/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
/*
* COPYRIGHT (C) 2006,2007
* THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
*
* Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
* and redistribute this software and such derivative works
* for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of
* Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
* pertaining to the use of distribution of this software
* without specific, written prior authorization. If the
* above copyright notice or any other identification of the
* University of Michigan is included in any copy of any
* portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
* also be included.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION
* FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY
* PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF
* MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
* WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
* REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN
* IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGES.
*/
#include "k5-int.h"
#include "pkinit_crypto_openssl.h"
#include "k5-buf.h"
#include "k5-hex.h"
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
static void pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
static void pkinit_fini_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context );
static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx);
static void pkinit_fini_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_init_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx);
static void pkinit_fini_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_encode_dh_params
(const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, uint8_t **, unsigned int *);
static DH *decode_dh_params(const uint8_t *, unsigned int );
static int pkinit_check_dh_params(DH *dh1, DH *dh2);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len);
static krb5_error_code create_signature
(unsigned char **, unsigned int *, unsigned char *, unsigned int,
EVP_PKEY *pkey);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context cryptoctx,
const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len, uint8_t **decoded,
unsigned int *decoded_len);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
static void print_dh(DH *, char *);
static void print_pubkey(BIGNUM *, char *);
#endif
static int prepare_enc_data
(const uint8_t *indata, int indata_len, uint8_t **outdata, int *outdata_len);
static int openssl_callback (int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
static int openssl_callback_ignore_crls (int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
static int pkcs7_decrypt
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, PKCS7 *p7,
unsigned char **data_out, unsigned int *len_out);
static ASN1_OBJECT * pkinit_pkcs7type2oid
(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers
(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int type, krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
static krb5_error_code pkinit_find_private_key
(pkinit_identity_crypto_context, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_login
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip, const char *password);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_open_session
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx);
static void * pkinit_C_LoadModule(const char *modname, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p);
static CK_RV pkinit_C_UnloadModule(void *handle);
#ifdef SILLYDECRYPT
CK_RV pkinit_C_Decrypt
(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen);
#endif
static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len, uint8_t **decoded_data,
unsigned int *decoded_data_len);
#endif /* WITHOUT_PKCS11 */
static krb5_error_code pkinit_sign_data_fs
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len);
static krb5_error_code pkinit_decode_data_fs
(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len, uint8_t **decoded_data,
unsigned int *decoded_data_len);
static krb5_error_code
create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids);
static krb5_error_code
create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids);
static int
wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len);
static char *
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(int err);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_CMS
/* Use CMS support present in OpenSSL. */
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(_cms) CMS_get0_content(_cms)
#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(_cms) CMS_get0_content(_cms)
#define pkinit_CMS_free1_crls(_sk_x509crl) \
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free((_sk_x509crl), X509_CRL_free)
#define pkinit_CMS_free1_certs(_sk_x509) \
sk_X509_pop_free((_sk_x509), X509_free)
#define pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(_cms,_si,_x509_pp) \
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(_si,NULL,_x509_pp,NULL,NULL)
#else
/* Fake up CMS support using PKCS7. */
#define pkinit_CMS_free1_crls(_stack_of_x509crls) /* Don't free these */
#define pkinit_CMS_free1_certs(_stack_of_x509certs) /* Don't free these */
#define CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY PKCS7_NOVERIFY
#define CMS_NOATTR PKCS7_NOATTR
#define CMS_ContentInfo PKCS7
#define CMS_SignerInfo PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
#define d2i_CMS_ContentInfo d2i_PKCS7
#define CMS_get0_type(_p7) ((_p7)->type)
#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(_p7) (&((_p7)->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.octet_string))
#define pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(_p7) (&((_p7)->d.other->value.octet_string))
#define CMS_set1_signers_certs(_p7,_stack_of_x509,_uint)
#define CMS_get0_SignerInfos PKCS7_get_signer_info
#define stack_st_CMS_SignerInfo stack_st_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
#undef sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value
#define sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value
#define CMS_get0_eContentType(_p7) (_p7->d.sign->contents->type)
#define CMS_verify PKCS7_verify
#define CMS_get1_crls(_p7) (_p7->d.sign->crl)
#define CMS_get1_certs(_p7) (_p7->d.sign->cert)
#define CMS_ContentInfo_free(_p7) PKCS7_free(_p7)
#define pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(_p7,_si,_x509_pp) \
(*_x509_pp) = PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info(_p7,_si)
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
/* 1.1 standardizes constructor and destructor names, renaming
* EVP_MD_CTX_{create,destroy} and deprecating ASN1_STRING_data. */
#define EVP_MD_CTX_new EVP_MD_CTX_create
#define EVP_MD_CTX_free EVP_MD_CTX_destroy
#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data ASN1_STRING_data
/* 1.1 makes many handle types opaque and adds accessors. Add compatibility
* versions of the new accessors we use for pre-1.1. */
#define OBJ_get0_data(o) ((o)->data)
#define OBJ_length(o) ((o)->length)
#define DH_set0_pqg compat_dh_set0_pqg
static int compat_dh_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
{
/* The real function frees the old values and does argument checking, but
* our code doesn't need that. */
dh->p = p;
dh->q = q;
dh->g = g;
return 1;
}
#define DH_get0_pqg compat_dh_get0_pqg
static void compat_dh_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p,
const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
{
if (p != NULL)
*p = dh->p;
if (q != NULL)
*q = dh->q;
if (g != NULL)
*g = dh->g;
}
#define DH_get0_key compat_dh_get0_key
static void compat_dh_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub,
const BIGNUM **priv)
{
if (pub != NULL)
*pub = dh->pub_key;
if (priv != NULL)
*priv = dh->priv_key;
}
/* Return true if the cert c includes a key usage which doesn't include u.
