/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
// For connections that are not processed on the socket transport thread, we do
// NOT use the async logic described below. Instead, we authenticate the
// certificate on the thread that the connection's I/O happens on,
// synchronously. This allows us to do certificate verification for blocking
// (not non-blocking) sockets and sockets that have their I/O processed on a
// thread other than the socket transport service thread. Also, we DO NOT
// support blocking sockets on the socket transport service thread at all.
//
// During certificate authentication, we call CERT_PKIXVerifyCert or
// CERT_VerifyCert. These functions may make zero or more HTTP requests
// for OCSP responses, CRLs, intermediate certificates, etc. Our fetching logic
// for these requests processes them on the socket transport service thread.
//
// If the connection for which we are verifying the certificate is happening
// on the socket transport thread (the usually case, at least for HTTP), then
// if our cert auth hook were to call the CERT_*Verify* functions directly,
// there would be a deadlock: The CERT_*Verify* function would cause an event
// to be asynchronously posted to the socket transport thread, and then it
// would block the socket transport thread waiting to be notified of the HTTP
// response. However, the HTTP request would never actually be processed
// because the socket transport thread would be blocked and so it wouldn't be
// able process HTTP requests. (i.e. Deadlock.)
//
// Consequently, when we are asked to verify a certificate on the socket
// transport service thread, we must always call the CERT_*Verify* cert
// functions on another thread. To accomplish this, our auth cert hook
// dispatches a SSLServerCertVerificationJob to a pool of background threads,
// and then immediately returns SECWouldBlock to libssl. These jobs are where
// the CERT_*Verify* functions are actually called.
//
// When our auth cert hook returns SECWouldBlock, libssl will carry on the
// handshake while we validate the certificate. This will free up the socket
// transport thread so that HTTP requests--in particular, the OCSP/CRL/cert
// requests needed for cert verification as mentioned above--can be processed.
//
// Once the CERT_*Verify* function returns, the cert verification job
// dispatches a SSLServerCertVerificationResult to the socket transport thread;
// the SSLServerCertVerificationResult will notify libssl that the certificate
// authentication is complete. Once libssl is notified that the authentication
// is complete, it will continue the SSL handshake (if it hasn't already
// finished) and it will begin allowing us to send/receive data on the
// connection.
//
// Timeline of events (for connections managed by the socket transport service):
//
// * libssl calls SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch on the socket
// transport thread.
// * SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch queues a job
// (instance of SSLServerCertVerificationJob) to its background thread
// pool and returns.
// * One of the background threads calls CERT_*Verify*, which may enqueue
// some HTTP request(s) onto the socket transport thread, and then
// blocks that background thread waiting for the responses and/or timeouts
// or errors for those requests.
// * Once those HTTP responses have all come back or failed, the
// CERT_*Verify* function returns a result indicating that the validation
// succeeded or failed.
// * If the validation succeeded, then a SSLServerCertVerificationResult
// event is posted to the socket transport thread, and the cert
// verification thread becomes free to verify other certificates.
// * Otherwise, a CertErrorRunnable is posted to the socket transport thread
// and then to the main thread (blocking both, see CertErrorRunnable) to
// do cert override processing and bad cert listener notification. Then
// the cert verification thread becomes free to verify other certificates.
// * After processing cert overrides, the CertErrorRunnable will dispatch a
// SSLServerCertVerificationResult event to the socket transport thread to
// notify it of the result of the override processing; then it returns,
// freeing up the main thread.
// * The SSLServerCertVerificationResult event will either wake up the
// socket (using SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert) if validation
// succeeded or there was an error override, or it will set an error flag
// so that the next I/O operation on the socket will fail, causing the
// socket transport thread to close the connection.
//
// Cert override processing must happen on the main thread because it accesses
// the nsICertOverrideService, and that service must be accessed on the main
// thread because some extensions (Selenium, in particular) replace it with a
// Javascript implementation, and chrome JS must always be run on the main
// thread.
//
// SSLServerCertVerificationResult must be dispatched to the socket transport
// thread because we must only call SSL_* functions on the socket transport
// thread since they may do I/O, because many parts of nsNSSSocketInfo (the
// subclass of TransportSecurityInfo used when validating certificates during
// an SSL handshake) and the PSM NSS I/O layer are not thread-safe, and because
// we need the event to interrupt the PR_Poll that may waiting for I/O on the
// socket for which we are validating the cert.
#include "SSLServerCertVerification.h"
#include <cstring>
#include "BRNameMatchingPolicy.h"
#include "CertVerifier.h"
#include "CryptoTask.h"
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include "PSMRunnable.h"
#include "RootCertificateTelemetryUtils.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
#include "SharedSSLState.h"
#include "TransportSecurityInfo.h" // For RememberCertErrorsTable
#include "cert.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsIBadCertListener2.h"
#include "nsICertOverrideService.h"
#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
#include "nsISocketProvider.h"
#include "nsIThreadPool.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h"
#include "nsSSLStatus.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "nsURLHelper.h"
#include "nsXPCOMCIDInternal.h"
#include "pkix/pkix.h"
#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "secoidt.h"
#include "secport.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslerr.h"
extern mozilla::LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
namespace mozilla {
namespace psm {
namespace {
// do not use a nsCOMPtr to avoid static initializer/destructor
nsIThreadPool* gCertVerificationThreadPool = nullptr;
} // unnamed namespace
// Called when the socket transport thread starts, to initialize the SSL cert
// verification thread pool. By tying the thread pool startup/shutdown directly
// to the STS thread's lifetime, we ensure that they are *always* available for
// SSL connections and that there are no races during startup and especially
// shutdown. (Previously, we have had multiple problems with races in PSM
// background threads, and the race-prevention/shutdown logic used there is
// brittle. Since this service is critical to things like downloading updates,
// we take no chances.) Also, by doing things this way, we avoid the need for
// locks, since gCertVerificationThreadPool is only ever accessed on the socket
// transport thread.
void InitializeSSLServerCertVerificationThreads() {
// TODO: tuning, make parameters preferences
// XXX: instantiate nsThreadPool directly, to make this more bulletproof.
// Currently, the nsThreadPool.h header isn't exported for us to do so.
nsresult rv = CallCreateInstance(NS_THREADPOOL_CONTRACTID,
&gCertVerificationThreadPool);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
NS_WARNING("Failed to create SSL cert verification threads.");
return;
}
(void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetIdleThreadLimit(5);
(void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetIdleThreadTimeout(30 * 1000);
(void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetThreadLimit(5);
(void)gCertVerificationThreadPool->SetName(NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("SSL Cert"));
}
// Called when the socket transport thread finishes, to destroy the thread
// pool. Since the socket transport service has stopped processing events, it
// will not attempt any more SSL I/O operations, so it is clearly safe to shut
// down the SSL cert verification infrastructure. Also, the STS will not
// dispatch many SSL verification result events at this point, so any pending
// cert verifications will (correctly) fail at the point they are dispatched.
