/*
* The crypt_blowfish homepage is:
*
* http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
*
* This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant
* and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password
* cracking removed.
*
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2014.
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
* Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
* general public under the following terms:
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted.
*
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
*
* It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system,
* as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
* ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate
* it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in
* the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let
* you place this code and any modifications you make under a license
* of your choice.
*
* This implementation is fully compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix
* "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and it uses
* some of his ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David
* Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>. For information on the level of
* compatibility for bcrypt hash prefixes other than "$2b$", please refer to
* the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the included crypt(3) man page.
*
* There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
*
* http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html
*
* Some of the tricks in BF_ROUND might be inspired by Eric Young's
* Blowfish library (I can't be sure if I would think of something if I
* hadn't seen his code).
*/
#include "crypt-port.h"
#include "crypt-private.h"
#include "byteorder.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#if INCLUDE_bcrypt
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(__alpha__) || defined(__hppa__)
#define BF_SCALE 1
#else
#define BF_SCALE 0
#endif
typedef uint32_t BF_word;
typedef int32_t BF_word_signed;
/* Set the int_to_cpu function according to the system's endianness */
#if IS_BIGENDIAN
#define BF_WORD_TO_CPU(x) be32_to_cpu (x)
#else
#define BF_WORD_TO_CPU(x) le32_to_cpu (x)
#endif
/* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */
#define BF_N 16
typedef BF_word BF_key[BF_N + 2];
typedef struct
{
BF_word S[4][0x100];
BF_key P;
} BF_ctx;
/*
* Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end.
* The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian.
*/
static const BF_word BF_magic_w[6] =
{
0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C,
0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274
};
/*
* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi.
*/
static const BF_ctx BF_init_state =
{
{
{
0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a
},
{
0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7
},
{
0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0
},
{
0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6
}
},
{
0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
}
};
static const unsigned char BF_itoa64[64 + 1] =
"./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
static const unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] =
{
64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 0, 1,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
64, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64,
64, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64
};
#define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \
{ \
tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \
if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \
tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \
if (tmp > 63) return -1; \
(dst) = tmp; \
}
static int
BF_decode (BF_word * dst, const char *src, int size)
{
unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *) dst;
unsigned char *end = dptr + size;
const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *) src;
unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4;
do
{
BF_safe_atoi64 (c1, *sptr++);
BF_safe_atoi64 (c2, *sptr++);
*dptr++ = (unsigned char)((c1 << 2) | ((c2 & 0x30) >> 4));
if (dptr >= end)
break;
BF_safe_atoi64 (c3, *sptr++);
*dptr++ = (unsigned char)(((c2 & 0x0F) << 4) | ((c3 & 0x3C) >> 2));
if (dptr >= end)
break;
BF_safe_atoi64 (c4, *sptr++);
*dptr++ = (unsigned char)(((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4);
}
while (dptr < end);
return 0;
}
static void
BF_encode (unsigned char *dst, const BF_word * src, int size)
{
const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *) src;
const unsigned char *end = sptr + size;
unsigned char *dptr = dst;
unsigned int c1, c2;
do
{
c1 = *sptr++;
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1 >> 2];
c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4;
if (sptr >= end)
{
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
break;
}
c2 = *sptr++;
c1 |= c2 >> 4;
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2;
if (sptr >= end)
{
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
break;
}
c2 = *sptr++;
c1 |= c2 >> 6;
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1];
*dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c2 & 0x3f];
}
while (sptr < end);
}
#if IS_BIGENDIAN
static void
BF_swap (ARG_UNUSED(BF_word * x), ARG_UNUSED(int count))
{
}
#else
static void
BF_swap (BF_word * x, int count)
{
BF_word tmp;
do
{
tmp = *x;
tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16);
*x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF);
}
while (--count);
}
#endif
#if BF_SCALE
/* Architectures which can shift addresses left by 2 bits with no extra cost */
#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
tmp2 = L >> 8; \
tmp2 &= 0xFF; \
tmp3 = L >> 16; \
tmp3 &= 0xFF; \
tmp4 = L >> 24; \
tmp1 = data->ctx.S[3][tmp1]; \
tmp2 = data->ctx.S[2][tmp2]; \
tmp3 = data->ctx.S[1][tmp3]; \
tmp3 += data->ctx.S[0][tmp4]; \
tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
R ^= data->ctx.P[N + 1]; \
tmp3 += tmp1; \
R ^= tmp3;
#else
/* Architectures with no complicated addressing modes supported */
#define BF_INDEX(S, i) \
BF_WORD_TO_CPU((((unsigned char *)S) + i))
#define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \
tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \
tmp1 <<= 2; \
tmp2 = L >> 6; \
tmp2 &= 0x3FC; \
tmp3 = L >> 14; \
tmp3 &= 0x3FC; \
tmp4 = L >> 22; \
tmp4 &= 0x3FC; \
tmp1 = BF_INDEX(data->ctx.S[3], tmp1); \
tmp2 = BF_INDEX(data->ctx.S[2], tmp2); \
tmp3 = BF_INDEX(data->ctx.S[1], tmp3); \
tmp3 += BF_INDEX(data->ctx.S[0], tmp4); \
tmp3 ^= tmp2; \
R ^= data->ctx.P[N + 1]; \
tmp3 += tmp1; \
R ^= tmp3;
#endif
/*
* Encrypt one block, BF_N is hardcoded here.
