/*
* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "e_os.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h> /* For d2i_DSAPrivateKey */
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h> /* For the PKCS8 stuff o.O */
#include <openssl/rsa.h> /* For d2i_RSAPrivateKey */
#include <openssl/safestack.h>
#include <openssl/store.h>
#include <openssl/ui.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h> /* For the PKCS8 stuff o.O */
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
#include "internal/o_dir.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "crypto/store.h"
#include "store_local.h"
#ifdef _WIN32
# define stat _stat
#endif
#ifndef S_ISDIR
# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
#endif
/*-
* Password prompting
* ------------------
*/
static char *file_get_pass(const UI_METHOD *ui_method, char *pass,
size_t maxsize, const char *prompt_info, void *data)
{
UI *ui = UI_new();
char *prompt = NULL;
if (ui == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_GET_PASS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if (ui_method != NULL)
UI_set_method(ui, ui_method);
UI_add_user_data(ui, data);
if ((prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase",
prompt_info)) == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_GET_PASS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
pass = NULL;
} else if (!UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD,
pass, 0, maxsize - 1)) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_GET_PASS, ERR_R_UI_LIB);
pass = NULL;
} else {
switch (UI_process(ui)) {
case -2:
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_GET_PASS,
OSSL_STORE_R_UI_PROCESS_INTERRUPTED_OR_CANCELLED);
pass = NULL;
break;
case -1:
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_GET_PASS, ERR_R_UI_LIB);
pass = NULL;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
OPENSSL_free(prompt);
UI_free(ui);
return pass;
}
struct pem_pass_data {
const UI_METHOD *ui_method;
void *data;
const char *prompt_info;
};
static int file_fill_pem_pass_data(struct pem_pass_data *pass_data,
const char *prompt_info,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *ui_data)
{
if (pass_data == NULL)
return 0;
pass_data->ui_method = ui_method;
pass_data->data = ui_data;
pass_data->prompt_info = prompt_info;
return 1;
}
/* This is used anywhere a pem_password_cb is needed */
static int file_get_pem_pass(char *buf, int num, int w, void *data)
{
struct pem_pass_data *pass_data = data;
char *pass = file_get_pass(pass_data->ui_method, buf, num,
pass_data->prompt_info, pass_data->data);
return pass == NULL ? 0 : strlen(pass);
}
/*-
* The file scheme decoders
* ------------------------
*
* Each possible data type has its own decoder, which either operates
* through a given PEM name, or attempts to decode to see if the blob
* it's given is decodable for its data type. The assumption is that
* only the correct data type will match the content.
*/
/*-
* The try_decode function is called to check if the blob of data can
* be used by this handler, and if it can, decodes it into a supported
* OpenSSL type and returns a OSSL_STORE_INFO with the decoded data.
* Input:
* pem_name: If this blob comes from a PEM file, this holds
* the PEM name. If it comes from another type of
* file, this is NULL.
* pem_header: If this blob comes from a PEM file, this holds
* the PEM headers. If it comes from another type of
* file, this is NULL.
* blob: The blob of data to match with what this handler
* can use.
* len: The length of the blob.
* handler_ctx: For a handler marked repeatable, this pointer can
* be used to create a context for the handler. IT IS
* THE HANDLER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO CREATE AND DESTROY
* THIS CONTEXT APPROPRIATELY, i.e. create on first call
* and destroy when about to return NULL.
* matchcount: A pointer to an int to count matches for this data.
* Usually becomes 0 (no match) or 1 (match!), but may
* be higher in the (unlikely) event that the data matches
* more than one possibility. The int will always be
* zero when the function is called.
* ui_method: Application UI method for getting a password, pin
* or any other interactive data.
* ui_data: Application data to be passed to ui_method when
* it's called.
