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb)
{
ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb)
{
s->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb)
{
ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
}
#endif
void SSL_set_psk_find_session_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func cb)
{
s->psk_find_session_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func cb)
{
ctx->psk_find_session_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_set_psk_use_session_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func cb)
{
s->psk_use_session_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func cb)
{
ctx->psk_use_session_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
int content_type, const void *buf,
size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
int
is_forward_secure))
{
SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB,
(void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
int is_forward_secure))
{
SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB,
(void (*)(void))cb);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
size_t (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int type,
size_t len, void *arg))
{
ctx->record_padding_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
{
ctx->record_padding_arg = arg;
}
void *SSL_CTX_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->record_padding_arg;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_block_padding(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t block_size)
{
/* block size of 0 or 1 is basically no padding */
if (block_size == 1)
ctx->block_padding = 0;
else if (block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
ctx->block_padding = block_size;
else
return 0;
return 1;
}
void SSL_set_record_padding_callback(SSL *ssl,
size_t (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int type,
size_t len, void *arg))
{
ssl->record_padding_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
{
ssl->record_padding_arg = arg;
}
void *SSL_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL *ssl)
{
return ssl->record_padding_arg;
}
int SSL_set_block_padding(SSL *ssl, size_t block_size)
{
/* block size of 0 or 1 is basically no padding */
if (block_size == 1)
ssl->block_padding = 0;
else if (block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
ssl->block_padding = block_size;
else
return 0;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_num_tickets(SSL *s, size_t num_tickets)
{
s->num_tickets = num_tickets;
return 1;
}
size_t SSL_get_num_tickets(const SSL *s)
{
return s->num_tickets;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t num_tickets)
{
ctx->num_tickets = num_tickets;
return 1;
}
size_t SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->num_tickets;
}
/*
* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
* variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this |md|.
* Returns the newly allocated ctx;
*/
EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
{
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash);
*hash = NULL;
return NULL;
}
return *hash;
}
void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash);
*hash = NULL;
}
/* Retrieve handshake hashes */
int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
size_t *hashlen)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst;
int hashleni = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hdgst);
int ret = 0;
if (hashleni < 0 || (size_t)hashleni > outlen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HASH,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, hdgst)
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HASH,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*hashlen = hashleni;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *s)
{
return s->hit;
}
int SSL_is_server(const SSL *s)
{
return s->server;
}
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
{
/* Old function was do-nothing anyway... */
(void)s;
(void)debug;
}
#endif
void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level)
{
s->cert->sec_level = level;
}
int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s)
{
return s->cert->sec_level;
}
void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s,
int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
int op, int bits, int nid,
void *other, void *ex))
{
s->cert->sec_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s,
const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
int bits, int nid, void *other,
void *ex) {
return s->cert->sec_cb;
}
void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex)
{
s->cert->sec_ex = ex;
}
void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s)
{
return s->cert->sec_ex;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level)
{
ctx->cert->sec_level = level;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->cert->sec_level;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
int op, int bits, int nid,
void *other, void *ex))
{
ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *s,
const SSL_CTX *ctx,
int op, int bits,
int nid,
void *other,
void *ex) {
return ctx->cert->sec_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex)
{
ctx->cert->sec_ex = ex;
}
void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->cert->sec_ex;
}
/*
* Get/Set/Clear options in SSL_CTX or SSL, formerly macros, now functions that
* can return unsigned long, instead of the generic long return value from the
* control interface.
*/
unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->options;
}
unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL *s)
{
return s->options;
}
unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op)
{
return ctx->options |= op;
}
unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op)
{
return s->options |= op;
}
unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op)
{
return ctx->options &= ~op;
}
unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op)
{
return s->options &= ~op;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s)
{
return s->verified_chain;
}
IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
/*
* Moves SCTs from the |src| stack to the |dst| stack.
* The source of each SCT will be set to |origin|.
* If |dst| points to a NULL pointer, a new stack will be created and owned by
* the caller.
* Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs.
*/
static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src,
sct_source_t origin)
{
int scts_moved = 0;
SCT *sct = NULL;
if (*dst == NULL) {
*dst = sk_SCT_new_null();
if (*dst == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(src)) != NULL) {
if (SCT_set_source(sct, origin) != 1)
goto err;
if (sk_SCT_push(*dst, sct) <= 0)
goto err;
scts_moved += 1;
}
return scts_moved;
err:
if (sct != NULL)
sk_SCT_push(src, sct); /* Put the SCT back */
return -1;
}
/*
* Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found.
* Returns the number of SCTs extracted.