//
// The other shutdown race condition that is possible is a race condition with
// shutdown of the nsNSSComponent service. We use the
// nsNSSShutdownPreventionLock where needed (not here) to prevent that.
void StopSSLServerCertVerificationThreads() {
if (gCertVerificationThreadPool) {
gCertVerificationThreadPool->Shutdown();
NS_RELEASE(gCertVerificationThreadPool);
}
}
namespace {
void LogInvalidCertError(nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo, PRErrorCode errorCode,
::mozilla::psm::SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType) {
nsString message;
socketInfo->GetErrorLogMessage(errorCode, errorMessageType, message);
if (!message.IsEmpty()) {
nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError(message, "SSL");
}
}
// Dispatched to the STS thread to notify the infoObject of the verification
// result.
//
// This will cause the PR_Poll in the STS thread to return, so things work
// correctly even if the STS thread is blocked polling (only) on the file
// descriptor that is waiting for this result.
class SSLServerCertVerificationResult : public Runnable {
public:
NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE
SSLServerCertVerificationResult(
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, PRErrorCode errorCode,
Telemetry::HistogramID telemetryID = Telemetry::HistogramCount,
uint32_t telemetryValue = -1,
SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType = SSLErrorMessageType::Plain);
void Dispatch();
private:
const RefPtr<nsNSSSocketInfo> mInfoObject;
public:
const PRErrorCode mErrorCode;
const SSLErrorMessageType mErrorMessageType;
const Telemetry::HistogramID mTelemetryID;
const uint32_t mTelemetryValue;
};
class CertErrorRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase {
public:
CertErrorRunnable(const void* fdForLogging, nsIX509Cert* cert,
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
PRErrorCode defaultErrorCodeToReport,
uint32_t collectedErrors, PRErrorCode errorCodeTrust,
PRErrorCode errorCodeMismatch, PRErrorCode errorCodeTime,
uint32_t providerFlags)
: mFdForLogging(fdForLogging),
mCert(cert),
mInfoObject(infoObject),
mDefaultErrorCodeToReport(defaultErrorCodeToReport),
mCollectedErrors(collectedErrors),
mErrorCodeTrust(errorCodeTrust),
mErrorCodeMismatch(errorCodeMismatch),
mErrorCodeTime(errorCodeTime),
mProviderFlags(providerFlags) {}
virtual void RunOnTargetThread() override;
RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationResult> mResult; // out
private:
SSLServerCertVerificationResult* CheckCertOverrides();
nsresult OverrideAllowedForHost(/*out*/ bool& overrideAllowed);
const void* const
mFdForLogging; // may become an invalid pointer; do not dereference
const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mCert;
const RefPtr<nsNSSSocketInfo> mInfoObject;
const PRErrorCode mDefaultErrorCodeToReport;
const uint32_t mCollectedErrors;
const PRErrorCode mErrorCodeTrust;
const PRErrorCode mErrorCodeMismatch;
const PRErrorCode mErrorCodeTime;
const uint32_t mProviderFlags;
};
// A probe value of 1 means "no error".
uint32_t MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode) {
switch (errorCode) {
case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
return 2;
case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
return 3;
case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
return 4;
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
return 5;
case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:
return 6;
case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:
return 7;
case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED:
return 8;
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN:
return 9;
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
return 10;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_CA_CERT_USED_AS_END_ENTITY:
return 11;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA:
return 12;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE:
return 13;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE:
return 14;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
return 15;
case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
return 16;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME:
return 17;
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED:
return 18;
}
NS_WARNING(
"Unknown certificate error code. Does MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue "
"handle everything in DetermineCertOverrideErrors?");
return 0;
}
static uint32_t MapCertErrorToProbeValue(PRErrorCode errorCode) {
uint32_t probeValue;
switch (errorCode) {
// see security/pkix/include/pkix/Result.h
#define MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP(name, value, nss_name) \
case nss_name: \
probeValue = value; \
break;
MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP_LIST
#undef MOZILLA_PKIX_MAP
default:
return 0;
}
// Since FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is 0x800, fatal error values are much larger than
// non-fatal error values. To conserve space, we remap these so they start at
// (decimal) 90 instead of 0x800. Currently there are ~50 non-fatal errors
// mozilla::pkix might return, so saving space for 90 should be sufficient
// (similarly, there are 4 fatal errors, so saving space for 10 should also
// be sufficient).
static_assert(
FATAL_ERROR_FLAG == 0x800,
"mozilla::pkix::FATAL_ERROR_FLAG is not what we were expecting");
if (probeValue & FATAL_ERROR_FLAG) {
probeValue ^= FATAL_ERROR_FLAG;
probeValue += 90;
}
return probeValue;
}
SECStatus DetermineCertOverrideErrors(const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
const nsACString& hostName, PRTime now,
PRErrorCode defaultErrorCodeToReport,
/*out*/ uint32_t& collectedErrors,
/*out*/ PRErrorCode& errorCodeTrust,
/*out*/ PRErrorCode& errorCodeMismatch,
/*out*/ PRErrorCode& errorCodeTime) {
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
MOZ_ASSERT(collectedErrors == 0);
MOZ_ASSERT(errorCodeTrust == 0);
MOZ_ASSERT(errorCodeMismatch == 0);
MOZ_ASSERT(errorCodeTime == 0);
// Assumes the error prioritization described in mozilla::pkix's
// BuildForward function. Also assumes that CheckCertHostname was only
// called if CertVerifier::VerifyCert succeeded.
switch (defaultErrorCodeToReport) {
case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED:
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_CA_CERT_USED_AS_END_ENTITY:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_V1_CERT_USED_AS_CA:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_EMPTY_ISSUER_NAME: {
collectedErrors = nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_UNTRUSTED;
errorCodeTrust = defaultErrorCodeToReport;
SECCertTimeValidity validity =
CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(cert.get(), now, false);
if (validity == secCertTimeUndetermined) {
// This only happens if cert is null. CERT_CheckCertValidTimes will
// have set the error code to SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS. We should really
// be using mozilla::pkix here anyway.
MOZ_ASSERT(PR_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if (validity == secCertTimeExpired) {
collectedErrors |= nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_TIME;
errorCodeTime = SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE;
} else if (validity == secCertTimeNotValidYet) {
collectedErrors |= nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_TIME;
errorCodeTime =
mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
break;
}
case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID_CERTIFICATE:
collectedErrors = nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_TIME;
errorCodeTime = defaultErrorCodeToReport;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN:
collectedErrors = nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_MISMATCH;
errorCodeMismatch = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN;
break;
case 0:
NS_ERROR("No error code set during certificate validation failure.");
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
default:
PR_SetError(defaultErrorCodeToReport, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
if (defaultErrorCodeToReport != SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN) {
Input certInput;
if (certInput.Init(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len) != Success) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
Input hostnameInput;
Result result = hostnameInput.Init(
BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const char*>(hostName.BeginReading()),
hostName.Length());
if (result != Success) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Use a lax policy so as to not generate potentially spurious name
// mismatch "hints".
BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(
BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce);
// CheckCertHostname expects that its input represents a certificate that
// has already been successfully validated by BuildCertChain. This is
// obviously not the case, however, because we're in the error path of
// certificate verification. Thus, this is problematic. In the future, it
// would be nice to remove this optimistic additional error checking and
// simply punt to the front-end, which can more easily (and safely) perform
// extra checks to give the user hints as to why verification failed.
result = CheckCertHostname(certInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
// Treat malformed name information as a domain mismatch.
if (result == Result::ERROR_BAD_DER ||
result == Result::ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN) {
collectedErrors |= nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_MISMATCH;
errorCodeMismatch = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN;
} else if (IsFatalError(result)) {
// Because its input has not been validated by BuildCertChain,
// CheckCertHostname can return an error that is less important than the
// original certificate verification error. Only return an error result
// from this function if we've encountered a fatal error.
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(result), 0);
return SECFailure;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
// Helper function to determine if overrides are allowed for this host.
// Overrides are not allowed for known HSTS or HPKP hosts. However, an IP
// address is never considered an HSTS or HPKP host.
nsresult CertErrorRunnable::OverrideAllowedForHost(
/*out*/ bool& overrideAllowed) {
overrideAllowed = false;
// If this is an IP address, overrides are allowed, because an IP address is
// never an HSTS or HPKP host. nsISiteSecurityService takes this into account
// already, but the real problem here is that calling NS_NewURI with an IPv6
// address fails. We do this to avoid that. A more comprehensive fix would be
// to have Necko provide an nsIURI to PSM and to use that here (and
// everywhere). However, that would be a wide-spanning change.
const nsACString& hostname = mInfoObject->GetHostName();
if (net_IsValidIPv6Addr(hostname.BeginReading(), hostname.Length())) {
overrideAllowed = true;
return NS_OK;
}
// If this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host or a pinned host and the
// certificate is bad, don't allow overrides (RFC 6797 section 12.1,
// HPKP draft spec section 2.6).
bool strictTransportSecurityEnabled = false;
bool hasPinningInformation = false;
nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss(do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID));
if (!sss) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] couldn't get nsISiteSecurityService to check HSTS/HPKP",
mFdForLogging, this));
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv =
NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("https://") + hostname);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] Creating new URI failed", mFdForLogging, this));
return rv;
}
rv = sss->IsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS, uri,
mProviderFlags, mInfoObject->GetOriginAttributes(),
nullptr, nullptr, &strictTransportSecurityEnabled);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] checking for HSTS failed", mFdForLogging, this));
return rv;
}
rv = sss->IsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HPKP, uri,
mProviderFlags, mInfoObject->GetOriginAttributes(),
nullptr, nullptr, &hasPinningInformation);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] checking for HPKP failed", mFdForLogging, this));
return rv;
}
overrideAllowed = !strictTransportSecurityEnabled && !hasPinningInformation;
return NS_OK;
}
SSLServerCertVerificationResult* CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides() {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] top of CheckCertOverrides\n", mFdForLogging, this));
// "Use" mFdForLogging in non-PR_LOGGING builds, too, to suppress
// clang's -Wunused-private-field build warning for this variable:
Unused << mFdForLogging;
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
NS_ERROR("CertErrorRunnable::CheckCertOverrides called off main thread");
return new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject,
mDefaultErrorCodeToReport);
}
int32_t port = mInfoObject->GetPort();
nsAutoCString hostWithPortString(mInfoObject->GetHostName());
hostWithPortString.Append(':');
hostWithPortString.AppendInt(port);
uint32_t remaining_display_errors = mCollectedErrors;
bool overrideAllowed;
if (NS_FAILED(OverrideAllowedForHost(overrideAllowed))) {
return new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject,
mDefaultErrorCodeToReport);
}
if (overrideAllowed) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] no HSTS or HPKP - overrides allowed\n", mFdForLogging,
this));
nsCOMPtr<nsICertOverrideService> overrideService =
do_GetService(NS_CERTOVERRIDE_CONTRACTID);
// it is fine to continue without the nsICertOverrideService
uint32_t overrideBits = 0;
if (overrideService) {
bool haveOverride;
bool isTemporaryOverride; // we don't care
const nsACString& hostString(mInfoObject->GetHostName());
nsresult rv = overrideService->HasMatchingOverride(
hostString, port, mCert, &overrideBits, &isTemporaryOverride,
&haveOverride);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && haveOverride) {
// remove the errors that are already overriden
remaining_display_errors &= ~overrideBits;
}
}
if (!remaining_display_errors) {
// This can double- or triple-count one certificate with multiple
// different types of errors. Since this is telemetry and we just
// want a ballpark answer, we don't care.
if (mErrorCodeTrust != 0) {
uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTrust);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES, probeValue);
}
if (mErrorCodeMismatch != 0) {
uint32_t probeValue =
MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeMismatch);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES, probeValue);
}
if (mErrorCodeTime != 0) {
uint32_t probeValue = MapOverridableErrorToProbeValue(mErrorCodeTime);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES, probeValue);
}
// all errors are covered by override rules, so let's accept the cert
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] All errors covered by override rules\n", mFdForLogging,
this));
return new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0);
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] HSTS or HPKP - no overrides allowed\n", mFdForLogging,
this));
}
MOZ_LOG(
gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] Certificate error was not overridden\n", mFdForLogging, this));
// Ok, this is a full stop.
// First, deliver the technical details of the broken SSL status.
// Try to get a nsIBadCertListener2 implementation from the socket consumer.
nsCOMPtr<nsISSLSocketControl> sslSocketControl = do_QueryInterface(
NS_ISUPPORTS_CAST(nsITransportSecurityInfo*, mInfoObject));
if (sslSocketControl) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> cb;
sslSocketControl->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(cb));
if (cb) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIBadCertListener2> bcl = do_GetInterface(cb);
if (bcl) {
nsIInterfaceRequestor* csi =
static_cast<nsIInterfaceRequestor*>(mInfoObject);
bool suppressMessage = false; // obsolete, ignored
Unused << bcl->NotifyCertProblem(csi, mInfoObject->SSLStatus(),
hostWithPortString, &suppressMessage);
}
}
}
// pick the error code to report by priority
PRErrorCode errorCodeToReport =
mErrorCodeTrust
? mErrorCodeTrust
: mErrorCodeMismatch
? mErrorCodeMismatch
: mErrorCodeTime ? mErrorCodeTime : mDefaultErrorCodeToReport;
SSLServerCertVerificationResult* result = new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(
mInfoObject, errorCodeToReport, Telemetry::HistogramCount, -1,
SSLErrorMessageType::OverridableCert);
LogInvalidCertError(mInfoObject, result->mErrorCode,
result->mErrorMessageType);
return result;
}
void CertErrorRunnable::RunOnTargetThread() {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
mResult = CheckCertOverrides();
MOZ_ASSERT(mResult);
}
// Returns null with the error code (PR_GetError()) set if it does not create
// the CertErrorRunnable.