* Output:
* a OSSL_STORE_INFO
*/
typedef OSSL_STORE_INFO *(*file_try_decode_fn)(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **handler_ctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data);
/*
* The eof function should return 1 if there's no more data to be found
* with the handler_ctx, otherwise 0. This is only used when the handler is
* marked repeatable.
*/
typedef int (*file_eof_fn)(void *handler_ctx);
/*
* The destroy_ctx function is used to destroy the handler_ctx that was
* initiated by a repeatable try_decode function. This is only used when
* the handler is marked repeatable.
*/
typedef void (*file_destroy_ctx_fn)(void **handler_ctx);
typedef struct file_handler_st {
const char *name;
file_try_decode_fn try_decode;
file_eof_fn eof;
file_destroy_ctx_fn destroy_ctx;
/* flags */
int repeatable;
} FILE_HANDLER;
/*
* PKCS#12 decoder. It operates by decoding all of the blob content,
* extracting all the interesting data from it and storing them internally,
* then serving them one piece at a time.
*/
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PKCS12(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = *pctx;
if (ctx == NULL) {
/* Initial parsing */
PKCS12 *p12;
int ok = 0;
if (pem_name != NULL)
/* No match, there is no PEM PKCS12 tag */
return NULL;
if ((p12 = d2i_PKCS12(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) {
char *pass = NULL;
char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE];
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
*matchcount = 1;
if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)
|| PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
pass = "";
} else {
if ((pass = file_get_pass(ui_method, tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE,
"PKCS12 import password",
ui_data)) == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PKCS12,
OSSL_STORE_R_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK_ERROR);
goto p12_end;
}
if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, strlen(pass))) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PKCS12,
OSSL_STORE_R_ERROR_VERIFYING_PKCS12_MAC);
goto p12_end;
}
}
if (PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &chain)) {
OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_pkey = NULL;
OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_cert = NULL;
OSSL_STORE_INFO *osi_ca = NULL;
if ((ctx = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_null()) != NULL
&& (osi_pkey = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(pkey)) != NULL
&& sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(ctx, osi_pkey) != 0
&& (osi_cert = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(cert)) != NULL
&& sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(ctx, osi_cert) != 0) {
ok = 1;
osi_pkey = NULL;
osi_cert = NULL;
while(sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
if ((osi_ca = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(ca)) == NULL
|| sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_push(ctx, osi_ca) == 0) {
ok = 0;
break;
}
osi_ca = NULL;
(void)sk_X509_shift(chain);
}
}
if (!ok) {
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(osi_ca);
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(osi_cert);
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(osi_pkey);
sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_pop_free(ctx, OSSL_STORE_INFO_free);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(cert);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
ctx = NULL;
}
*pctx = ctx;
}
}
p12_end:
PKCS12_free(p12);
if (!ok)
return NULL;
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
*matchcount = 1;
store_info = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_shift(ctx);
}
return store_info;
}
static int eof_PKCS12(void *ctx_)
{
STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = ctx_;
return ctx == NULL || sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_num(ctx) == 0;
}
static void destroy_ctx_PKCS12(void **pctx)
{
STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = *pctx;
sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_pop_free(ctx, OSSL_STORE_INFO_free);
*pctx = NULL;
}
static FILE_HANDLER PKCS12_handler = {
"PKCS12",
try_decode_PKCS12,
eof_PKCS12,
destroy_ctx_PKCS12,
1 /* repeatable */
};
/*
* Encrypted PKCS#8 decoder. It operates by just decrypting the given blob
* into a new blob, which is returned as an EMBEDDED STORE_INFO. The whole
* decoding process will then start over with the new blob.