*/
static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s)
{
int scts_extracted = 0;
if (s->ext.scts != NULL) {
const unsigned char *p = s->ext.scts;
STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->ext.scts_len);
scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION);
SCT_LIST_free(scts);
}
return scts_extracted;
}
/*
* Checks for an OCSP response and then attempts to extract any SCTs found if it
* contains an SCT X509 extension. They will be stored in |s->scts|.
* Returns:
* - The number of SCTs extracted, assuming an OCSP response exists.
* - 0 if no OCSP response exists or it contains no SCTs.
* - A negative integer if an error occurs.
*/
static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s)
{
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int scts_extracted = 0;
const unsigned char *p;
OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL;
int i;
if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL || s->ext.ocsp.resp_len == 0)
goto err;
p = s->ext.ocsp.resp;
rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, (int)s->ext.ocsp.resp_len);
if (rsp == NULL)
goto err;
br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
if (br == NULL)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) {
OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i);
if (single == NULL)
continue;
scts =
OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL);
scts_extracted =
ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE);
if (scts_extracted < 0)
goto err;
}
err:
SCT_LIST_free(scts);
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return scts_extracted;
# else
/* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */
return 0;
# endif
}
/*
* Attempts to extract SCTs from the peer certificate.
* Return the number of SCTs extracted, or a negative integer if an error
* occurs.
*/
static int ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(SSL *s)
{
int scts_extracted = 0;
X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
if (cert != NULL) {
STACK_OF(SCT) *scts =
X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, NULL, NULL);
scts_extracted =
ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION);
SCT_LIST_free(scts);
}
return scts_extracted;
}
/*
* Attempts to find all received SCTs by checking TLS extensions, the OCSP
* response (if it exists) and X509v3 extensions in the certificate.
* Returns NULL if an error occurs.
*/
const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s)
{
if (!s->scts_parsed) {
if (ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(s) < 0 ||
ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(s) < 0 ||
ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(s) < 0)
goto err;
s->scts_parsed = 1;
}
return s->scts;
err:
return NULL;
}
static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx,
const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg)
{
return 1;
}
static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx,
const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg)
{
int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
int status = SCT_get_validation_status(sct);
if (status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID)
return 1;
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_STRICT, SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS);
return 0;
}
int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
void *arg)
{
/*
* Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look
* for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT.
*/
if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx,
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK,
SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED);
return 0;
}
if (callback != NULL) {
/*
* If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP
*/
if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp))
return 0;
}
s->ct_validation_callback = callback;
s->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg;
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg)
{
/*
* Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for
* this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT.
*/
if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx,
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK,
SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED);
return 0;
}
ctx->ct_validation_callback = callback;
ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg;
return 1;
}
int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s)
{
return s->ct_validation_callback != NULL;
}
int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->ct_validation_callback != NULL;
}
int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s)
{
int ret = 0;
X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
X509 *issuer;
SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts;
/*
* If no callback is set, the peer is anonymous, or its chain is invalid,
* skip SCT validation - just return success. Applications that continue
* handshakes without certificates, with unverified chains, or pinned leaf
* certificates are outside the scope of the WebPKI and CT.
*
* The above exclusions notwithstanding the vast majority of peers will
* have rather ordinary certificate chains validated by typical
* applications that perform certificate verification and therefore will
* process SCTs when enabled.
*/
if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL ||
s->verify_result != X509_V_OK ||
s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1)
return 1;
/*
* CT not applicable for chains validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3)
* trust-anchors. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-4.2
*/
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mtlsa != NULL) {
switch (dane->mtlsa->usage) {
case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA:
case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE:
return 1;
}
}
ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
issuer = sk_X509_value(s->verified_chain, 1);
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert);
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer);
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store);
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(
ctx, (uint64_t)SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_get0_session(s)) * 1000);
scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s);
/*
* This function returns success (> 0) only when all the SCTs are valid, 0
* when some are invalid, and < 0 on various internal errors (out of
* memory, etc.). Having some, or even all, invalid SCTs is not sufficient
* reason to abort the handshake, that decision is up to the callback.
* Therefore, we error out only in the unexpected case that the return
* value is negative.
*
* XXX: One might well argue that the return value of this function is an
* unfortunate design choice. Its job is only to determine the validation
* status of each of the provided SCTs. So long as it correctly separates
* the wheat from the chaff it should return success. Failure in this case
* ought to correspond to an inability to carry out its duties.
*/
if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, ctx) < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT,
SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED);
goto end;
}
ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg);
if (ret < 0)
ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */
if (!ret)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT,
SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
end:
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx);
/*
* With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a
* failure return code here. Also the application may wish the complete
* the handshake, and then disconnect cleanly at a higher layer, after
* checking the verification status of the completed connection.
*
* We therefore force a certificate verification failure which will be
* visible via SSL_get_verify_result() and cached as part of any resumed
* session.