CertErrorRunnable* CreateCertErrorRunnable(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
PRErrorCode defaultErrorCodeToReport,
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
const void* fdForLogging,
uint32_t providerFlags, PRTime now) {
MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject);
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
uint32_t probeValue = MapCertErrorToProbeValue(defaultErrorCodeToReport);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_VERIFICATION_ERRORS, probeValue);
uint32_t collected_errors = 0;
PRErrorCode errorCodeTrust = 0;
PRErrorCode errorCodeMismatch = 0;
PRErrorCode errorCodeTime = 0;
if (DetermineCertOverrideErrors(cert, infoObject->GetHostName(), now,
defaultErrorCodeToReport, collected_errors,
errorCodeTrust, errorCodeMismatch,
errorCodeTime) != SECSuccess) {
// Attempt to enforce that if DetermineCertOverrideErrors failed,
// PR_SetError was set with a non-overridable error. This is because if we
// return from CreateCertErrorRunnable without calling
// infoObject->SetStatusErrorBits, we won't have the required information
// to actually add a certificate error override. This results in a broken
// UI which is annoying but not a security disaster.
MOZ_ASSERT(!ErrorIsOverridable(PR_GetError()));
return nullptr;
}
RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nssCert(nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert.get()));
if (!nssCert) {
NS_ERROR("nsNSSCertificate::Create failed");
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, 0);
return nullptr;
}
if (!collected_errors) {
// This will happen when CERT_*Verify* only returned error(s) that are
// not on our whitelist of overridable certificate errors.
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p] !collected_errors: %d\n", fdForLogging,
static_cast<int>(defaultErrorCodeToReport)));
PR_SetError(defaultErrorCodeToReport, 0);
return nullptr;
}
infoObject->SetStatusErrorBits(nssCert, collected_errors);
return new CertErrorRunnable(
fdForLogging, static_cast<nsIX509Cert*>(nssCert.get()), infoObject,
defaultErrorCodeToReport, collected_errors, errorCodeTrust,
errorCodeMismatch, errorCodeTime, providerFlags);
}
// When doing async cert processing, we dispatch one of these runnables to the
// socket transport service thread, which blocks the socket transport
// service thread while it waits for the inner CertErrorRunnable to execute
// CheckCertOverrides on the main thread. CheckCertOverrides must block events
// on both of these threads because it calls
// TransportSecurityInfo::GetInterface(), which may call
// nsHttpConnection::GetInterface() through TransportSecurityInfo::mCallbacks.
// nsHttpConnection::GetInterface must always execute on the main thread, with
// the socket transport service thread blocked.
class CertErrorRunnableRunnable : public Runnable {
public:
explicit CertErrorRunnableRunnable(CertErrorRunnable* certErrorRunnable)
: Runnable("psm::CertErrorRunnableRunnable"),
mCertErrorRunnable(certErrorRunnable) {}
private:
NS_IMETHOD Run() override {
nsresult rv = mCertErrorRunnable->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
// The result must run on the socket transport thread, which we are already
// on, so we can just run it directly, instead of dispatching it.
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
rv = mCertErrorRunnable->mResult ? mCertErrorRunnable->mResult->Run()
: NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
return rv;
}
RefPtr<CertErrorRunnable> mCertErrorRunnable;
};
class SSLServerCertVerificationJob : public Runnable {
public:
// Must be called only on the socket transport thread
static SECStatus Dispatch(const RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier>& certVerifier,
const void* fdForLogging,
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
const UniqueCERTCertificate& serverCert,
const UniqueCERTCertList& peerCertChain,
const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtension,
uint32_t providerFlags, Time time, PRTime prtime);
private:
NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE
// Must be called only on the socket transport thread
SSLServerCertVerificationJob(
const RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier>& certVerifier, const void* fdForLogging,
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
UniqueCERTCertList peerCertChain, const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtension, uint32_t providerFlags, Time time,
PRTime prtime);
const RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier> mCertVerifier;
const void* const mFdForLogging;
const RefPtr<nsNSSSocketInfo> mInfoObject;
const UniqueCERTCertificate mCert;
UniqueCERTCertList mPeerCertChain;
const uint32_t mProviderFlags;
const Time mTime;
const PRTime mPRTime;
const TimeStamp mJobStartTime;
const UniqueSECItem mStapledOCSPResponse;
const UniqueSECItem mSCTsFromTLSExtension;
};
SSLServerCertVerificationJob::SSLServerCertVerificationJob(
const RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier>& certVerifier, const void* fdForLogging,
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
UniqueCERTCertList peerCertChain, const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtension, uint32_t providerFlags, Time time,
PRTime prtime)
: Runnable("psm::SSLServerCertVerificationJob"),
mCertVerifier(certVerifier),
mFdForLogging(fdForLogging),
mInfoObject(infoObject),
mCert(CERT_DupCertificate(cert.get())),
mPeerCertChain(Move(peerCertChain)),
mProviderFlags(providerFlags),
mTime(time),
mPRTime(prtime),
mJobStartTime(TimeStamp::Now()),
mStapledOCSPResponse(SECITEM_DupItem(stapledOCSPResponse)),
mSCTsFromTLSExtension(SECITEM_DupItem(sctsFromTLSExtension)) {}
// This function assumes that we will only use the SPDY connection coalescing
// feature on connections where we have negotiated SPDY using NPN. If we ever
// talk SPDY without having negotiated it with SPDY, this code will give wrong
// and perhaps unsafe results.
//
// Returns SECSuccess on the initial handshake of all connections, on
// renegotiations for any connections where we did not negotiate SPDY, or on any
// SPDY connection where the server's certificate did not change.
//
// Prohibit changing the server cert only if we negotiated SPDY,
// in order to support SPDY's cross-origin connection pooling.
static SECStatus BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy(
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, const UniqueCERTCertificate& serverCert) {
// Get the existing cert. If there isn't one, then there is
// no cert change to worry about.
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert;
RefPtr<nsSSLStatus> status(infoObject->SSLStatus());
if (!status) {
// If we didn't have a status, then this is the
// first handshake on this connection, not a
// renegotiation.
return SECSuccess;
}
status->GetServerCert(getter_AddRefs(cert));
if (!cert) {
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(
"nsSSLStatus must have a cert implementing nsIX509Cert");
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Filter out sockets that did not neogtiate SPDY via NPN
nsAutoCString negotiatedNPN;
nsresult rv = infoObject->GetNegotiatedNPN(negotiatedNPN);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv),
"GetNegotiatedNPN() failed during renegotiation");
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) &&
!StringBeginsWith(negotiatedNPN, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("spdy/"))) {
return SECSuccess;
}
// If GetNegotiatedNPN() failed we will assume spdy for safety's safe
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy failed GetNegotiatedNPN() call."