*/
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PKCS8Encrypted(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
X509_SIG *p8 = NULL;
char kbuf[PEM_BUFSIZE];
char *pass = NULL;
const X509_ALGOR *dalg = NULL;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *doct = NULL;
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
BUF_MEM *mem = NULL;
unsigned char *new_data = NULL;
int new_data_len;
if (pem_name != NULL) {
if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) != 0)
return NULL;
*matchcount = 1;
}
if ((p8 = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &blob, len)) == NULL)
return NULL;
*matchcount = 1;
if ((mem = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PKCS8ENCRYPTED,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto nop8;
}
if ((pass = file_get_pass(ui_method, kbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE,
"PKCS8 decrypt password", ui_data)) == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PKCS8ENCRYPTED,
OSSL_STORE_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
goto nop8;
}
X509_SIG_get0(p8, &dalg, &doct);
if (!PKCS12_pbe_crypt(dalg, pass, strlen(pass), doct->data, doct->length,
&new_data, &new_data_len, 0))
goto nop8;
mem->data = (char *)new_data;
mem->max = mem->length = (size_t)new_data_len;
X509_SIG_free(p8);
store_info = ossl_store_info_new_EMBEDDED(PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF, mem);
if (store_info == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PKCS8ENCRYPTED,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto nop8;
}
return store_info;
nop8:
X509_SIG_free(p8);
BUF_MEM_free(mem);
return NULL;
}
static FILE_HANDLER PKCS8Encrypted_handler = {
"PKCS8Encrypted",
try_decode_PKCS8Encrypted
};
/*
* Private key decoder. Decodes all sorts of private keys, both PKCS#8
* encoded ones and old style PEM ones (with the key type is encoded into
* the PEM name).
*/
int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix);
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PrivateKey(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL;
if (pem_name != NULL) {
if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf =
d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &blob, len);
*matchcount = 1;
if (p8inf != NULL)
pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
} else {
int slen;
if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(pem_name, "PRIVATE KEY")) > 0
&& (ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pem_name,
slen)) != NULL) {
*matchcount = 1;
pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, NULL, &blob, len);
}
}
} else {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) {
EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL;
const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob;
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i);
if (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS)
continue;
tmp_pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, NULL, &tmp_blob, len);
if (tmp_pkey != NULL) {
if (pkey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
else
pkey = tmp_pkey;
(*matchcount)++;
}
}
if (*matchcount > 1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
}
if (pkey == NULL)
/* No match */
return NULL;
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(pkey);
if (store_info == NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return store_info;
}
static FILE_HANDLER PrivateKey_handler = {
"PrivateKey",
try_decode_PrivateKey
};
/*
* Public key decoder. Only supports SubjectPublicKeyInfo formatted keys.
*/
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PUBKEY(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if (pem_name != NULL) {
if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC) != 0)
/* No match */
return NULL;
*matchcount = 1;
}
if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) {
*matchcount = 1;
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(pkey);
}
return store_info;
}
static FILE_HANDLER PUBKEY_handler = {
"PUBKEY",
try_decode_PUBKEY
};
/*
* Key parameter decoder.
*/
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_params(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
int slen = 0;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL;
int ok = 0;
if (pem_name != NULL) {
if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(pem_name, "PARAMETERS")) == 0)
return NULL;
*matchcount = 1;
}
if (slen > 0) {
if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PARAMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return NULL;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(pkey, pem_name, slen)
&& (ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey)) != NULL
&& ameth->param_decode != NULL
&& ameth->param_decode(pkey, &blob, len))
ok = 1;
} else {
int i;
EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) {
const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob;
if (tmp_pkey == NULL && (tmp_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PARAMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
break;
}
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i);
if (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS)
continue;
if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmp_pkey, ameth->pkey_id)
&& (ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(tmp_pkey)) != NULL
&& ameth->param_decode != NULL
&& ameth->param_decode(tmp_pkey, &tmp_blob, len)) {
if (pkey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
else
pkey = tmp_pkey;
tmp_pkey = NULL;
(*matchcount)++;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
if (*matchcount == 1) {
ok = 1;
}
}
if (ok)
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PARAMS(pkey);
if (store_info == NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return store_info;
}
static FILE_HANDLER params_handler = {
"params",
try_decode_params
};
/*
* X.509 certificate decoder.