* Define using direct member access for pre-1.1. */
#define ku_reject(c, u) \
(((c)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((c)->ex_kusage & (u)))
#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L */
/* Return true if the cert x includes a key usage which doesn't include u. */
#define ku_reject(c, u) (!(X509_get_key_usage(c) & (u)))
#endif
static struct pkcs11_errstrings {
short code;
char *text;
} pkcs11_errstrings[] = {
{ 0x0, "ok" },
{ 0x1, "cancel" },
{ 0x2, "host memory" },
{ 0x3, "slot id invalid" },
{ 0x5, "general error" },
{ 0x6, "function failed" },
{ 0x7, "arguments bad" },
{ 0x8, "no event" },
{ 0x9, "need to create threads" },
{ 0xa, "cant lock" },
{ 0x10, "attribute read only" },
{ 0x11, "attribute sensitive" },
{ 0x12, "attribute type invalid" },
{ 0x13, "attribute value invalid" },
{ 0x20, "data invalid" },
{ 0x21, "data len range" },
{ 0x30, "device error" },
{ 0x31, "device memory" },
{ 0x32, "device removed" },
{ 0x40, "encrypted data invalid" },
{ 0x41, "encrypted data len range" },
{ 0x50, "function canceled" },
{ 0x51, "function not parallel" },
{ 0x54, "function not supported" },
{ 0x60, "key handle invalid" },
{ 0x62, "key size range" },
{ 0x63, "key type inconsistent" },
{ 0x64, "key not needed" },
{ 0x65, "key changed" },
{ 0x66, "key needed" },
{ 0x67, "key indigestible" },
{ 0x68, "key function not permitted" },
{ 0x69, "key not wrappable" },
{ 0x6a, "key unextractable" },
{ 0x70, "mechanism invalid" },
{ 0x71, "mechanism param invalid" },
{ 0x82, "object handle invalid" },
{ 0x90, "operation active" },
{ 0x91, "operation not initialized" },
{ 0xa0, "pin incorrect" },
{ 0xa1, "pin invalid" },
{ 0xa2, "pin len range" },
{ 0xa3, "pin expired" },
{ 0xa4, "pin locked" },
{ 0xb0, "session closed" },
{ 0xb1, "session count" },
{ 0xb3, "session handle invalid" },
{ 0xb4, "session parallel not supported" },
{ 0xb5, "session read only" },
{ 0xb6, "session exists" },
{ 0xb7, "session read only exists" },
{ 0xb8, "session read write so exists" },
{ 0xc0, "signature invalid" },
{ 0xc1, "signature len range" },
{ 0xd0, "template incomplete" },
{ 0xd1, "template inconsistent" },
{ 0xe0, "token not present" },
{ 0xe1, "token not recognized" },
{ 0xe2, "token write protected" },
{ 0xf0, "unwrapping key handle invalid" },
{ 0xf1, "unwrapping key size range" },
{ 0xf2, "unwrapping key type inconsistent" },
{ 0x100, "user already logged in" },
{ 0x101, "user not logged in" },
{ 0x102, "user pin not initialized" },
{ 0x103, "user type invalid" },
{ 0x104, "user another already logged in" },
{ 0x105, "user too many types" },
{ 0x110, "wrapped key invalid" },
{ 0x112, "wrapped key len range" },
{ 0x113, "wrapping key handle invalid" },
{ 0x114, "wrapping key size range" },
{ 0x115, "wrapping key type inconsistent" },
{ 0x120, "random seed not supported" },
{ 0x121, "random no rng" },
{ 0x130, "domain params invalid" },
{ 0x150, "buffer too small" },
{ 0x160, "saved state invalid" },
{ 0x170, "information sensitive" },
{ 0x180, "state unsaveable" },
{ 0x190, "cryptoki not initialized" },
{ 0x191, "cryptoki already initialized" },
{ 0x1a0, "mutex bad" },
{ 0x1a1, "mutex not locked" },
{ 0x200, "function rejected" },
{ -1, NULL }
};
/* DH parameters */
static uint8_t oakley_1024[128] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x81,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
static uint8_t oakley_2048[2048/8] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
static uint8_t oakley_4096[4096/8] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34,
0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1,
0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74,
0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22,
0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD,
0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B,
0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37,
0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45,
0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6,
0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B,
0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED,
0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5,
0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6,
0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D,
0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05,
0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A,
0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F,
0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96,
0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB,
0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D,
0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04,
0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C,
0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B,
0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03,
0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F,
0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9,
0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18,
0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5,
0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10,
0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D,
0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33,
0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64,
0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A,
0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D,
0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7,
0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7,
0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D,
0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B,
0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64,
0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64,
0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C,
0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C,
0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2,
0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31,
0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E,
0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01,
0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7,
0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26,
0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C,
0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA,
0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8,
0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9,
0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6,
0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D,
0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2,
0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED,
0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF,
0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C,
0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9,
0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1,
0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F,
0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99,
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
};
MAKE_INIT_FUNCTION(pkinit_openssl_init);
static krb5_error_code oerr(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code,
const char *fmt, ...)
#if !defined(__cplusplus) && (__GNUC__ > 2)
__attribute__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 4)))
#endif
;
/*
* Set an error string containing the formatted arguments and the first pending
* OpenSSL error. Write the formatted arguments and all pending OpenSSL error
* messages to the trace log. Return code, or KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED if
* code is 0.
*/
static krb5_error_code
oerr(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, const char *fmt, ...)
{
unsigned long err;
va_list ap;
char *str, buf[128];
int r;
if (!code)
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&str, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (r < 0)
return code;
err = ERR_peek_error();
if (err) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, code, _("%s: %s"), str,
ERR_reason_error_string(err));
} else {
krb5_set_error_message(context, code, "%s", str);
}
TRACE_PKINIT_OPENSSL_ERROR(context, str);
while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
ERR_error_string_n(err, buf, sizeof(buf));
TRACE_PKINIT_OPENSSL_ERROR(context, buf);
}
free(str);
return code;
}
/*
* Set an appropriate error string containing msg for a certificate
* verification failure from certctx. Write the message and all pending
* OpenSSL error messages to the trace log. Return code, or
* KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED if code is 0.
*/
static krb5_error_code
oerr_cert(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, X509_STORE_CTX *certctx,
const char *msg)
{
int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(certctx);
int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(certctx);
const char *errstr = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
return oerr(context, code, _("%s (depth %d): %s"), msg, depth, errstr);
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
(void)CALL_INIT_FUNCTION(pkinit_openssl_init);
ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
pkiDebug("%s: initializing openssl crypto context at %p\n",
__FUNCTION__, ctx);
retval = pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = pkinit_init_dh_params(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
*cryptoctx = ctx;
out:
if (retval && ctx != NULL)
pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(ctx);
return retval;
}
void
pkinit_fini_plg_crypto(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx)
{
pkiDebug("%s: freeing context at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, cryptoctx);
if (cryptoctx == NULL)
return;
pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(cryptoctx);
pkinit_fini_dh_params(cryptoctx);
free(cryptoctx);
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_identity_crypto(pkinit_identity_crypto_context *idctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->identity = NULL;
retval = pkinit_init_certs(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = pkinit_init_pkcs11(ctx);
if (retval)
goto out;
pkiDebug("%s: returning ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, ctx);
*idctx = ctx;
out:
if (retval) {
if (ctx)
pkinit_fini_identity_crypto(ctx);
}
return retval;
}
void
pkinit_fini_identity_crypto(pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx)
{
if (idctx == NULL)
return;
pkiDebug("%s: freeing ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, idctx);
if (idctx->deferred_ids != NULL)
pkinit_free_deferred_ids(idctx->deferred_ids);
free(idctx->identity);
pkinit_fini_certs(idctx);
pkinit_fini_pkcs11(idctx);
free(idctx);
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context *cryptoctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
pkinit_req_crypto_context ctx = NULL;
ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->dh = NULL;
ctx->received_cert = NULL;
*cryptoctx = ctx;
pkiDebug("%s: returning ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, ctx);
retval = 0;
out:
if (retval)
free(ctx);
return retval;
}
void
pkinit_fini_req_crypto(pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx)
{
if (req_cryptoctx == NULL)
return;
pkiDebug("%s: freeing ctx at %p\n", __FUNCTION__, req_cryptoctx);
if (req_cryptoctx->dh != NULL)
DH_free(req_cryptoctx->dh);
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert != NULL)
X509_free(req_cryptoctx->received_cert);
free(req_cryptoctx);