" Assuming spdy.\n"));
}
// Check to see if the cert has actually changed
UniqueCERTCertificate c(cert->GetCert());
MOZ_ASSERT(c, "Somehow couldn't get underlying cert from nsIX509Cert");
bool sameCert = CERT_CompareCerts(c.get(), serverCert.get());
if (sameCert) {
return SECSuccess;
}
// Report an error - changed cert is confirmed
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("SPDY Refused to allow new cert during renegotiation\n"));
PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
void AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(const char* commonName,
bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames) {
if (!commonName) {
// 1 means no common name present
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_2_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME, 1);
} else if (!commonNameInSubjectAltNames) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: common name '%s' not in subject alt. names "
"(or the subject alt. names extension is not present)\n",
commonName));
// 2 means the common name is not present in subject alt names
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_2_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME, 2);
} else {
// 0 means the common name is present in subject alt names
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_2_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME, 0);
}
}
// Returns true if and only if commonName ends with altName (minus its leading
// "*"). altName has already been checked to be of the form "*.<something>".
// commonName may be NULL.
static bool TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(const char* commonName,
const nsACString& altName) {
return commonName &&
StringEndsWith(nsDependentCString(commonName), Substring(altName, 1));
}
// Gathers telemetry on Baseline Requirements 9.2.1 (Subject Alternative
// Names Extension) and 9.2.2 (Subject Common Name Field).
// Specifically:
// - whether or not the subject common name field is present
// - whether or not the subject alternative names extension is present
// - if there is a malformed entry in the subject alt. names extension
// - if there is an entry in the subject alt. names extension corresponding
// to the subject common name
// Telemetry is only gathered for certificates that chain to a trusted root
// in Mozilla's Root CA program.
// certList consists of a validated certificate chain. The end-entity
// certificate is first and the root (trust anchor) is last.
void GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) {
CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
MOZ_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)));
if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* cert = endEntityNode->cert;
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
if (!cert) {
return;
}
UniquePORTString commonName(CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject));
// This only applies to certificates issued by authorities in our root
// program.
CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
MOZ_ASSERT(rootCert);
if (!rootCert) {
return;
}
bool isBuiltIn = false;
Result result = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn);
if (result != Success || !isBuiltIn) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: root certificate for '%s' is not a built-in root "
"(or IsCertBuiltInRoot failed)\n",
commonName.get()));
return;
}
ScopedAutoSECItem altNameExtension;
SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert, SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
&altNameExtension);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: no subject alt names extension for '%s'\n",
commonName.get()));
// 1 means there is no subject alt names extension
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_1_SUBJECT_ALT_NAMES, 1);
AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false);
return;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
CERTGeneralName* subjectAltNames =
CERT_DecodeAltNameExtension(arena.get(), &altNameExtension);
if (!subjectAltNames) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: could not decode subject alt names for '%s'\n",
commonName.get()));
// 2 means the subject alt names extension could not be decoded
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_1_SUBJECT_ALT_NAMES, 2);
AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(), false);
return;
}
CERTGeneralName* currentName = subjectAltNames;
bool commonNameInSubjectAltNames = false;
bool nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false;
bool malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = false;
bool nonFQDNPresent = false;
do {
nsAutoCString altName;
if (currentName->type == certDNSName) {
altName.Assign(
BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(currentName->name.other.data),
currentName->name.other.len);
nsDependentCString altNameWithoutWildcard(altName, 0);
if (StringBeginsWith(altNameWithoutWildcard, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("*."))) {
altNameWithoutWildcard.Rebind(altName, 2);
commonNameInSubjectAltNames |=
TryMatchingWildcardSubjectAltName(commonName.get(), altName);
}
// net_IsValidHostName appears to return true for valid IP addresses,
// which would be invalid for a DNS name.
// Note that the net_IsValidHostName check will catch things like
// "a.*.example.com".
if (!net_IsValidHostName(altNameWithoutWildcard) ||
net_IsValidIPv4Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length()) ||
net_IsValidIPv6Addr(altName.get(), altName.Length())) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: DNSName '%s' not valid (for '%s')\n",
altName.get(), commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
}
if (!altName.Contains('.')) {
nonFQDNPresent = true;
}
} else if (currentName->type == certIPAddress) {
// According to DNS.h, this includes space for the null-terminator
char buf[net::kNetAddrMaxCStrBufSize] = {0};
PRNetAddr addr;
if (currentName->name.other.len == 4) {
addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET;
memcpy(&addr.inet.ip, currentName->name.other.data,
currentName->name.other.len);
if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v4) not valid (for '%s')\n",
commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
} else {
altName.Assign(buf);
}
} else if (currentName->name.other.len == 16) {
addr.inet.family = PR_AF_INET6;
memcpy(&addr.ipv6.ip, currentName->name.other.data,
currentName->name.other.len);
if (PR_NetAddrToString(&addr, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1) != PR_SUCCESS) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: IPAddress (v6) not valid (for '%s')\n",
commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
} else {
altName.Assign(buf);
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: IPAddress not valid (for '%s')\n",
commonName.get()));
malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("BR telemetry: non-DNSName, non-IPAddress present for '%s'\n",
commonName.get()));
nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent = true;
}
if (commonName && altName.Equals(commonName.get())) {
commonNameInSubjectAltNames = true;
}
currentName = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(currentName);
} while (currentName && currentName != subjectAltNames);
if (nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent) {
// 3 means there's an entry that isn't an ip address or dns name
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_1_SUBJECT_ALT_NAMES, 3);
}
if (malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent) {
// 4 means there's a malformed ip address or dns name entry
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_1_SUBJECT_ALT_NAMES, 4);
}
if (nonFQDNPresent) {
// 5 means there's a DNS name entry with a non-fully-qualified domain name
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_1_SUBJECT_ALT_NAMES, 5);
}
if (!nonDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent && !malformedDNSNameOrIPAddressPresent &&
!nonFQDNPresent) {
// 0 means the extension is acceptable
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::BR_9_2_1_SUBJECT_ALT_NAMES, 0);
}
AccumulateSubjectCommonNameTelemetry(commonName.get(),
commonNameInSubjectAltNames);
}
// Gather telemetry on whether the end-entity cert for a server has the
// required TLS Server Authentication EKU, or any others
void GatherEKUTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) {
CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
MOZ_ASSERT(!(CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)));
if (CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList) ||
CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert;
MOZ_ASSERT(endEntityCert);
if (!endEntityCert) {
return;
}
// Only log telemetry if the root CA is built-in
CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
MOZ_ASSERT(rootCert);
if (!rootCert) {
return;
}
bool isBuiltIn = false;
Result rv = IsCertBuiltInRoot(rootCert, isBuiltIn);
if (rv != Success || !isBuiltIn) {
return;
}
// Find the EKU extension, if present
bool foundEKU = false;
SECOidTag oidTag;
CERTCertExtension* ekuExtension = nullptr;
for (size_t i = 0; endEntityCert->extensions && endEntityCert->extensions[i];
i++) {
oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&endEntityCert->extensions[i]->id);
if (oidTag == SEC_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
foundEKU = true;
ekuExtension = endEntityCert->extensions[i];
}
}
if (!foundEKU) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SERVER_AUTH_EKU, 0);
return;
}
// Parse the EKU extension
UniqueCERTOidSequence ekuSequence(
CERT_DecodeOidSequence(&ekuExtension->value));
if (!ekuSequence) {
return;
}
// Search through the available EKUs
bool foundServerAuth = false;
bool foundOther = false;
for (SECItem** oids = ekuSequence->oids; oids && *oids; oids++) {
oidTag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(*oids);
if (oidTag == SEC_OID_EXT_KEY_USAGE_SERVER_AUTH) {
foundServerAuth = true;
} else {
foundOther = true;
}
}
// Cases 3 is included only for completeness. It should never
// appear in these statistics, because CheckExtendedKeyUsage()
// should require the EKU extension, if present, to contain the
// value id_kp_serverAuth.