*/
#define BF_ENCRYPT \
L ^= data->ctx.P[0]; \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \
BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \
BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \
tmp4 = R; \
R = L; \
L = tmp4 ^ data->ctx.P[BF_N + 1];
#define BF_body() \
L = R = 0; \
ptr = data->ctx.P; \
do { \
ptr += 2; \
BF_ENCRYPT; \
*(ptr - 2) = L; \
*(ptr - 1) = R; \
} while (ptr < &data->ctx.P[BF_N + 2]); \
\
ptr = data->ctx.S[0]; \
do { \
ptr += 2; \
BF_ENCRYPT; \
*(ptr - 2) = L; \
*(ptr - 1) = R; \
} while (ptr < &data->ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
static void
BF_set_key (const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial,
unsigned char flags)
{
const char *ptr = key;
unsigned int bug, i, j;
BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2];
BF_word_signed stmp;
/*
* There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While
* we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide
* a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and
* a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain
* multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to
* the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally
* deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions.
* While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing
* characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a
* collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects
* only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of
* those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid
* UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings.
* Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a
* reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that
* are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm.
*
* We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password
* information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead
* of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password
* length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is
* difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by
* the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.)
*
* For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug"
* (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the
* variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested).
* Valid combinations of settings are:
*
* Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000
* Prefix "$2b$": bug = 0, safety = 0
* Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0
* Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0
*/
bug = (unsigned int) flags & 1;
safety = ((BF_word) flags & 2) << 15;
sign = diff = 0;
for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++)
{
tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
tmp[0] <<= 8;
tmp[0] |= (unsigned char) *ptr; /* correct */
tmp[1] <<= 8;
stmp = (BF_word_signed) (signed char) *ptr; /* bug */
tmp[1] |= (BF_word) stmp; /* two steps avoid GCC 6 spurious warning */
/*
* Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet,
* and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For
* chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign
* extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set.
*/
if (j)
sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80;
if (!*ptr)
ptr = key;
else
ptr++;
}
diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */
expanded[i] = tmp[bug];
initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug];
}
/*
* At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced
* exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates
* that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a
* collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of
* passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure
* is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by
* deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this.
*/
diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */
diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */
diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */
sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */
sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */
/*
* If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm,
* flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but
* let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's
* not any worse than any other choice we could make.)
*
* It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main
* Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a
* state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm
* (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect).