*
* Note: the permissive callback is for information gathering only, always
* returns success, and does not affect verification status. Only the
* strict callback or a custom application-specified callback can trigger
* connection failure or record a verification error.
*/
if (ret <= 0)
s->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS;
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode)
{
switch (validation_mode) {
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE);
return 0;
case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_permissive, NULL);
case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_strict, NULL);
}
}
int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode)
{
switch (validation_mode) {
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE);
return 0;
case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_permissive, NULL);
case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_strict, NULL);
}
}
int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(ctx->ctlog_store);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path)
{
return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path);
}
void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE * logs)
{
CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store);
ctx->ctlog_store = logs;
}
const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->ctlog_store;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */
void SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(SSL_CTX *c, SSL_client_hello_cb_fn cb,
void *arg)
{
c->client_hello_cb = cb;
c->client_hello_cb_arg = arg;
}
int SSL_client_hello_isv2(SSL *s)
{
if (s->clienthello == NULL)
return 0;
return s->clienthello->isv2;
}
unsigned int SSL_client_hello_get0_legacy_version(SSL *s)
{
if (s->clienthello == NULL)
return 0;
return s->clienthello->legacy_version;
}
size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_random(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out)
{
if (s->clienthello == NULL)
return 0;
if (out != NULL)
*out = s->clienthello->random;
return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
}
size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_session_id(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out)
{
if (s->clienthello == NULL)
return 0;
if (out != NULL)
*out = s->clienthello->session_id;
return s->clienthello->session_id_len;
}
size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_ciphers(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out)
{
if (s->clienthello == NULL)
return 0;
if (out != NULL)
*out = PACKET_data(&s->clienthello->ciphersuites);
return PACKET_remaining(&s->clienthello->ciphersuites);
}
size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_compression_methods(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out)
{
if (s->clienthello == NULL)
return 0;
if (out != NULL)
*out = s->clienthello->compressions;
return s->clienthello->compressions_len;
}
int SSL_client_hello_get1_extensions_present(SSL *s, int **out, size_t *outlen)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *ext;
int *present;
size_t num = 0, i;
if (s->clienthello == NULL || out == NULL || outlen == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) {
ext = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i;
if (ext->present)
num++;
}
if (num == 0) {
*out = NULL;
*outlen = 0;
return 1;
}
if ((present = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*present) * num)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_GET1_EXTENSIONS_PRESENT,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) {
ext = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i;
if (ext->present) {
if (ext->received_order >= num)
goto err;
present[ext->received_order] = ext->type;
}
}
*out = present;
*outlen = num;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(present);
return 0;
}
int SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(SSL *s, unsigned int type, const unsigned char **out,
size_t *outlen)
{
size_t i;
RAW_EXTENSION *r;
if (s->clienthello == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; ++i) {
r = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i;
if (r->present && r->type == type) {
if (out != NULL)
*out = PACKET_data(&r->data);
if (outlen != NULL)
*outlen = PACKET_remaining(&r->data);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int SSL_free_buffers(SSL *ssl)
{
RECORD_LAYER *rl = &ssl->rlayer;
if (RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(rl) || RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(rl))
return 0;
RECORD_LAYER_release(rl);
return 1;
}
int SSL_alloc_buffers(SSL *ssl)
{
return ssl3_setup_buffers(ssl);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func cb)
{
ctx->keylog_callback = cb;
}
SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->keylog_callback;
}
static int nss_keylog_int(const char *prefix,
SSL *ssl,
const uint8_t *parameter_1,
size_t parameter_1_len,
const uint8_t *parameter_2,
size_t parameter_2_len)
{
char *out = NULL;
char *cursor = NULL;
size_t out_len = 0;
size_t i;
size_t prefix_len;
if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL)
return 1;
/*
* Our output buffer will contain the following strings, rendered with
* space characters in between, terminated by a NULL character: first the
* prefix, then the first parameter, then the second parameter. The
* meaning of each parameter depends on the specific key material being
* logged. Note that the first and second parameters are encoded in
* hexadecimal, so we need a buffer that is twice their lengths.