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx)
{
ctx->id_pkinit_san = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.5.2.2", 1);
if (ctx->id_pkinit_san == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_pkinit_authData = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.1", 1);
if (ctx->id_pkinit_authData == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_pkinit_DHKeyData = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.2", 1);
if (ctx->id_pkinit_DHKeyData == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_pkinit_rkeyData = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.3", 1);
if (ctx->id_pkinit_rkeyData == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4", 1);
if (ctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5", 1);
if (ctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2", 1);
if (ctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_ms_san_upn = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3", 1);
if (ctx->id_ms_san_upn == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ctx->id_kp_serverAuth = OBJ_txt2obj("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1", 1);
if (ctx->id_kp_serverAuth == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
get_cert(char *filename, X509 **retcert)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retcert == NULL)
return EINVAL;
*retcert = NULL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
cert = (X509 *) PEM_read_bio_X509(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (cert == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read certificate from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retcert = cert;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
struct get_key_cb_data {
krb5_context context;
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx;
const char *fsname;
char *filename;
const char *password;
};
static int
get_key_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata)
{
struct get_key_cb_data *data = userdata;
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx;
krb5_data rdat;
krb5_prompt kprompt;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
krb5_error_code retval;
char *prompt;
if (data->id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt) {
/* Supply the identity name to be passed to a responder callback. */
pkinit_set_deferred_id(&data->id_cryptoctx->deferred_ids,
data->fsname, 0, NULL);
return -1;
}
if (data->password == NULL) {
/* We don't already have a password to use, so prompt for one. */
if (data->id_cryptoctx->prompter == NULL)
return -1;
if (asprintf(&prompt, "%s %s", _("Pass phrase for"),
data->filename) < 0)
return -1;
rdat.data = buf;
rdat.length = size;
kprompt.prompt = prompt;
kprompt.hidden = 1;
kprompt.reply = &rdat;
prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
k5int_set_prompt_types(data->context, &prompt_type);
id_cryptoctx = data->id_cryptoctx;
retval = (data->id_cryptoctx->prompter)(data->context,
id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
k5int_set_prompt_types(data->context, 0);
free(prompt);
if (retval != 0)
return -1;
} else {
/* Just use the already-supplied password. */
rdat.length = strlen(data->password);
if ((int)rdat.length >= size)
return -1;
snprintf(buf, size, "%s", data->password);
}
return (int)rdat.length;
}
static krb5_error_code
get_key(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
char *filename, const char *fsname, EVP_PKEY **retkey,
const char *password)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
struct get_key_cb_data cb_data;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retkey == NULL)
return EINVAL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
cb_data.context = context;
cb_data.id_cryptoctx = id_cryptoctx;
cb_data.filename = filename;
cb_data.fsname = fsname;
cb_data.password = password;
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(tmp, NULL, get_key_cb, &cb_data);
if (pkey == NULL && !id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read private key from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retkey = pkey;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_pkinit_oids(pkinit_plg_crypto_context ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_san);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_authData);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_DHKeyData);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_rkeyData);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_ms_san_upn);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->id_kp_serverAuth);
}
/* Construct an OpenSSL DH object for an Oakley group. */
static DH *
make_oakley_dh(uint8_t *prime, size_t len)
{
DH *dh = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
p = BN_bin2bn(prime, len, NULL);
if (p == NULL)
goto cleanup;
q = BN_new();
if (q == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!BN_rshift1(q, p))
goto cleanup;
g = BN_new();
if (g == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!BN_set_word(g, DH_GENERATOR_2))
goto cleanup;
dh = DH_new();
if (dh == NULL)
goto cleanup;
DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, q, g);
p = g = q = NULL;
cleanup:
BN_free(p);
BN_free(q);
BN_free(g);
return dh;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
plgctx->dh_1024 = make_oakley_dh(oakley_1024, sizeof(oakley_1024));
if (plgctx->dh_1024 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_2048 = make_oakley_dh(oakley_2048, sizeof(oakley_2048));
if (plgctx->dh_2048 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
plgctx->dh_4096 = make_oakley_dh(oakley_4096, sizeof(oakley_4096));
if (plgctx->dh_4096 == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval)
pkinit_fini_dh_params(plgctx);
return retval;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_dh_params(pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx)
{
if (plgctx->dh_1024 != NULL)
DH_free(plgctx->dh_1024);
if (plgctx->dh_2048 != NULL)
DH_free(plgctx->dh_2048);
if (plgctx->dh_4096 != NULL)
DH_free(plgctx->dh_4096);
plgctx->dh_1024 = plgctx->dh_2048 = plgctx->dh_4096 = NULL;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++)
ctx->creds[i] = NULL;
ctx->my_certs = NULL;
ctx->cert_index = 0;
ctx->my_key = NULL;
ctx->trustedCAs = NULL;
ctx->intermediateCAs = NULL;
ctx->revoked = NULL;
retval = 0;
return retval;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
if (ctx->my_certs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->my_certs, X509_free);
if (ctx->my_key != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->my_key);
if (ctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->trustedCAs, X509_free);
if (ctx->intermediateCAs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->intermediateCAs, X509_free);
if (ctx->revoked != NULL)
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(ctx->revoked, X509_CRL_free);
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_init_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
ctx->p11_module_name = strdup(PKCS11_MODNAME);
if (ctx->p11_module_name == NULL)
return retval;
ctx->p11_module = NULL;
ctx->slotid = PK_NOSLOT;
ctx->token_label = NULL;
ctx->cert_label = NULL;
ctx->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ctx->p11 = NULL;
#endif
ctx->pkcs11_method = 0;
retval = 0;
return retval;
}
static void
pkinit_fini_pkcs11(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
if (ctx->p11 != NULL) {
if (ctx->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
ctx->p11->C_CloseSession(ctx->session);
ctx->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
ctx->p11->C_Finalize(NULL_PTR);
ctx->p11 = NULL;
}
if (ctx->p11_module != NULL) {
pkinit_C_UnloadModule(ctx->p11_module);
ctx->p11_module = NULL;
}
free(ctx->p11_module_name);
free(ctx->token_label);
free(ctx->cert_id);
free(ctx->cert_label);
#endif
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_identity_set_prompter(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
void *prompter_data)
{
id_cryptoctx->prompter = prompter;
id_cryptoctx->prompter_data = prompter_data;
return 0;
}
/* Create a CMS ContentInfo of type oid containing the octet string in data. */
static krb5_error_code
create_contentinfo(krb5_context context, ASN1_OBJECT *oid,
unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, PKCS7 **p7_out)
{
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ostr = NULL;
*p7_out = NULL;
ostr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (ostr == NULL)
goto oom;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ostr, (unsigned char *)data, data_len))
goto oom;
p7 = PKCS7_new();
if (p7 == NULL)
goto oom;
p7->type = OBJ_dup(oid);
if (p7->type == NULL)
goto oom;
p7->d.other = ASN1_TYPE_new();
if (p7->d.other == NULL)
goto oom;
p7->d.other->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
p7->d.other->value.octet_string = ostr;
*p7_out = p7;
return 0;
oom:
if (ostr != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ostr);
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
return ENOMEM;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_contentinfo_create(krb5_context context, /* IN */
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, /* IN */
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, /* IN */
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, /* IN */
int cms_msg_type,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out_data, unsigned int *out_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
/* Pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo. */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
retval = create_contentinfo(context, oid, data, data_len, &p7);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
*out_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*out_data_len)) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to DER encode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup;
}
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((p = *out_data = malloc(*out_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to DER encode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7)
PKCS7_free(p7);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **signed_data,
unsigned int *signed_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL, *inner_p7 = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(X509) * cert_stack = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest_attr = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_MD *md_tmp = NULL;
unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], md_data2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *digestInfo_buf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
unsigned int md_len, md_len2, alen, digestInfo_len;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * sk;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
unsigned int sig_len = 0;
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL;
unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0;
unsigned char *y = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL, *oid_copy;
/* Start creating PKCS7 data. */
if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->d.sign = p7s;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 3))
goto cleanup;
/* pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
/* create a cert chain that has at least the signer's certificate */
if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
if (!include_certchain) {
pkiDebug("only including signer's certificate\n");
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(cert));
} else {
/* create a cert chain */