if (foundServerAuth && !foundOther) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SERVER_AUTH_EKU, 1);
} else if (foundServerAuth && foundOther) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SERVER_AUTH_EKU, 2);
} else if (!foundServerAuth) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SERVER_AUTH_EKU, 3);
}
}
// Gathers telemetry on which CA is the root of a given cert chain.
// If the root is a built-in root, then the telemetry makes a count
// by root. Roots that are not built-in are counted in one bin.
void GatherRootCATelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) {
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
MOZ_ASSERT(rootNode);
if (!rootNode) {
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(!CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList));
if (CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
MOZ_ASSERT(rootCert);
if (!rootCert) {
return;
}
AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_SUCCESS_BY_CA,
rootCert);
}
// These time are appoximate, i.e., doesn't account for leap seconds, etc
const uint64_t ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS = (7 * (24 * 60 * 60));
const uint64_t ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS = 52;
// Gathers telemetry on the certificate lifetimes we observe in the wild
void GatherEndEntityTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) {
CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
MOZ_ASSERT(endEntityNode && !CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList));
if (!endEntityNode || CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* endEntityCert = endEntityNode->cert;
MOZ_ASSERT(endEntityCert);
if (!endEntityCert) {
return;
}
PRTime notBefore;
PRTime notAfter;
if (CERT_GetCertTimes(endEntityCert, ¬Before, ¬After) != SECSuccess) {
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(notAfter > notBefore);
if (notAfter <= notBefore) {
return;
}
uint64_t durationInWeeks =
(notAfter - notBefore) / PR_USEC_PER_SEC / ONE_WEEK_IN_SECONDS;
if (durationInWeeks > (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS)) {
durationInWeeks = (2 * ONE_YEAR_IN_WEEKS) + 1;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OBSERVED_END_ENTITY_CERTIFICATE_LIFETIME,
durationInWeeks);
}
// There are various things that we want to measure about certificate
// chains that we accept. This is a single entry point for all of them.
void GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) {
GatherBaselineRequirementsTelemetry(certList);
GatherEKUTelemetry(certList);
GatherRootCATelemetry(certList);
GatherEndEntityTelemetry(certList);
}
void GatherTelemetryForSingleSCT(const ct::VerifiedSCT& verifiedSct) {
// See SSL_SCTS_ORIGIN in Histograms.json.
uint32_t origin = 0;
switch (verifiedSct.origin) {
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Origin::Embedded:
origin = 1;
break;
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Origin::TLSExtension:
origin = 2;
break;
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Origin::OCSPResponse:
origin = 3;
break;
default:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected VerifiedSCT::Origin type");
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_ORIGIN, origin);
// See SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS in Histograms.json.
uint32_t verificationStatus = 0;
switch (verifiedSct.status) {
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::Valid:
verificationStatus = 1;
break;
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::UnknownLog:
verificationStatus = 2;
break;
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidSignature:
verificationStatus = 3;
break;
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidTimestamp:
verificationStatus = 4;
break;
case ct::VerifiedSCT::Status::ValidFromDisqualifiedLog:
verificationStatus = 5;
break;
default:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected VerifiedSCT::Status type");
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS,
verificationStatus);
}
void GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(
const UniqueCERTCertList& certList, bool isEV,
const CertificateTransparencyInfo& info) {
if (!info.enabled) {
// No telemetry is gathered when CT is disabled.
return;
}
for (const ct::VerifiedSCT& sct : info.verifyResult.verifiedScts) {
GatherTelemetryForSingleSCT(sct);
}
// Decoding errors are reported to the 0th bucket
// of the SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS enumerated probe.
for (size_t i = 0; i < info.verifyResult.decodingErrors; ++i) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_VERIFICATION_STATUS, 0);
}
// Handle the histogram of SCTs counts.
uint32_t sctsCount =
static_cast<uint32_t>(info.verifyResult.verifiedScts.length());
// Note that sctsCount can also be 0 in case we've received SCT binary data,
// but it failed to parse (e.g. due to unsupported CT protocol version).
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_SCTS_PER_CONNECTION, sctsCount);
// Report CT Policy compliance of EV certificates.
if (isEV) {
uint32_t evCompliance = 0;
switch (info.policyCompliance) {
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::Compliant:
evCompliance = 1;
break;
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::NotEnoughScts:
evCompliance = 2;
break;
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::NotDiverseScts:
evCompliance = 3;
break;
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::Unknown:
default:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected CTPolicyCompliance type");
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CT_POLICY_COMPLIANCE_OF_EV_CERTS,
evCompliance);
}
// Get the root cert.
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
MOZ_ASSERT(rootNode);
if (!rootNode) {
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(!CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList));
if (CERT_LIST_END(rootNode, certList)) {
return;
}
CERTCertificate* rootCert = rootNode->cert;
MOZ_ASSERT(rootCert);
if (!rootCert) {
return;
}
// Report CT Policy compliance by CA.
switch (info.policyCompliance) {
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::Compliant:
AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(
Telemetry::SSL_CT_POLICY_COMPLIANT_CONNECTIONS_BY_CA, rootCert);
break;
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::NotEnoughScts:
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::NotDiverseScts:
AccumulateTelemetryForRootCA(
Telemetry::SSL_CT_POLICY_NON_COMPLIANT_CONNECTIONS_BY_CA, rootCert);
break;
case ct::CTPolicyCompliance::Unknown:
default:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected CTPolicyCompliance type");
}
}
// Note: Takes ownership of |peerCertChain| if SECSuccess is not returned.