*/
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_X509Certificate(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
/*
* In most cases, we can try to interpret the serialized data as a trusted
* cert (X509 + X509_AUX) and fall back to reading it as a normal cert
* (just X509), but if the PEM name specifically declares it as a trusted
* cert, then no fallback should be engaged. |ignore_trusted| tells if
* the fallback can be used (1) or not (0).
*/
int ignore_trusted = 1;
if (pem_name != NULL) {
if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0)
ignore_trusted = 0;
else if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) != 0
&& strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509) != 0)
/* No match */
return NULL;
*matchcount = 1;
}
if ((cert = d2i_X509_AUX(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL
|| (ignore_trusted && (cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL)) {
*matchcount = 1;
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(cert);
}
if (store_info == NULL)
X509_free(cert);
return store_info;
}
static FILE_HANDLER X509Certificate_handler = {
"X509Certificate",
try_decode_X509Certificate
};
/*
* X.509 CRL decoder.
*/
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_X509CRL(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
if (pem_name != NULL) {
if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) != 0)
/* No match */
return NULL;
*matchcount = 1;
}
if ((crl = d2i_X509_CRL(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) {
*matchcount = 1;
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CRL(crl);
}
if (store_info == NULL)
X509_CRL_free(crl);
return store_info;
}
static FILE_HANDLER X509CRL_handler = {
"X509CRL",
try_decode_X509CRL
};
/*
* To finish it all off, we collect all the handlers.
*/
static const FILE_HANDLER *file_handlers[] = {
&PKCS12_handler,
&PKCS8Encrypted_handler,
&X509Certificate_handler,
&X509CRL_handler,
¶ms_handler,
&PUBKEY_handler,
&PrivateKey_handler,
};
/*-
* The loader itself
* -----------------
*/
struct ossl_store_loader_ctx_st {
enum {
is_raw = 0,
is_pem,
is_dir
} type;
int errcnt;
#define FILE_FLAG_SECMEM (1<<0)
unsigned int flags;
union {
struct { /* Used with is_raw and is_pem */
BIO *file;
/*
* The following are used when the handler is marked as
* repeatable
*/
const FILE_HANDLER *last_handler;
void *last_handler_ctx;
} file;
struct { /* Used with is_dir */
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *ctx;
int end_reached;
char *uri;
/*
* When a search expression is given, these are filled in.
* |search_name| contains the file basename to look for.
* The string is exactly 8 characters long.
*/
char search_name[9];
/*
* The directory reading utility we have combines opening with
* reading the first name. To make sure we can detect the end
* at the right time, we read early and cache the name.
*/
const char *last_entry;
int last_errno;
} dir;
} _;
/* Expected object type. May be unspecified */
int expected_type;
};
static void OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->type == is_dir) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->_.dir.uri);
} else {
if (ctx->_.file.last_handler != NULL) {
ctx->_.file.last_handler->destroy_ctx(&ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx);
ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx = NULL;
ctx->_.file.last_handler = NULL;
}
}
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
static OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *file_open(const OSSL_STORE_LOADER *loader,
const char *uri,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
struct stat st;
struct {
const char *path;
unsigned int check_absolute:1;
} path_data[2];
size_t path_data_n = 0, i;
const char *path;
/*
* First step, just take the URI as is.
*/
path_data[path_data_n].check_absolute = 0;
path_data[path_data_n++].path = uri;
/*
* Second step, if the URI appears to start with the 'file' scheme,
* extract the path and make that the second path to check.
* There's a special case if the URI also contains an authority, then
* the full URI shouldn't be used as a path anywhere.