X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX *certctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int i = 0, size = 0;
if ((certstore = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pkiDebug("building certificate chain\n");
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(certstore, openssl_callback);
certctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (certctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_STORE_CTX_init(certctx, certstore, cert,
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs);
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs);
if (!X509_verify_cert(certctx)) {
retval = oerr_cert(context, 0, certctx,
_("Failed to verify own certificate"));
goto cleanup;
}
certstack = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(certctx);
size = sk_X509_num(certstack);
pkiDebug("size of certificate chain = %d\n", size);
for(i = 0; i < size - 1; i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certstack, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(x));
}
X509_STORE_CTX_free(certctx);
X509_STORE_free(certstore);
sk_X509_pop_free(certstack, X509_free);
}
p7s->cert = cert_stack;
/* fill-in PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO */
if ((p7si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1))
goto cleanup;
if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
goto cleanup;
/* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do
* things the ugly way. */
ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial =
ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
goto cleanup;
/* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
/* Set digest algs */
p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
if (p7si->digest_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_alg->parameter);
if ((p7si->digest_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* Set sig algs */
if (p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter);
p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption);
if (!(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* add signed attributes */
/* compute sha1 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, data_len);
md_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md_data, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
/* create a message digest attr */
digest_attr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest_attr, md_data, (int)md_len);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (char *)digest_attr);
/* create a content-type attr */
oid_copy = OBJ_dup(oid);
if (oid_copy == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid_copy);
/* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
/* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
sk = p7si->auth_attr;
alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)sk, &abuf,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
if (abuf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
/* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha1 hash */
/* to compute sha1WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the hash
* function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo
* DigestInfo::=SEQUENCE {
* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* digest OCTET STRING }
*/
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
pkiDebug("mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS\n");
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, abuf, alen);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md_data2, &md_len2);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (alg == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
alg_len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, NULL);
digest = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (digest == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest, md_data2, (int)md_len2);
digest_len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, NULL);
digestInfo_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
y = digestInfo_buf = malloc(digestInfo_len);
if (digestInfo_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_put_object(&y, 1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, &y);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, &y);
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
pkiDebug("signing buffer\n");
print_buffer(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len);
print_buffer_bin(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len, "/tmp/pkcs7_tosign");
#endif
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, digestInfo_buf,
digestInfo_len, &sig, &sig_len);
} else
#endif
{
pkiDebug("mech = %s\n",
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS" : "FS");
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, abuf, alen,
&sig, &sig_len);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
print_buffer(sig, sig_len);
#endif
free(abuf);
if (retval)
goto cleanup2;
/* Add signature */
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(p7si->enc_digest, (unsigned char *) sig,
(int)sig_len)) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to add digest attribute"));
goto cleanup2;
}
/* adder signer_info to pkcs7 signed */
if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, p7si))
goto cleanup2;
} /* we have a certificate */
/* start on adding data to the pkcs7 signed */
retval = create_contentinfo(context, oid, data, data_len, &inner_p7);
if (p7s->contents != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7s->contents);
p7s->contents = inner_p7;
*signed_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*signed_data_len)) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to DER encode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((p = *signed_data = malloc(*signed_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to DER encode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/kdc_pkcs7_signeddata");
}
#endif
cleanup2:
if (p7si) {
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
free(digestInfo_buf);
if (digest != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(digest);
}
#endif
if (alg != NULL)
X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
}
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
free(sig);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_signeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *signed_data,
unsigned int signed_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len,
unsigned char **authz_data,
unsigned int *authz_data_len,
int *is_signed)
{
/*
* Warning: Since most openssl functions do not set retval, large chunks of
* this function assume that retval is always a failure and may go to
* cleanup without setting retval explicitly. Make sure retval is not set
* to 0 or errors such as signature verification failure may be converted
* to success with significant security consequences.
*/
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
int flags = CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY;
int valid_oid = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
unsigned int vflags = 0, size = 0;
const unsigned char *p = signed_data;
STACK_OF(CMS_SignerInfo) *si_sk = NULL;
CMS_SignerInfo *si = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *signerCerts = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *intermediateCAs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *signerRevoked = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *revoked = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
const ASN1_OBJECT *type = NULL, *etype = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **octets;
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_verified_chain = NULL;
krb5_data *authz = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(signed_data, signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_received_pkcs7_signeddata");
#endif
if (is_signed)
*is_signed = 1;
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plgctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* decode received CMS message */
if ((cms = d2i_CMS_ContentInfo(NULL, &p, (int)signed_data_len)) == NULL) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decode CMS message"));
goto cleanup;
}
etype = CMS_get0_eContentType(cms);
/*
* Prior to 1.10 the MIT client incorrectly emitted the pkinit structure
* directly in a CMS ContentInfo rather than using SignedData with no
* signers. Handle that case.
*/
type = CMS_get0_type(cms);
if (is_signed && !OBJ_cmp(type, oid)) {
unsigned char *d;
*is_signed = 0;
octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_data(cms);
if (!octets || ((*octets)->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Invalid pkinit packet: octet string "
"expected"));
goto cleanup;
}
*data_len = ASN1_STRING_length(*octets);
d = malloc(*data_len);
if (d == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(d, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(*octets), *data_len);
*data = d;
goto out;
} else {
/* Verify that the received message is CMS SignedData message. */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(type) != NID_pkcs7_signed) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-signedData CMS msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, _("wrong oid\n"));
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* setup to verify X509 certificate used to sign CMS message */
if (!(store = X509_STORE_new()))
goto cleanup;
/* check if we are inforcing CRL checking */
vflags = X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
if (require_crl_checking)
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, openssl_callback);
else
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, openssl_callback_ignore_crls);
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags);
/*
* Get the signer's information from the CMS message. Match signer ID
* against anchors and intermediate CAs in case no certs are present in the
* SignedData. If we start sending kdcPkId values in requests, we'll need
* to match against the source of that information too.
*/
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, NULL, 0);
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->trustedCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
CMS_set1_signers_certs(cms, idctx->intermediateCAs, CMS_NOINTERN);
if (((si_sk = CMS_get0_SignerInfos(cms)) == NULL) ||
((si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(si_sk, 0)) == NULL)) {
/* Not actually signed; anonymous case */
if (!is_signed)
goto cleanup;
*is_signed = 0;
/* We cannot use CMS_dataInit because there may be no digest */
octets = pkinit_CMS_get0_content_signed(cms);
if (octets)
out = BIO_new_mem_buf((*octets)->data, (*octets)->length);
if (out == NULL)
goto cleanup;
} else {
pkinit_CMS_SignerInfo_get_cert(cms, si, &x);
if (x == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* create available CRL information (get local CRLs and include CRLs
* received in the CMS message
*/
signerRevoked = CMS_get1_crls(cms);
if (idctx->revoked == NULL)
revoked = signerRevoked;
else if (signerRevoked == NULL)
revoked = idctx->revoked;
else {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(idctx->revoked);
revoked = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(idctx->revoked, i));
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(signerRevoked);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
sk_X509_CRL_push(revoked, sk_X509_CRL_value(signerRevoked, i));
}
/* create available intermediate CAs chains (get local intermediateCAs and