SECStatus AuthCertificate(CertVerifier& certVerifier,
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject,
const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert,
UniqueCERTCertList& peerCertChain,
const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtension,
uint32_t providerFlags, Time time) {
MOZ_ASSERT(infoObject);
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
// We want to avoid storing any intermediate cert information when browsing
// in private, transient contexts.
bool saveIntermediates =
!(providerFlags & nsISocketProvider::NO_PERMANENT_STORAGE);
SECOidTag evOidPolicy;
UniqueCERTCertList builtCertChain;
CertVerifier::OCSPStaplingStatus ocspStaplingStatus =
CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
KeySizeStatus keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked;
PinningTelemetryInfo pinningTelemetryInfo;
CertificateTransparencyInfo certificateTransparencyInfo;
int flags = 0;
if (!infoObject->SharedState().IsOCSPStaplingEnabled() ||
!infoObject->SharedState().IsOCSPMustStapleEnabled()) {
flags |= CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST;
}
Result rv = certVerifier.VerifySSLServerCert(
cert, stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, time, infoObject,
infoObject->GetHostName(), builtCertChain, saveIntermediates, flags,
infoObject->GetOriginAttributes(), &evOidPolicy, &ocspStaplingStatus,
&keySizeStatus, &sha1ModeResult, &pinningTelemetryInfo,
&certificateTransparencyInfo);
uint32_t evStatus = (rv != Success)
? 0 // 0 = Failure
: (evOidPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) ? 1 // 1 = DV
: 2; // 2 = EV
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_EV_STATUS, evStatus);
if (ocspStaplingStatus != CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_OCSP_STAPLING, ocspStaplingStatus);
}
if (keySizeStatus != KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_CHAIN_KEY_SIZE_STATUS,
static_cast<uint32_t>(keySizeStatus));
}
if (sha1ModeResult != SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS,
static_cast<uint32_t>(sha1ModeResult));
}
if (pinningTelemetryInfo.accumulateForRoot) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_PINNING_FAILURES_BY_CA,
pinningTelemetryInfo.rootBucket);
}
if (pinningTelemetryInfo.accumulateResult) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(pinningTelemetryInfo.certPinningResultHistogram,
pinningTelemetryInfo.certPinningResultBucket);
}
if (rv == Success) {
// Certificate verification succeeded. Delete any potential record of
// certificate error bits.
RememberCertErrorsTable::GetInstance().RememberCertHasError(
infoObject, nullptr, SECSuccess);
GatherSuccessfulValidationTelemetry(builtCertChain);
GatherCertificateTransparencyTelemetry(
builtCertChain,
/*isEV*/ evOidPolicy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, certificateTransparencyInfo);
// The connection may get terminated, for example, if the server requires
// a client cert. Let's provide a minimal SSLStatus
// to the caller that contains at least the cert and its status.
RefPtr<nsSSLStatus> status(infoObject->SSLStatus());
if (!status) {
status = new nsSSLStatus();
infoObject->SetSSLStatus(status);
}
EVStatus evStatus;
if (evOidPolicy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
evStatus = EVStatus::NotEV;
} else {
evStatus = EVStatus::EV;
}
RefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nsc = nsNSSCertificate::Create(cert.get());
status->SetServerCert(nsc, evStatus);
status->SetSucceededCertChain(Move(builtCertChain));
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("AuthCertificate setting NEW cert %p", nsc.get()));
status->SetCertificateTransparencyInfo(certificateTransparencyInfo);
}
if (rv != Success) {
// Certificate validation failed; store the peer certificate chain on
// infoObject so it can be used for error reporting.
infoObject->SetFailedCertChain(Move(peerCertChain));
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv), 0);
}
return rv == Success ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
}
/*static*/ SECStatus SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch(
const RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier>& certVerifier, const void* fdForLogging,
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, const UniqueCERTCertificate& serverCert,
const UniqueCERTCertList& peerCertChain, const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtension, uint32_t providerFlags, Time time,
PRTime prtime) {
// Runs on the socket transport thread
if (!certVerifier || !infoObject || !serverCert) {
NS_ERROR("Invalid parameters for SSL server cert validation");
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!gCertVerificationThreadPool) {
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Copy the certificate list so the runnable can take ownership of it in the
// constructor.
UniqueCERTCertList peerCertChainCopy =
nsNSSCertList::DupCertList(peerCertChain);
if (!peerCertChainCopy) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationJob> job(new SSLServerCertVerificationJob(
certVerifier, fdForLogging, infoObject, serverCert,
Move(peerCertChainCopy), stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension,
providerFlags, time, prtime));
nsresult nrv = gCertVerificationThreadPool->Dispatch(job, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
if (NS_FAILED(nrv)) {
// We can't call SetCertVerificationResult here to change
// mCertVerificationState because SetCertVerificationResult will call
// libssl functions that acquire SSL locks that are already being held at
// this point. However, we can set an error with PR_SetError and return
// SECFailure, and the correct thing will happen (the error will be
// propagated and this connection will be terminated).
PRErrorCode error = nrv == NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ? PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR
: PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR;
PR_SetError(error, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
return SECWouldBlock;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run() {
// Runs on a cert verification thread
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p] SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Run\n", mInfoObject.get()));
PRErrorCode error;
Telemetry::HistogramID successTelemetry =
Telemetry::SSL_SUCCESFUL_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX;
Telemetry::HistogramID failureTelemetry =
Telemetry::SSL_INITIAL_FAILED_CERT_VALIDATION_TIME_MOZILLAPKIX;
// Reset the error code here so we can detect if AuthCertificate fails to
// set the error code if/when it fails.
PR_SetError(0, 0);
SECStatus rv =
AuthCertificate(*mCertVerifier, mInfoObject, mCert, mPeerCertChain,
mStapledOCSPResponse.get(), mSCTsFromTLSExtension.get(),
mProviderFlags, mTime);
MOZ_ASSERT((mPeerCertChain && rv == SECSuccess) ||
(!mPeerCertChain && rv != SECSuccess),
"AuthCertificate() should take ownership of chain on failure");
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
uint32_t interval =
(uint32_t)((TimeStamp::Now() - mJobStartTime).ToMilliseconds());
RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationResult> restart(
new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, 0, successTelemetry,
interval));
restart->Dispatch();
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES, 1);
return NS_OK;
}
// Note: the interval is not calculated once as PR_GetError MUST be called
// before any other function call
error = PR_GetError();
TimeStamp now = TimeStamp::Now();
Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(failureTelemetry, mJobStartTime, now);
if (error != 0) {
RefPtr<CertErrorRunnable> runnable(
CreateCertErrorRunnable(*mCertVerifier, error, mInfoObject, mCert,
mFdForLogging, mProviderFlags, mPRTime));
if (!runnable) {
// CreateCertErrorRunnable set a new error code
error = PR_GetError();
} else {
// We must block the the socket transport service thread while the
// main thread executes the CertErrorRunnable. The CertErrorRunnable
// will dispatch the result asynchronously, so we don't have to block
// this thread waiting for it.
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p][%p] Before dispatching CertErrorRunnable\n", mFdForLogging,
runnable.get()));
nsresult nrv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> stsTarget =
do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &nrv);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nrv)) {
nrv = stsTarget->Dispatch(new CertErrorRunnableRunnable(runnable),
NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
}
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nrv)) {
return NS_OK;
}
NS_ERROR("Failed to dispatch CertErrorRunnable");
error = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
if (error == 0) {
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(
"No error set during certificate validation failure");
error = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR;
}
RefPtr<SSLServerCertVerificationResult> failure(
new SSLServerCertVerificationResult(mInfoObject, error));
failure->Dispatch();
return NS_OK;
}
} // unnamed namespace
// Extracts whatever information we need out of fd (using SSL_*) and passes it
// to SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch. SSLServerCertVerificationJob
// should never do anything with fd except logging.