*/
initial[0] ^= sign;
}
static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] =
{
2, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0
};
/* prefix: $2z$00$ = 7 chars
(where z = a, b, x, or y, and 00 = a decimal number
from 00 to 31 inclusive)
salt: 22 chars */
#define BF_SETTING_LENGTH (7 + 22)
/* prefix: BF_SETTING_LENGTH
hash: 31 chars
terminator: 1 char */
#define BF_HASH_LENGTH (BF_SETTING_LENGTH + 31 + 1)
static_assert (BF_HASH_LENGTH <= CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE,
"CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE is too small for bcrypt");
/* BF_data holds all of the sensitive intermediate data used by
BF_crypt. */
struct BF_data
{
BF_ctx ctx;
BF_key expanded_key;
union
{
BF_word salt[4];
BF_word output[6];
} binary;
};
/* A BF_buffer holds a BF_data plus two extra output buffers used by
the self-test logic. One of them is slightly overlength so the
self-test can verify that BF_crypt emits exactly BF_HASH_LENGTH
bytes and no more. */
struct BF_buffer
{
struct BF_data data;
unsigned char re_output[BF_HASH_LENGTH];
unsigned char st_output[BF_HASH_LENGTH + 2];
};
static_assert (sizeof (struct BF_buffer) <= ALG_SPECIFIC_SIZE,
"ALG_SPECIFIC_SIZE is too small for bcrypt");
static bool
BF_crypt (const char *key, const char *setting, unsigned char *output,
struct BF_data *data, BF_word min)
{
BF_word L, R;
BF_word tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4;
BF_word *ptr;
BF_word count;
int i;
if (setting[0] != '$' ||
setting[1] != '2' ||
setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' ||
!flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int) (unsigned char) setting[2] - 'a'] ||
setting[3] != '$' ||
setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' ||
setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' ||
(setting[4] == '3' && setting[5] > '1') || setting[6] != '$')
{
errno = EINVAL;
return false;
}
count = (BF_word) 1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0'));
if (count < min || BF_decode (data->binary.salt, &setting[7], 16))
{
errno = EINVAL;
return false;
}
BF_swap (data->binary.salt, 4);
BF_set_key (key, data->expanded_key, data->ctx.P,
flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int) (unsigned char) setting[2] -
'a']);
memcpy (data->ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof (data->ctx.S));
L = R = 0;
for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2)
{
L ^= data->binary.salt[i & 2];
R ^= data->binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1];
BF_ENCRYPT;
data->ctx.P[i] = L;
data->ctx.P[i + 1] = R;
}
ptr = data->ctx.S[0];
do
{
ptr += 4;
L ^= data->binary.salt[(BF_N + 2) & 3];
R ^= data->binary.salt[(BF_N + 3) & 3];
BF_ENCRYPT;
*(ptr - 4) = L;
*(ptr - 3) = R;
L ^= data->binary.salt[(BF_N + 4) & 3];
R ^= data->binary.salt[(BF_N + 5) & 3];
BF_ENCRYPT;
*(ptr - 2) = L;
*(ptr - 1) = R;
}
while (ptr < &data->ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
do
{
int done;
for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2)
{
data->ctx.P[i] ^= data->expanded_key[i];
data->ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data->expanded_key[i + 1];
}
done = 0;
do
{
BF_body ();
if (done)
break;
done = 1;
tmp1 = data->binary.salt[0];
tmp2 = data->binary.salt[1];
tmp3 = data->binary.salt[2];
tmp4 = data->binary.salt[3];
for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4)
{
data->ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1;
data->ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2;
data->ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3;
data->ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4;
}
data->ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1;
data->ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2;
}
while (1);
}
while (--count);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2)
{
L = BF_magic_w[i];
R = BF_magic_w[i + 1];
count = 64;
do
{
BF_ENCRYPT;
}
while (--count);
data->binary.output[i] = L;
data->binary.output[i + 1] = R;
}
memcpy (output, setting, BF_SETTING_LENGTH - 1);
output[BF_SETTING_LENGTH - 1] =
BF_itoa64[(int)
BF_atoi64[(int) setting[BF_SETTING_LENGTH - 1] -
0x20] & 0x30];
/* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so
* only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. :-) */
BF_swap (data->binary.output, 6);
BF_encode (&output[BF_SETTING_LENGTH], data->binary.output, 23);
output[BF_HASH_LENGTH - 1] = '\0';
return true;
}
/*
* Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once:
*
* 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g.
* when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or
* library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or
* it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile
* might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such
* as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover
* from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not
* enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed.
*
* 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash
* computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code
* would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash
* computation is more reliable.
*
* The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08"
* setting.