* include the CA chain received in the CMS message
*/
signerCerts = CMS_get1_certs(cms);
if (idctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
intermediateCAs = signerCerts;
else if (signerCerts == NULL)
intermediateCAs = idctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->intermediateCAs);
intermediateCAs = sk_X509_new_null();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs,
sk_X509_value(idctx->intermediateCAs, i));
}
size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sk_X509_push(intermediateCAs, sk_X509_value(signerCerts, i));
}
}
/* initialize x509 context with the received certificate and
* trusted and intermediate CA chains and CRLs
*/
cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (cert_ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, x, intermediateCAs))
goto cleanup;
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(cert_ctx, revoked);
/* add trusted CAs certificates for cert verification */
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(cert_ctx, idctx->trustedCAs);
else {
pkiDebug("unable to find any trusted CAs\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
if (intermediateCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(intermediateCAs);
pkiDebug("untrusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(intermediateCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (idctx->trustedCAs != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_num(idctx->trustedCAs);
pkiDebug("trusted cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(
sk_X509_value(idctx->trustedCAs, i)), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
}
}
if (revoked != NULL) {
size = sk_X509_CRL_num(revoked);
pkiDebug("CRL chain of size %d\n", size);
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(revoked, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("crls by CA #%d: %s\n", i , buf);
}
}
#endif
i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx);
X509 *cert;
cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(cert_ctx);
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(cert);
switch(j) {
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE;
break;
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE;
}
(void)oerr_cert(context, retval, cert_ctx,
_("Failed to verify received certificate"));
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
strlcpy(buf, "(none)", sizeof(buf));
else
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("problem with cert DN = %s (error=%d) %s\n", buf, j,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
#ifdef DEBUG_CERTCHAIN
size = sk_X509_num(signerCerts);
pkiDebug("received cert chain of size %d\n", size);
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *tmp_cert = sk_X509_value(signerCerts, j);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tmp_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", j, buf);
}
#endif
} else {
/* retrieve verified certificate chain */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT)
verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(cert_ctx);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0)
goto cleanup;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (CMS_verify(cms, NULL, store, NULL, out, flags) == 0) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
switch(ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
case PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DIGEST_IN_SIGNED_DATA_NOT_ACCEPTED;
break;
case PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
default:
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INVALID_SIG;
}
(void)oerr(context, retval, _("Failed to verify CMS message"));
goto cleanup;
}
} /* message was signed */
if (!OBJ_cmp(etype, oid))
valid_oid = 1;
if (valid_oid)
pkiDebug("CMS Verification successful\n");
else {
pkiDebug("wrong oid in eContentType\n");
print_buffer(OBJ_get0_data(etype), OBJ_length(etype));
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* transfer the data from CMS message into return buffer */
for (size = 0;;) {
int remain;
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((*data = realloc(*data, size + 1024 * 10)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
remain = BIO_read(out, &((*data)[size]), 1024 * 10);
if (remain <= 0)
break;
else
size += remain;
}
*data_len = size;
if (x) {
reqctx->received_cert = X509_dup(x);
/* generate authorization data */
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) {
if (authz_data == NULL || authz_data_len == NULL)
goto out;
*authz_data = NULL;
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(verified_chain,
&krb5_verified_chain);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_identifiers_from_stack failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((krb5_external_principal_identifier *const *)krb5_verified_chain, &authz);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)authz->data, authz->length,
"/tmp/kdc_ad_initial_verified_cas");
#endif
*authz_data = malloc(authz->length);
if (*authz_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(*authz_data, authz->data, authz->length);
*authz_data_len = authz->length;
}
}
out:
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (out != NULL)
BIO_free(out);
if (store != NULL)
X509_STORE_free(store);
if (cms != NULL) {
if (signerCerts != NULL)
pkinit_CMS_free1_certs(signerCerts);
if (idctx->intermediateCAs != NULL && signerCerts)
sk_X509_free(intermediateCAs);
if (signerRevoked != NULL)
pkinit_CMS_free1_crls(signerRevoked);
if (idctx->revoked != NULL && signerRevoked)
sk_X509_CRL_free(revoked);
CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
}
if (verified_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(verified_chain, X509_free);
if (krb5_verified_chain != NULL)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_verified_chain);
if (authz != NULL)
krb5_free_data(context, authz);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_envelopeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *key_pack,
unsigned int key_pack_len,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *signed_data = NULL, *enc_data = NULL;
int signed_data_len = 0, enc_data_len = 0, flags = PKCS7_BINARY;
STACK_OF(X509) *encerts = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
retval = cms_signeddata_create(context, plgctx, reqctx, idctx,
CMS_ENVEL_SERVER, include_certchain,
key_pack, key_pack_len, &signed_data,
(unsigned int *)&signed_data_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to create pkcs7 signed data\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* check we have client's certificate */
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(encerts, reqctx->received_cert);
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
prepare_enc_data(signed_data, signed_data_len, &enc_data,
&enc_data_len);
retval = BIO_write(in, enc_data, enc_data_len);
if (retval != enc_data_len) {
pkiDebug("BIO_write only wrote %d\n", retval);
goto cleanup;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to encrypt PKCS7 object"));
goto cleanup;
}
p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->content_type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
*out_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!*out_len || (p = *out = malloc(*out_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to DER encode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(*out, *out_len, "/tmp/kdc_enveloped_data");
#endif
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
free(signed_data);
free(enc_data);
if (encerts != NULL)
sk_X509_free(encerts);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
cms_envelopeddata_verify(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_preauthtype pa_type,
int require_crl_checking,
unsigned char *enveloped_data,
unsigned int enveloped_data_len,
unsigned char **data,
unsigned int *data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = enveloped_data;
unsigned int tmp_buf_len = 0, tmp_buf2_len = 0, vfy_buf_len = 0;
unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL, *tmp_buf2 = NULL, *vfy_buf = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(enveloped_data, enveloped_data_len,
"/tmp/client_envelopeddata");
#endif
/* decode received PKCS7 message */
if ((p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, (int)enveloped_data_len)) == NULL) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decode PKCS7"));
goto cleanup;
}
/* verify that the received message is PKCS7 EnvelopedData message */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
pkiDebug("Expected id-enveloped PKCS7 msg (received type = %d)\n",
OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type));
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "wrong oid\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* decrypt received PKCS7 message */
if (pkcs7_decrypt(context, id_cryptoctx, p7, &tmp_buf, &tmp_buf_len)) {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 decryption successful\n");
} else {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Failed to decrypt PKCS7 message"));
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack");
#endif
/* verify PKCS7 SignedData message */
/* Wrap the signed data to make decoding easier in the verify routine. */
retval = wrap_signeddata(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &tmp_buf2, &tmp_buf2_len);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to encode signeddata\n");
goto cleanup;
}
vfy_buf = tmp_buf2;
vfy_buf_len = tmp_buf2_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len, "/tmp/client_enc_keypack2");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, CMS_ENVEL_SERVER,
require_crl_checking,
vfy_buf, vfy_buf_len,
data, data_len, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!retval)
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Success\n");
else {
pkiDebug("PKCS7 Verification Failure\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
free(tmp_buf);
free(tmp_buf2);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
X509 *cert,
krb5_principal **princs_ret, char ***upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int p = 0, u = 0, d = 0, ret = 0, l;
krb5_principal *princs = NULL;
char **upns = NULL;
unsigned char **dnss = NULL;
unsigned int i, num_found = 0, num_sans = 0;
X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *ialt = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gen = NULL;
if (princs_ret != NULL)
*princs_ret = NULL;
if (upn_ret != NULL)
*upn_ret = NULL;
if (dns_ret != NULL)
*dns_ret = NULL;
if (princs_ret == NULL && upn_ret == NULL && dns_ret == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: nowhere to return any values!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
if (cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: no certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("%s: looking for SANs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf);
l = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1);
if (l < 0)
return 0;
if (!(ext = X509_get_ext(cert, l)) || !(ialt = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) {
pkiDebug("%s: found no subject alt name extensions\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
num_sans = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ialt);
pkiDebug("%s: found %d subject alt name extension(s)\n", __FUNCTION__,
num_sans);
/* OK, we're likely returning something. Allocate return values */
if (princs_ret != NULL) {
princs = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(krb5_principal));