SECStatus AuthCertificateHook(void* arg, PRFileDesc* fd, PRBool checkSig,
PRBool isServer) {
RefPtr<SharedCertVerifier> certVerifier(GetDefaultCertVerifier());
if (!certVerifier) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Runs on the socket transport thread
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p] starting AuthCertificateHook\n", fd));
// Modern libssl always passes PR_TRUE for checkSig, and we have no means of
// doing verification without checking signatures.
MOZ_ASSERT(checkSig, "AuthCertificateHook: checkSig unexpectedly false");
// PSM never causes libssl to call this function with PR_TRUE for isServer,
// and many things in PSM assume that we are a client.
MOZ_ASSERT(!isServer, "AuthCertificateHook: isServer unexpectedly true");
nsNSSSocketInfo* socketInfo = static_cast<nsNSSSocketInfo*>(arg);
UniqueCERTCertificate serverCert(SSL_PeerCertificate(fd));
if (!checkSig || isServer || !socketInfo || !serverCert) {
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Get the peer certificate chain for error reporting
UniqueCERTCertList peerCertChain(SSL_PeerCertificateChain(fd));
if (!peerCertChain) {
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
socketInfo->SetFullHandshake();
Time now(Now());
PRTime prnow(PR_Now());
if (BlockServerCertChangeForSpdy(socketInfo, serverCert) != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
nsCOMPtr<nsISSLSocketControl> sslSocketControl = do_QueryInterface(
NS_ISUPPORTS_CAST(nsITransportSecurityInfo*, socketInfo));
if (sslSocketControl && sslSocketControl->GetBypassAuthentication()) {
MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("[%p] Bypass Auth in AuthCertificateHook\n", fd));
return SECSuccess;
}
bool onSTSThread;
nsresult nrv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts =
do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &nrv);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(nrv)) {
nrv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread);
}
if (NS_FAILED(nrv)) {
NS_ERROR("Could not get STS service or IsOnCurrentThread failed");
PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses will never return a non-empty response if
// OCSP stapling wasn't enabled because libssl wouldn't have let the server
// return a stapled OCSP response.
// We don't own these pointers.
const SECItemArray* csa = SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(fd);
SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse = nullptr;
// we currently only support single stapled responses
if (csa && csa->len == 1) {
stapledOCSPResponse = &csa->items[0];
}
const SECItem* sctsFromTLSExtension = SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(fd);
if (sctsFromTLSExtension && sctsFromTLSExtension->len == 0) {
// SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps returns null on error and empty item
// when no extension was returned by the server. We always use null when
// no extension was received (for whatever reason), ignoring errors.
sctsFromTLSExtension = nullptr;
}
uint32_t providerFlags = 0;
socketInfo->GetProviderFlags(&providerFlags);
if (onSTSThread) {
// We *must* do certificate verification on a background thread because
// we need the socket transport thread to be free for our OCSP requests,
// and we *want* to do certificate verification on a background thread
// because of the performance benefits of doing so.
socketInfo->SetCertVerificationWaiting();
SECStatus rv = SSLServerCertVerificationJob::Dispatch(
certVerifier, static_cast<const void*>(fd), socketInfo, serverCert,
peerCertChain, stapledOCSPResponse, sctsFromTLSExtension, providerFlags,
now, prnow);
return rv;
}
// We can't do certificate verification on a background thread, because the
// thread doing the network I/O may not interrupt its network I/O on receipt
// of our SSLServerCertVerificationResult event, and/or it might not even be
// a non-blocking socket.
SECStatus rv = AuthCertificate(*certVerifier, socketInfo, serverCert,
peerCertChain, stapledOCSPResponse,
sctsFromTLSExtension, providerFlags, now);
MOZ_ASSERT((peerCertChain && rv == SECSuccess) ||
(!peerCertChain && rv != SECSuccess),
"AuthCertificate() should take ownership of chain on failure");
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_CERT_ERROR_OVERRIDES, 1);
return SECSuccess;
}
PRErrorCode error = PR_GetError();
if (error != 0) {
RefPtr<CertErrorRunnable> runnable(CreateCertErrorRunnable(
*certVerifier, error, socketInfo, serverCert,
static_cast<const void*>(fd), providerFlags, prnow));
if (!runnable) {
// CreateCertErrorRunnable sets a new error code when it fails
error = PR_GetError();
} else {
// We have to return SECSuccess or SECFailure based on the result of the
// override processing, so we must block this thread waiting for it. The
// CertErrorRunnable will NOT dispatch the result at all, since we passed
// false for CreateCertErrorRunnable's async parameter
nrv = runnable->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
if (NS_FAILED(nrv)) {
NS_ERROR("Failed to dispatch CertErrorRunnable");
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!runnable->mResult) {
NS_ERROR("CertErrorRunnable did not set result");
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
if (runnable->mResult->mErrorCode == 0) {
return SECSuccess; // cert error override occurred.
}
// We must call SetCanceled here to set the error message type
// in case it isn't SSLErrorMessageType::Plain, which is what we would
// default to if we just called
// PR_SetError(runnable->mResult->mErrorCode, 0) and returned
// SECFailure without doing this.
socketInfo->SetCanceled(runnable->mResult->mErrorCode,
runnable->mResult->mErrorMessageType);
error = runnable->mResult->mErrorCode;
}
}
if (error == 0) {
NS_ERROR("error code not set");
error = PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
PR_SetError(error, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
SSLServerCertVerificationResult::SSLServerCertVerificationResult(
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject, PRErrorCode errorCode,
Telemetry::HistogramID telemetryID, uint32_t telemetryValue,
SSLErrorMessageType errorMessageType)
: Runnable("psm::SSLServerCertVerificationResult"),
mInfoObject(infoObject),
mErrorCode(errorCode),
mErrorMessageType(errorMessageType),
mTelemetryID(telemetryID),
mTelemetryValue(telemetryValue) {
// We accumulate telemetry for (only) successful validations on the main
// thread to avoid adversely affecting performance by acquiring the mutex that
// we use when accumulating the telemetry for unsuccessful validations.
// Unsuccessful validations times are accumulated elsewhere.
MOZ_ASSERT(telemetryID == Telemetry::HistogramCount || errorCode == 0);
}
void SSLServerCertVerificationResult::Dispatch() {
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> stsTarget =
do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
MOZ_ASSERT(stsTarget, "Failed to get socket transport service event target");
rv = stsTarget->Dispatch(this, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv),
"Failed to dispatch SSLServerCertVerificationResult");
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
SSLServerCertVerificationResult::Run() {
// TODO: Assert that we're on the socket transport thread
if (mTelemetryID != Telemetry::HistogramCount) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(mTelemetryID, mTelemetryValue);
}
mInfoObject->SetCertVerificationResult(mErrorCode, mErrorMessageType);
return NS_OK;
}
} // namespace psm
} // namespace mozilla