*/
if (strncasecmp(uri, "file:", 5) == 0) {
const char *p = &uri[5];
if (strncmp(&uri[5], "//", 2) == 0) {
path_data_n--; /* Invalidate using the full URI */
if (strncasecmp(&uri[7], "localhost/", 10) == 0) {
p = &uri[16];
} else if (uri[7] == '/') {
p = &uri[7];
} else {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_OPEN,
OSSL_STORE_R_URI_AUTHORITY_UNSUPPORTED);
return NULL;
}
}
path_data[path_data_n].check_absolute = 1;
#ifdef _WIN32
/* Windows file: URIs with a drive letter start with a / */
if (p[0] == '/' && p[2] == ':' && p[3] == '/') {
char c = ossl_tolower(p[1]);
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') {
p++;
/* We know it's absolute, so no need to check */
path_data[path_data_n].check_absolute = 0;
}
}
#endif
path_data[path_data_n++].path = p;
}
for (i = 0, path = NULL; path == NULL && i < path_data_n; i++) {
/*
* If the scheme "file" was an explicit part of the URI, the path must
* be absolute. So says RFC 8089
*/
if (path_data[i].check_absolute && path_data[i].path[0] != '/') {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_OPEN,
OSSL_STORE_R_PATH_MUST_BE_ABSOLUTE);
ERR_add_error_data(1, path_data[i].path);
return NULL;
}
if (stat(path_data[i].path, &st) < 0) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_STAT, errno);
ERR_add_error_data(1, path_data[i].path);
} else {
path = path_data[i].path;
}
}
if (path == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* Successfully found a working path, clear possible collected errors */
ERR_clear_error();
ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_OPEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
/*
* Try to copy everything, even if we know that some of them must be
* NULL for the moment. This prevents errors in the future, when more
* components may be used.
*/
ctx->_.dir.uri = OPENSSL_strdup(uri);
ctx->type = is_dir;
if (ctx->_.dir.uri == NULL)
goto err;
ctx->_.dir.last_entry = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx->_.dir.ctx, path);
ctx->_.dir.last_errno = errno;
if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry == NULL) {
if (ctx->_.dir.last_errno != 0) {
char errbuf[256];
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_OPEN, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
errno = ctx->_.dir.last_errno;
if (openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf)))
ERR_add_error_data(1, errbuf);
goto err;
}
ctx->_.dir.end_reached = 1;
}
} else {
BIO *buff = NULL;
char peekbuf[4096] = { 0, };
if ((buff = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL
|| (ctx->_.file.file = BIO_new_file(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
BIO_free_all(buff);
goto err;
}
ctx->_.file.file = BIO_push(buff, ctx->_.file.file);
if (BIO_buffer_peek(ctx->_.file.file, peekbuf, sizeof(peekbuf) - 1) > 0) {
peekbuf[sizeof(peekbuf) - 1] = '\0';
if (strstr(peekbuf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL)
ctx->type = is_pem;
}
}
return ctx;
err:
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(ctx);
return NULL;
}
static int file_ctrl(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx, int cmd, va_list args)
{
int ret = 1;
switch (cmd) {
case OSSL_STORE_C_USE_SECMEM:
{
int on = *(va_arg(args, int *));
switch (on) {
case 0:
ctx->flags &= ~FILE_FLAG_SECMEM;
break;
case 1:
ctx->flags |= FILE_FLAG_SECMEM;
break;
default:
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_CTRL,
ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
static int file_expect(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx, int expected)
{
ctx->expected_type = expected;
return 1;
}
static int file_find(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx, OSSL_STORE_SEARCH *search)
{
/*
* If ctx == NULL, the library is looking to know if this loader supports
* the given search type.