if (princs == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (upn_ret != NULL) {
upns = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(*upns));
if (upns == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (dns_ret != NULL) {
dnss = calloc(num_sans + 1, sizeof(*dnss));
if (dnss == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_sans; i++) {
krb5_data name = { 0, 0, NULL };
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ialt, i);
switch (gen->type) {
case GEN_OTHERNAME:
name.length = gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->length;
name.data = (char *)gen->d.otherName->value->value.sequence->data;
if (princs != NULL &&
OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_pkinit_san,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)name.data, name.length,
"/tmp/pkinit_san");
#endif
ret = k5int_decode_krb5_principal_name(&name, &princs[p]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed decoding pkinit san value\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
p++;
num_found++;
}
} else if (upns != NULL &&
OBJ_cmp(plgctx->id_ms_san_upn,
gen->d.otherName->type_id) == 0) {
/* Prevent abuse of embedded null characters. */
if (memchr(name.data, '\0', name.length))
break;
upns[u] = k5memdup0(name.data, name.length, &ret);
if (upns[u] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
} else {
pkiDebug("%s: unrecognized othername oid in SAN\n",
__FUNCTION__);
continue;
}
break;
case GEN_DNS:
if (dnss != NULL) {
/* Prevent abuse of embedded null characters. */
if (memchr(gen->d.dNSName->data, '\0', gen->d.dNSName->length))
break;
pkiDebug("%s: found dns name = %s\n", __FUNCTION__,
gen->d.dNSName->data);
dnss[d] = (unsigned char *)
strdup((char *)gen->d.dNSName->data);
if (dnss[d] == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to duplicate dns name\n",
__FUNCTION__);
} else {
d++;
num_found++;
}
}
break;
default:
pkiDebug("%s: SAN type = %d expecting %d\n", __FUNCTION__,
gen->type, GEN_OTHERNAME);
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ialt, GENERAL_NAME_free);
retval = 0;
if (princs != NULL && *princs != NULL) {
*princs_ret = princs;
princs = NULL;
}
if (upns != NULL && *upns != NULL) {
*upn_ret = upns;
upns = NULL;
}
if (dnss != NULL && *dnss != NULL) {
*dns_ret = dnss;
dnss = NULL;
}
cleanup:
for (i = 0; princs != NULL && princs[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, princs[i]);
free(princs);
for (i = 0; upns != NULL && upns[i] != NULL; i++)
free(upns[i]);
free(upns);
for (i = 0; dnss != NULL && dnss[i] != NULL; i++)
free(dnss[i]);
free(dnss);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_retrieve_signer_identity(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const char **identity)
{
*identity = id_cryptoctx->identity;
if (*identity == NULL)
return ENOENT;
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_retrieve_cert_sans(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
krb5_principal **princs_ret, char ***upn_ret,
unsigned char ***dns_ret)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: No certificate!\n", __FUNCTION__);
return retval;
}
return crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plgctx, reqctx,
reqctx->received_cert, princs_ret,
upn_ret, dns_ret);
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_check_cert_eku(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
int checking_kdc_cert,
int allow_secondary_usage,
int *valid_eku)
{
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int found_eku = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
int i;
*valid_eku = 0;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
if ((i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(reqctx->received_cert,
NID_ext_key_usage, -1)) >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert, NID_ext_key_usage,
NULL, NULL);
if (extusage) {
pkiDebug("%s: found eku info in the cert\n", __FUNCTION__);
for (i = 0; found_eku == 0 && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *tmp_oid;
tmp_oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i);
pkiDebug("%s: checking eku %d of %d, allow_secondary = %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, i+1, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage),
allow_secondary_usage);
if (checking_kdc_cert) {
if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc) == 0)
|| (allow_secondary_usage
&& OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_kp_serverAuth) == 0))
found_eku = 1;
} else {
if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth) == 0)
|| (allow_secondary_usage
&& OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon) == 0))
found_eku = 1;
}
}
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(extusage);
if (found_eku) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
/* check that digitalSignature KeyUsage is present */
X509_check_ca(reqctx->received_cert);
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert,
NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
if (!ku_reject(reqctx->received_cert,
X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
TRACE_PKINIT_EKU(context);
*valid_eku = 1;
} else
TRACE_PKINIT_EKU_NO_KU(context);
}
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
pkiDebug("%s: returning retval %d, valid_eku %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, *valid_eku);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_octetstring2key(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype etype,
unsigned char *key,
unsigned int dh_key_len,
krb5_keyblock *key_block)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char counter;
size_t keybytes, keylength, offset;
krb5_data random_data;
if ((buf = malloc(dh_key_len)) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(buf, 0, dh_key_len);
counter = 0;
offset = 0;
do {
SHA_CTX c;
SHA1_Init(&c);
SHA1_Update(&c, &counter, 1);
SHA1_Update(&c, key, dh_key_len);
SHA1_Final(md, &c);
if (dh_key_len - offset < sizeof(md))
memcpy(buf + offset, md, dh_key_len - offset);
else
memcpy(buf + offset, md, sizeof(md));
offset += sizeof(md);
counter++;
} while (offset < dh_key_len);
key_block->magic = 0;
key_block->enctype = etype;
retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, etype, &keybytes, &keylength);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
key_block->length = keylength;
key_block->contents = malloc(keylength);
if (key_block->contents == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
random_data.length = keybytes;
random_data.data = (char *)buf;
retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, etype, &random_data, key_block);
cleanup:
free(buf);
/* If this is an error return, free the allocated keyblock, if any */
if (retval) {
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
}
return retval;
}
/**
* Given an algorithm_identifier, this function returns the hash length
* and EVP function associated with that algorithm.
*/
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_alg_values(krb5_context context,
const krb5_data *alg_id,
size_t *hash_bytes,
const EVP_MD *(**func)(void))
{
*hash_bytes = 0;
*func = NULL;
if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, &krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha1_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 20;
*func = &EVP_sha1;
return 0;
} else if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha256_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 32;
*func = &EVP_sha256;
return 0;
} else if ((alg_id->length == krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid_len) &&
(0 == memcmp(alg_id->data, krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid,
krb5_pkinit_sha512_oid_len))) {
*hash_bytes = 64;
*func = &EVP_sha512;
return 0;
} else {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_ERR_BAD_S2K_PARAMS,
"Bad algorithm ID passed to PK-INIT KDF.");
return KRB5_ERR_BAD_S2K_PARAMS;
}
} /* pkinit_alg_values() */
/* pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() --
* This function generates a key using the KDF described in
* draft_ietf_krb_wg_pkinit_alg_agility-04.txt. The algorithm is
* described as follows:
*
* 1. reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H)
*
* 2. Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
*
* 3. For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
*
* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).
*
* - Increment counter (modulo 2^32)
*
* 4. Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes.
*/
krb5_error_code
pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *secret,
krb5_data *alg_oid,
krb5_const_principal party_u_info,
krb5_const_principal party_v_info,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_data *as_req,
krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
krb5_keyblock *key_block)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
unsigned int reps = 0;
uint32_t counter = 1; /* Does this type work on Windows? */
size_t offset = 0;
size_t hash_len = 0;
size_t rand_len = 0;
size_t key_len = 0;
krb5_data random_data;
krb5_sp80056a_other_info other_info_fields;
krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info supp_pub_info_fields;
krb5_data *other_info = NULL;
krb5_data *supp_pub_info = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_id;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void);
/* initialize random_data here to make clean-up safe */
random_data.length = 0;
random_data.data = NULL;
/* allocate and initialize the key block */
key_block->magic = 0;
key_block->enctype = enctype;
if (0 != (retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, enctype, &rand_len,
&key_len)))
goto cleanup;
random_data.length = rand_len;
key_block->length = key_len;
if (NULL == (key_block->contents = malloc(key_block->length))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset (key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length);
/* If this is anonymous pkinit, use the anonymous principle for party_u_info */
if (party_u_info && krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, party_u_info,
krb5_anonymous_principal()))
party_u_info = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
if (0 != (retval = pkinit_alg_values(context, alg_oid, &hash_len, &EVP_func)))
goto cleanup;
/* 1. reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H) */
reps = key_block->length/hash_len;
/* ... and round up, if necessary */
if (key_block->length > (reps * hash_len))
reps++;
/* Allocate enough space in the random data buffer to hash directly into
* it, even if the last hash will make it bigger than the key length. */
if (NULL == (random_data.data = malloc(reps * hash_len))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the ASN.1 octet string for "SuppPubInfo" */
supp_pub_info_fields.enctype = enctype;
supp_pub_info_fields.as_req = *as_req;
supp_pub_info_fields.pk_as_rep = *pk_as_rep;
if (0 != ((retval = encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info(&supp_pub_info_fields,
&supp_pub_info))))
goto cleanup;
/* Now encode the ASN.1 octet string for "OtherInfo" */
memset(&alg_id, 0, sizeof alg_id);
alg_id.algorithm = *alg_oid; /*alias*/
other_info_fields.algorithm_identifier = alg_id;
other_info_fields.party_u_info = (krb5_principal) party_u_info;
other_info_fields.party_v_info = (krb5_principal) party_v_info;
other_info_fields.supp_pub_info = *supp_pub_info;
if (0 != (retval = encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info(&other_info_fields, &other_info)))
goto cleanup;
/* 2. Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
* 3. For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).