*/
prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
out_len = prefix_len + (2 * parameter_1_len) + (2 * parameter_2_len) + 3;
if ((out = cursor = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(ssl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_NSS_KEYLOG_INT,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
strcpy(cursor, prefix);
cursor += prefix_len;
*cursor++ = ' ';
for (i = 0; i < parameter_1_len; i++) {
sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_1[i]);
cursor += 2;
}
*cursor++ = ' ';
for (i = 0; i < parameter_2_len; i++) {
sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_2[i]);
cursor += 2;
}
*cursor = '\0';
ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out);
OPENSSL_clear_free(out, out_len);
return 1;
}
int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl,
const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster,
size_t encrypted_premaster_len,
const uint8_t *premaster,
size_t premaster_len)
{
if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) {
SSLfatal(ssl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_SSL_LOG_RSA_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* We only want the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster as a tag. */
return nss_keylog_int("RSA",
ssl,
encrypted_premaster,
8,
premaster,
premaster_len);
}
int ssl_log_secret(SSL *ssl,
const char *label,
const uint8_t *secret,
size_t secret_len)
{
return nss_keylog_int(label,
ssl,
ssl->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
secret,
secret_len);
}
#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
int ssl_cache_cipherlist(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, int sslv2format)
{
int n;
n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST,
SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
if (sslv2format) {
size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
unsigned int leadbyte;
unsigned char *raw;
/*
* We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
* preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
* ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
* slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
* problem.
*/
raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
if (raw == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
|| (leadbyte == 0
&& !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
|| (leadbyte != 0
&& !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST,
SSL_R_BAD_PACKET);
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
return 0;
}
if (leadbyte == 0)
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
}
} else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
&s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const unsigned char *bytes, size_t len,
int isv2format, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sk,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs)
{
PACKET pkt;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, bytes, len))
return 0;
return bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &pkt, sk, scsvs, isv2format, 0);
}
int bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs_out,
int sslv2format, int fatal)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
int n;
/* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return 0;
}
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
scsvs = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
if (sk == NULL || scsvs == NULL) {
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
/*
* SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
* first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
* first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
*/
if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
continue;
/* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher, 1);
if (c != NULL) {
if ((c->valid && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) ||
(!c->valid && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(scsvs, c))) {
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
if (fatal)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (skp != NULL)
*skp = sk;
else
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
if (scsvs_out != NULL)
*scsvs_out = scsvs;
else
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
return 1;
err:
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t max_early_data)
{
ctx->max_early_data = max_early_data;
return 1;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->max_early_data;
}
int SSL_set_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t max_early_data)
{
s->max_early_data = max_early_data;
return 1;
}
uint32_t SSL_get_max_early_data(const SSL *s)
{
return s->max_early_data;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t recv_max_early_data)
{
ctx->recv_max_early_data = recv_max_early_data;
return 1;
}
uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->recv_max_early_data;
}
int SSL_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t recv_max_early_data)
{
s->recv_max_early_data = recv_max_early_data;
return 1;
}
uint32_t SSL_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL *s)
{
return s->recv_max_early_data;
}
__owur unsigned int ssl_get_max_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl)
{
/* Return any active Max Fragment Len extension */
if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session))
return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session);
/* return current SSL connection setting */
return ssl->max_send_fragment;
}
__owur unsigned int ssl_get_split_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl)
{
/* Return a value regarding an active Max Fragment Len extension */
if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session)
&& ssl->split_send_fragment > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session))
return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session);
/* else limit |split_send_fragment| to current |max_send_fragment| */
if (ssl->split_send_fragment > ssl->max_send_fragment)
return ssl->max_send_fragment;
/* return current SSL connection setting */
return ssl->split_send_fragment;
}
int SSL_stateless(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
if (!SSL_clear(s))
return 0;
ERR_clear_error();
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS;
ret = SSL_accept(s);
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS;
if (ret > 0 && s->ext.cookieok)
return 1;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && !ossl_statem_in_error(s))
return 0;
return -1;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val)
{
ctx->pha_enabled = val;
}
void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val)
{
ssl->pha_enabled = val;
}
int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl)
{
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(ssl)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl->server) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NOT_SERVER);
return 0;
}
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT);
return 0;
}
switch (ssl->post_handshake_auth) {
case SSL_PHA_NONE:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_EXTENSION_NOT_RECEIVED);
return 0;
default:
case SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
case SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED:
break;
case SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_REQUEST_PENDING);
return 0;
case SSL_PHA_REQUESTED:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_REQUEST_SENT);
return 0;
}
ssl->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING;
/* checks verify_mode and algorithm_auth */
if (!send_certificate_request(ssl)) {
ssl->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; /* restore on error */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIG);
return 0;
}
ossl_statem_set_in_init(ssl, 1);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_CTX_generate_session_ticket_fn gen_cb,
SSL_CTX_decrypt_session_ticket_fn dec_cb,
void *arg)
{
ctx->generate_ticket_cb = gen_cb;
ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb = dec_cb;
ctx->ticket_cb_data = arg;
return 1;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb,
void *arg)
{
ctx->allow_early_data_cb = cb;
ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data = arg;
}
void SSL_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL *s,
SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb,
void *arg)
{
s->allow_early_data_cb = cb;
s->allow_early_data_cb_data = arg;
}