*/
if (OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get_type(search) == OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_BY_NAME) {
unsigned long hash = 0;
if (ctx == NULL)
return 1;
if (ctx->type != is_dir) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_FIND,
OSSL_STORE_R_SEARCH_ONLY_SUPPORTED_FOR_DIRECTORIES);
return 0;
}
hash = X509_NAME_hash(OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get0_name(search));
BIO_snprintf(ctx->_.dir.search_name, sizeof(ctx->_.dir.search_name),
"%08lx", hash);
return 1;
}
if (ctx != NULL)
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_FIND,
OSSL_STORE_R_UNSUPPORTED_SEARCH_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* Internal function to decode an already opened PEM file */
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ossl_store_file_attach_pem_bio_int(BIO *bp)
{
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_OSSL_STORE_FILE_ATTACH_PEM_BIO_INT,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
ctx->_.file.file = bp;
ctx->type = is_pem;
return ctx;
}
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *file_load_try_decode(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx,
const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
unsigned char *data, size_t len,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data, int *matchcount)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *result = NULL;
BUF_MEM *new_mem = NULL;
char *new_pem_name = NULL;
int t = 0;
again:
{
size_t i = 0;
void *handler_ctx = NULL;
const FILE_HANDLER **matching_handlers =
OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*matching_handlers)
* OSSL_NELEM(file_handlers));
if (matching_handlers == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD_TRY_DECODE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
*matchcount = 0;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(file_handlers); i++) {
const FILE_HANDLER *handler = file_handlers[i];
int try_matchcount = 0;
void *tmp_handler_ctx = NULL;
OSSL_STORE_INFO *tmp_result =
handler->try_decode(pem_name, pem_header, data, len,
&tmp_handler_ctx, &try_matchcount,
ui_method, ui_data);
if (try_matchcount > 0) {
matching_handlers[*matchcount] = handler;
if (handler_ctx)
handler->destroy_ctx(&handler_ctx);
handler_ctx = tmp_handler_ctx;
if ((*matchcount += try_matchcount) > 1) {
/* more than one match => ambiguous, kill any result */
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(result);
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(tmp_result);
if (handler->destroy_ctx != NULL)
handler->destroy_ctx(&handler_ctx);
handler_ctx = NULL;
tmp_result = NULL;
result = NULL;
}
if (result == NULL)
result = tmp_result;
}
}
if (*matchcount == 1 && matching_handlers[0]->repeatable) {
ctx->_.file.last_handler = matching_handlers[0];
ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx = handler_ctx;
}
OPENSSL_free(matching_handlers);
}
err:
OPENSSL_free(new_pem_name);
BUF_MEM_free(new_mem);
if (result != NULL
&& (t = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get_type(result)) == OSSL_STORE_INFO_EMBEDDED) {
pem_name = new_pem_name =
ossl_store_info_get0_EMBEDDED_pem_name(result);
new_mem = ossl_store_info_get0_EMBEDDED_buffer(result);
data = (unsigned char *)new_mem->data;
len = new_mem->length;
OPENSSL_free(result);
result = NULL;
goto again;
}
if (result != NULL)
ERR_clear_error();
return result;
}
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *file_load_try_repeat(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *result = NULL;
int try_matchcount = 0;
if (ctx->_.file.last_handler != NULL) {
result =
ctx->_.file.last_handler->try_decode(NULL, NULL, NULL, 0,
&ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx,
&try_matchcount,
ui_method, ui_data);
if (result == NULL) {
ctx->_.file.last_handler->destroy_ctx(&ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx);
ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx = NULL;
ctx->_.file.last_handler = NULL;
}
}
return result;
}
static void pem_free_flag(void *pem_data, int secure, size_t num)
{
if (secure)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pem_data, num);
else
OPENSSL_free(pem_data);
}
static int file_read_pem(BIO *bp, char **pem_name, char **pem_header,
unsigned char **data, long *len,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data, int secure)
{
int i = secure
? PEM_read_bio_ex(bp, pem_name, pem_header, data, len,
PEM_FLAG_SECURE | PEM_FLAG_EAY_COMPATIBLE)
: PEM_read_bio(bp, pem_name, pem_header, data, len);
if (i <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* 10 is the number of characters in "Proc-Type:", which
* PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO() requires to be present.
* If the PEM header has less characters than that, it's
* not worth spending cycles on it.