* - Increment counter (modulo 2^32)
*/
for (counter = 1; counter <= reps; counter++) {
uint s = 0;
uint32_t be_counter = htonl(counter);
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo). */
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_func())) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestInit() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &be_counter, 4) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, secret->data, secret->length) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other_info->data, other_info->length)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* 4. Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes. */
if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (uint8_t *)random_data.data + offset, &s)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
offset += s;
assert(s == hash_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, enctype, &random_data,
key_block);
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
/* If this has been an error, free the allocated key_block, if any */
if (retval) {
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
}
/* free other allocated resources, either way */
if (random_data.data)
free(random_data.data);
krb5_free_data(context, other_info);
krb5_free_data(context, supp_pub_info);
return retval;
} /*pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() */
/* Call DH_compute_key() and ensure that we left-pad short results instead of
* leaving junk bytes at the end of the buffer. */
static void
compute_dh(unsigned char *buf, int size, BIGNUM *server_pub_key, DH *dh)
{
int len, pad;
len = DH_compute_key(buf, server_pub_key, dh);
assert(len >= 0 && len <= size);
if (len < size) {
pad = size - len;
memmove(buf + pad, buf, len);
memset(buf, 0, pad);
}
}
krb5_error_code
client_create_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int dh_size,
unsigned char **dh_params_out,
unsigned int *dh_params_len_out,
unsigned char **dh_pubkey_out,
unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int dh_err = 0;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pubkey_bn, *p, *q, *g;
unsigned char *dh_params = NULL, *dh_pubkey = NULL;
unsigned int dh_params_len, dh_pubkey_len;
*dh_params_out = *dh_pubkey_out = NULL;
*dh_params_len_out = *dh_pubkey_len_out = 0;
if (cryptoctx->dh == NULL) {
if (dh_size == 1024)
cryptoctx->dh = make_oakley_dh(oakley_1024, sizeof(oakley_1024));
else if (dh_size == 2048)
cryptoctx->dh = make_oakley_dh(oakley_2048, sizeof(oakley_2048));
else if (dh_size == 4096)
cryptoctx->dh = make_oakley_dh(oakley_4096, sizeof(oakley_4096));
if (cryptoctx->dh == NULL)
goto cleanup;
}
DH_generate_key(cryptoctx->dh);
DH_get0_key(cryptoctx->dh, &pubkey_bn, NULL);
DH_check(cryptoctx->dh, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("Warning: dh_check failed with %d\n", dh_err);
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
pkiDebug("p value is not a safe prime\n");
if (dh_err & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("unable to check the generator value\n");
if (dh_err & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)
pkiDebug("the g value is not a generator\n");
}
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_dh(cryptoctx->dh, "client's DH params\n");
print_pubkey(cryptoctx->dh->pub_key, "client's pub_key=");
#endif
DH_check_pub_key(cryptoctx->dh, pubkey_bn, &dh_err);
if (dh_err != 0) {
pkiDebug("dh_check_pub_key failed with %d\n", dh_err);
goto cleanup;
}
/* pack DHparams */
/* aglo: usually we could just call i2d_DHparams to encode DH params
* however, PKINIT requires RFC3279 encoding and openssl does pkcs#3.
*/
DH_get0_pqg(cryptoctx->dh, &p, &q, &g);
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(p, g, q, &dh_params, &dh_params_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* pack DH public key */
/* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
* encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the
* subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
* data element
*/
pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pubkey_bn, NULL);
if (pub_key == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL);
buf = dh_pubkey = malloc(dh_pubkey_len);
if (dh_pubkey == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &buf);
*dh_params_out = dh_params;
*dh_params_len_out = dh_params_len;
*dh_pubkey_out = dh_pubkey;
*dh_pubkey_len_out = dh_pubkey_len;
dh_params = dh_pubkey = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval) {
DH_free(cryptoctx->dh);
cryptoctx->dh = NULL;
}
free(dh_params);
free(dh_pubkey);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
client_process_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *subjectPublicKey_data,
unsigned int subjectPublicKey_length,
unsigned char **client_key_out,
unsigned int *client_key_len_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
BIGNUM *server_pub_key = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
unsigned char *client_key = NULL;
unsigned int client_key_len;
const unsigned char *p = NULL;
*client_key_out = NULL;
*client_key_len_out = 0;
client_key_len = DH_size(cryptoctx->dh);
client_key = malloc(client_key_len);
if (client_key == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
p = subjectPublicKey_data;
pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, (long)subjectPublicKey_length);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((server_pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
compute_dh(client_key, client_key_len, server_pub_key, cryptoctx->dh);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_pubkey(server_pub_key, "server's pub_key=");
pkiDebug("client computed key (%d)= ", client_key_len);
print_buffer(client_key, client_key_len);
#endif
*client_key_out = client_key;
*client_key_len_out = client_key_len;
client_key = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
BN_free(server_pub_key);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
free(client_key);
return retval;
}
/* Return 1 if dh is a permitted well-known group, otherwise return 0. */
static int
check_dh_wellknown(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, DH *dh, int nbits)
{
switch (nbits) {
case 1024:
/* Oakley MODP group 2 */
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_1024, dh) == 0)
return 1;
break;
case 2048:
/* Oakley MODP group 14 */
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_2048, dh) == 0)
return 1;
break;
case 4096:
/* Oakley MODP group 16 */
if (pkinit_check_dh_params(cryptoctx->dh_4096, dh) == 0)
return 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
server_check_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_data *dh_params,
int minbits)
{
DH *dh = NULL;
const BIGNUM *p;
int dh_prime_bits;
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
dh = decode_dh_params((uint8_t *)dh_params->data, dh_params->length);
if (dh == NULL) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode dhparams\n");
goto cleanup;
}
/* KDC SHOULD check to see if the key parameters satisfy its policy */
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
dh_prime_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (minbits && dh_prime_bits < minbits) {
pkiDebug("client sent dh params with %d bits, we require %d\n",
dh_prime_bits, minbits);
goto cleanup;
}
if (check_dh_wellknown(cryptoctx, dh, dh_prime_bits))
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (retval == 0)
req_cryptoctx->dh = dh;
else
DH_free(dh);
return retval;
}
/* Duplicate a DH handle (parameters only, not public or private key). */
static DH *
dup_dh_params(const DH *src)
{
const BIGNUM *oldp, *oldq, *oldg;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
DH *dh;
DH_get0_pqg(src, &oldp, &oldq, &oldg);
p = BN_dup(oldp);
q = BN_dup(oldq);
g = BN_dup(oldg);
dh = DH_new();
if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL || dh == NULL) {
BN_free(p);
BN_free(q);
BN_free(g);
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, q, g);
return dh;
}
/* kdc's dh function */
krb5_error_code
server_process_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **dh_pubkey_out,
unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len_out,
unsigned char **server_key_out,
unsigned int *server_key_len_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
DH *dh = NULL, *dh_server = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
BIGNUM *client_pubkey = NULL;
const BIGNUM *server_pubkey;
unsigned char *dh_pubkey = NULL, *server_key = NULL;
unsigned int dh_pubkey_len = 0, server_key_len = 0;
*dh_pubkey_out = *server_key_out = NULL;
*dh_pubkey_len_out = *server_key_len_out = 0;
/* get client's received DH parameters that we saved in server_check_dh */
dh = cryptoctx->dh;
dh_server = dup_dh_params(dh);
if (dh_server == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* decode client's public key */
p = data;
pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, (int)data_len);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
client_pubkey = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL);
if (client_pubkey == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_server))
goto cleanup;
DH_get0_key(dh_server, &server_pubkey, NULL);
/* generate DH session key */
server_key_len = DH_size(dh_server);
server_key = malloc(server_key_len);
if (server_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
compute_dh(server_key, server_key_len, client_pubkey, dh_server);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_dh(dh_server, "client&server's DH params\n");
print_pubkey(client_pubkey, "client's pub_key=");
print_pubkey(server_pubkey, "server's pub_key=");
pkiDebug("server computed key=");
print_buffer(server_key, server_key_len);
#endif
/* KDC reply */
/* pack DH public key */
/* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
* encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the
* subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
* data element
*/
pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(server_pubkey, NULL);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL);
p = dh_pubkey = malloc(dh_pubkey_len);
if (dh_pubkey == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &p);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
*dh_pubkey_out = dh_pubkey;
*dh_pubkey_len_out = dh_pubkey_len;
*server_key_out = server_key;
*server_key_len_out = server_key_len;
dh_pubkey = server_key = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
BN_free(client_pubkey);
DH_free(dh_server);
free(dh_pubkey);
free(server_key);
return retval;
}
int
pkinit_openssl_init()
{
/* Initialize OpenSSL. */
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_encode_dh_params(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *q,
uint8_t **buf, unsigned int *buf_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int bufsize = 0, r = 0;
unsigned char *tmp = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *ap = NULL, *ag = NULL, *aq = NULL;
if ((ap = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(p, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((ag = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(g, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if ((aq = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(q, NULL)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
bufsize = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ap, NULL);
bufsize += i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ag, NULL);
bufsize += i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(aq, NULL);
r = ASN1_object_size(1, bufsize, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
tmp = *buf = malloc((size_t) r);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ASN1_put_object(&tmp, 1, bufsize, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ap, &tmp);
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(ag, &tmp);
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(aq, &tmp);
*buf_len = r;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (ap != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ap);
if (ag != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ag);
if (aq != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(aq);
return retval;
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
/*
* We need to decode DomainParameters from RFC 3279 section 2.3.3. We would
* like to just call d2i_DHxparams(), but Microsoft's implementation may omit
* the q value in violation of the RFC. Instead we must copy the internal
* structures and sequence declarations from dh_asn1.c, modified to make the q
* field optional.