*/
void
crypt_bcrypt_rn (const char *phrase, size_t ARG_UNUSED (phr_size),
const char *setting, size_t ARG_UNUSED (set_size),
uint8_t *output, size_t out_size,
void *scratch, size_t scr_size)
{
/* This shouldn't ever happen, but... */
if (out_size < BF_HASH_LENGTH || scr_size < sizeof (struct BF_buffer))
{
errno = ERANGE;
return;
}
struct BF_buffer *buffer = scratch;
/* Hash the supplied password */
if (!BF_crypt (phrase, setting, buffer->re_output, &buffer->data, 16))
return; /* errno has already been set */
/* Save and restore the current value of errno around the self-test. */
int save_errno = errno;
/* Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to
BF_crypt() from the same scope such that they likely use the same
stack locations, which makes the second call overwrite the first
call's sensitive data on the stack and makes it more likely that
any alignment related issues would be detected by the self-test. */
static const char test_key[] = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8";
static const char test_setting_init[] = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu";
static const char *const test_hashes[2] =
{
"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55", /* 'a', 'b', 'y' */
"VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55" /* 'x' */
};
const char *test_hash = test_hashes[0];
char test_setting[BF_SETTING_LENGTH];
unsigned int flags = flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int) (unsigned char)
setting[2] - 'a'];
bool ok;
memcpy (test_setting, test_setting_init, BF_SETTING_LENGTH);
test_hash = test_hashes[flags & 1];
test_setting[2] = setting[2];
memset (buffer->st_output, 0x55, sizeof buffer->st_output);
ok = (BF_crypt (test_key, test_setting, buffer->st_output, &buffer->data, 1)
&& !memcmp (buffer->st_output, test_setting, BF_SETTING_LENGTH)
&& !memcmp (buffer->st_output + BF_SETTING_LENGTH, test_hash,
sizeof buffer->st_output - (BF_SETTING_LENGTH + 1)));
/* Do a second self-test of the key-expansion "safety" logic. */
{
const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345";
BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi;
BF_set_key (k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */
BF_set_key (k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */
ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */
ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 &&
!memcmp (ae, ye, sizeof (ae)) && !memcmp (ai, yi, sizeof (ai));
}
if (!ok)
{
/* Self-test failed; pretend we don't support this hash type. */
errno = EINVAL;
return;
}
/* Self-test succeeded; copy the true output into the true output
buffer and return. We already know there is enough space. */
memcpy (output, buffer->re_output, BF_HASH_LENGTH);
errno = save_errno;
}
static void
BF_gensalt (char subtype, unsigned long count,
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes,
uint8_t *output, size_t o_size)
{
if (!count)
count = 5;
if (nrbytes < 16 ||
count < 4 || count > 31 ||
(subtype != 'a' && subtype != 'b' && subtype != 'x' && subtype != 'y'))
{
errno = EINVAL;
return;
}
if (o_size < 7 + 22 + 1)
{
errno = ERANGE;
return;
}
BF_word aligned_rbytes[16 / sizeof(BF_word)];
memcpy(aligned_rbytes, rbytes, 16);
output[0] = '$';
output[1] = '2';
output[2] = (uint8_t)subtype;
output[3] = '$';
output[4] = (uint8_t)('0' + count / 10);
output[5] = (uint8_t)('0' + count % 10);
output[6] = '$';
BF_encode (&output[7], aligned_rbytes, 16);
output[7 + 22] = '\0';
}
void
gensalt_bcrypt_a_rn (unsigned long count,
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes,
uint8_t *output, size_t o_size)
{
BF_gensalt ('a', count, rbytes, nrbytes, output, o_size);
}
void
gensalt_bcrypt_b_rn (unsigned long count,
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes,
uint8_t *output, size_t o_size)
{
BF_gensalt ('b', count, rbytes, nrbytes, output, o_size);
}
void
gensalt_bcrypt_x_rn (unsigned long count,
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes,
uint8_t *output, size_t o_size)
{
BF_gensalt ('x', count, rbytes, nrbytes, output, o_size);
}
void
gensalt_bcrypt_y_rn (unsigned long count,
const uint8_t *rbytes, size_t nrbytes,
uint8_t *output, size_t o_size)
{
BF_gensalt ('y', count, rbytes, nrbytes, output, o_size);
}
#endif