*/
if (strlen(*pem_header) > 10) {
EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher;
struct pem_pass_data pass_data;
if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(*pem_header, &cipher)
|| !file_fill_pem_pass_data(&pass_data, "PEM", ui_method, ui_data)
|| !PEM_do_header(&cipher, *data, len, file_get_pem_pass,
&pass_data)) {
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int file_read_asn1(BIO *bp, unsigned char **data, long *len)
{
BUF_MEM *mem = NULL;
if (asn1_d2i_read_bio(bp, &mem) < 0)
return 0;
*data = (unsigned char *)mem->data;
*len = (long)mem->length;
OPENSSL_free(mem);
return 1;
}
static int ends_with_dirsep(const char *uri)
{
if (*uri != '\0')
uri += strlen(uri) - 1;
#if defined __VMS
if (*uri == ']' || *uri == '>' || *uri == ':')
return 1;
#elif defined _WIN32
if (*uri == '\\')
return 1;
#endif
return *uri == '/';
}
static int file_name_to_uri(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx, const char *name,
char **data)
{
assert(name != NULL);
assert(data != NULL);
{
const char *pathsep = ends_with_dirsep(ctx->_.dir.uri) ? "" : "/";
long calculated_length = strlen(ctx->_.dir.uri) + strlen(pathsep)
+ strlen(name) + 1 /* \0 */;
*data = OPENSSL_zalloc(calculated_length);
if (*data == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_NAME_TO_URI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_strlcat(*data, ctx->_.dir.uri, calculated_length);
OPENSSL_strlcat(*data, pathsep, calculated_length);
OPENSSL_strlcat(*data, name, calculated_length);
}
return 1;
}
static int file_name_check(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
const char *p = NULL;
/* If there are no search criteria, all names are accepted */
if (ctx->_.dir.search_name[0] == '\0')
return 1;
/* If the expected type isn't supported, no name is accepted */
if (ctx->expected_type != 0
&& ctx->expected_type != OSSL_STORE_INFO_CERT
&& ctx->expected_type != OSSL_STORE_INFO_CRL)
return 0;
/*
* First, check the basename
*/
if (strncasecmp(name, ctx->_.dir.search_name,
sizeof(ctx->_.dir.search_name) - 1) != 0
|| name[sizeof(ctx->_.dir.search_name) - 1] != '.')
return 0;
p = &name[sizeof(ctx->_.dir.search_name)];
/*
* Then, if the expected type is a CRL, check that the extension starts
* with 'r'
*/
if (*p == 'r') {
p++;
if (ctx->expected_type != 0
&& ctx->expected_type != OSSL_STORE_INFO_CRL)
return 0;
} else if (ctx->expected_type == OSSL_STORE_INFO_CRL) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Last, check that the rest of the extension is a decimal number, at
* least one digit long.
*/
if (!ossl_isdigit(*p))
return 0;
while (ossl_isdigit(*p))
p++;
# ifdef __VMS
/*
* One extra step here, check for a possible generation number.
*/
if (*p == ';')
for (p++; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (!ossl_isdigit(*p))
break;
# endif
/*
* If we've reached the end of the string at this point, we've successfully
* found a fitting file name.
*/
return *p == '\0';
}
static int file_eof(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx);
static int file_error(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx);
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *file_load(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *result = NULL;
ctx->errcnt = 0;
ERR_clear_error();
if (ctx->type == is_dir) {
do {
char *newname = NULL;
if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry == NULL) {
if (!ctx->_.dir.end_reached) {
char errbuf[256];
assert(ctx->_.dir.last_errno != 0);
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
errno = ctx->_.dir.last_errno;
ctx->errcnt++;
if (openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf)))
ERR_add_error_data(1, errbuf);
}
return NULL;
}
if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry[0] != '.'
&& file_name_check(ctx, ctx->_.dir.last_entry)
&& !file_name_to_uri(ctx, ctx->_.dir.last_entry, &newname))
return NULL;
/*
* On the first call (with a NULL context), OPENSSL_DIR_read()
* cares about the second argument. On the following calls, it
* only cares that it isn't NULL. Therefore, we can safely give
* it our URI here.
*/
ctx->_.dir.last_entry = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx->_.dir.ctx,
ctx->_.dir.uri);
ctx->_.dir.last_errno = errno;
if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry == NULL && ctx->_.dir.last_errno == 0)
ctx->_.dir.end_reached = 1;
if (newname != NULL
&& (result = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_NAME(newname)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(newname);
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD, ERR_R_OSSL_STORE_LIB);
return NULL;
}
} while (result == NULL && !file_eof(ctx));
} else {
int matchcount = -1;
again:
result = file_load_try_repeat(ctx, ui_method, ui_data);
if (result != NULL)
return result;
if (file_eof(ctx))
return NULL;
do {
char *pem_name = NULL; /* PEM record name */
char *pem_header = NULL; /* PEM record header */
unsigned char *data = NULL; /* DER encoded data */
long len = 0; /* DER encoded data length */
matchcount = -1;
if (ctx->type == is_pem) {
if (!file_read_pem(ctx->_.file.file, &pem_name, &pem_header,
&data, &len, ui_method, ui_data,
(ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0)) {
ctx->errcnt++;
goto endloop;
}
} else {
if (!file_read_asn1(ctx->_.file.file, &data, &len)) {
ctx->errcnt++;
goto endloop;
}
}
result = file_load_try_decode(ctx, pem_name, pem_header, data, len,
ui_method, ui_data, &matchcount);
if (result != NULL)
goto endloop;
/*
* If a PEM name matches more than one handler, the handlers are
* badly coded.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(pem_name == NULL || matchcount <= 1)) {
ctx->errcnt++;
goto endloop;
}
if (matchcount > 1) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD,
OSSL_STORE_R_AMBIGUOUS_CONTENT_TYPE);
} else if (matchcount == 1) {
/*
* If there are other errors on the stack, they already show
* what the problem is.
*/
if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD,
OSSL_STORE_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
if (pem_name != NULL)
ERR_add_error_data(3, "PEM type is '", pem_name, "'");
}
}
if (matchcount > 0)
ctx->errcnt++;
endloop:
pem_free_flag(pem_name, (ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0, 0);
pem_free_flag(pem_header, (ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0, 0);
pem_free_flag(data, (ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0, len);
} while (matchcount == 0 && !file_eof(ctx) && !file_error(ctx));
/* We bail out on ambiguity */
if (matchcount > 1)
return NULL;
if (result != NULL
&& ctx->expected_type != 0
&& ctx->expected_type != OSSL_STORE_INFO_get_type(result)) {
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(result);
goto again;
}
}
return result;
}
static int file_error(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->errcnt > 0;
}
static int file_eof(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->type == is_dir)
return ctx->_.dir.end_reached;
if (ctx->_.file.last_handler != NULL
&& !ctx->_.file.last_handler->eof(ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx))
return 0;
return BIO_eof(ctx->_.file.file);
}
static int file_close(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->type == is_dir) {
OPENSSL_DIR_end(&ctx->_.dir.ctx);
} else {
BIO_free_all(ctx->_.file.file);
}
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
}
int ossl_store_file_detach_pem_bio_int(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
{
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
}
static OSSL_STORE_LOADER file_loader =
{
"file",
NULL,
file_open,
file_ctrl,
file_expect,
file_find,
file_load,
file_eof,
file_error,
file_close
};
static void store_file_loader_deinit(void)
{
ossl_store_unregister_loader_int(file_loader.scheme);
}
int ossl_store_file_loader_init(void)
{
int ret = ossl_store_register_loader_int(&file_loader);
OPENSSL_atexit(store_file_loader_deinit);
return ret;
}