*/
typedef struct {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed;
BIGNUM *counter;
} int_dhvparams;
typedef struct {
BIGNUM *p;
BIGNUM *q;
BIGNUM *g;
BIGNUM *j;
int_dhvparams *vparams;
} int_dhx942_dh;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(DHvparams) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhvparams, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhvparams, counter, BIGNUM)
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(int_dhvparams, DHvparams)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(DHxparams) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, p, BIGNUM),
ASN1_SIMPLE(int_dhx942_dh, g, BIGNUM),
ASN1_OPT(int_dhx942_dh, q, BIGNUM),
ASN1_OPT(int_dhx942_dh, j, BIGNUM),
ASN1_OPT(int_dhx942_dh, vparams, DHvparams),
} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(int_dhx942_dh, DHxparams)
static DH *
decode_dh_params(const uint8_t *p, unsigned int len)
{
int_dhx942_dh *params;
DH *dh;
dh = DH_new();
if (dh == NULL)
return NULL;
params = (int_dhx942_dh *)ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, len,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(DHxparams));
if (params == NULL) {
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
/* Steal the p, q, and g values from dhparams for dh. Ignore j and
* vparams. */
DH_set0_pqg(dh, params->p, params->q, params->g);
params->p = params->q = params->g = NULL;
ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)params, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(DHxparams));
return dh;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
/*
* Do the same decoding (except without decoding j and vparams or checking the
* sequence length) using the pre-OpenSSL-1.1 asn1_mac.h. Define an internal
* function in the form demanded by the macros, then wrap it for caller
* convenience.
*/
static DH *
decode_dh_params_int(DH ** a, uint8_t **pp, unsigned int len)
{
ASN1_INTEGER ai, *aip = NULL;
long length = (long) len;
M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a, DH *, DH_new);
M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
aip = &ai;
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (aip == NULL)
return NULL;
else {
ret->p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL);
if (ret->p == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ai.data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
}
}
M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_INTEGER, aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (aip == NULL)
return NULL;
else {
ret->g = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL);
if (ret->g == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ai.data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
}
}
M_ASN1_D2I_get_opt(aip, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, V_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (aip == NULL || ai.data == NULL)
ret->q = NULL;
else {
ret->q = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(aip, NULL);
if (ret->q == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ai.data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ai.data);
ai.data = NULL;
ai.length = 0;
}
}
M_ASN1_D2I_end_sequence();
M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a, DH_free, 0);
}
static DH *
decode_dh_params(const uint8_t *p, unsigned int len)
{
uint8_t *ptr = (uint8_t *)p;
return decode_dh_params_int(NULL, &ptr, len);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L */
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(
krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int type,
krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_trusted_certifiers = NULL;
krb5_data *td_certifiers = NULL;
krb5_pa_data **pa_data = NULL;
switch(type) {
case TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS:
retval = create_krb5_trustedCertifiers(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, &krb5_trusted_certifiers);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_krb5_trustedCertifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
case TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES:
retval = create_krb5_invalidCertificates(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx, &krb5_trusted_certifiers);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("create_krb5_invalidCertificates failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
break;
default:
retval = -1;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers((krb5_external_principal_identifier *const *)krb5_trusted_certifiers, &td_certifiers);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("encode_krb5_td_trusted_certifiers failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)td_certifiers->data,
td_certifiers->length, "/tmp/kdc_td_certifiers");
#endif
pa_data = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_pa_data *));
if (pa_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
pa_data[1] = NULL;
pa_data[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (pa_data[0] == NULL) {
free(pa_data);
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
pa_data[0]->pa_type = type;
pa_data[0]->length = td_certifiers->length;
pa_data[0]->contents = (krb5_octet *)td_certifiers->data;
*e_data_out = pa_data;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers != NULL)
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_trusted_certifiers);
free(td_certifiers);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_td_trusted_certifiers(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context,
plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx,
TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS, e_data_out);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_td_invalid_certificate(
krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = pkinit_create_sequence_of_principal_identifiers(context,
plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx,
TD_INVALID_CERTIFICATES, e_data_out);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_create_td_dh_parameters(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
pkinit_plg_opts *opts,
krb5_pa_data ***e_data_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
unsigned int buf1_len = 0, buf2_len = 0, buf3_len = 0, i = 0;
unsigned char *buf1 = NULL, *buf2 = NULL, *buf3 = NULL;
krb5_pa_data **pa_data = NULL;
krb5_data *encoded_algId = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier **algId = NULL;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
if (opts->dh_min_bits > 4096)
goto cleanup;
if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024) {
DH_get0_pqg(plg_cryptoctx->dh_1024, &p, &q, &g);
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(p, g, q, &buf1, &buf1_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048) {
DH_get0_pqg(plg_cryptoctx->dh_2048, &p, &q, &g);
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(p, g, q, &buf2, &buf2_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
DH_get0_pqg(plg_cryptoctx->dh_4096, &p, &q, &g);
retval = pkinit_encode_dh_params(p, g, q, &buf3, &buf3_len);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 1024) {
algId = malloc(4 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (algId == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[3] = NULL;
algId[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[0]->parameters.data = malloc(buf2_len);
if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf2, buf2_len);
algId[0]->parameters.length = buf2_len;
algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid;
algId[1] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[1] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[1]->parameters.data = malloc(buf3_len);
if (algId[1]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(algId[1]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len);
algId[1]->parameters.length = buf3_len;
algId[1]->algorithm = dh_oid;
algId[2] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[2] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[2]->parameters.data = malloc(buf1_len);
if (algId[2]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(algId[2]->parameters.data, buf1, buf1_len);
algId[2]->parameters.length = buf1_len;
algId[2]->algorithm = dh_oid;
} else if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 2048) {
algId = malloc(3 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (algId == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[2] = NULL;
algId[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[0]->parameters.data = malloc(buf2_len);
if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf2, buf2_len);
algId[0]->parameters.length = buf2_len;
algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid;
algId[1] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[1] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[1]->parameters.data = malloc(buf3_len);
if (algId[1]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(algId[1]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len);
algId[1]->parameters.length = buf3_len;
algId[1]->algorithm = dh_oid;
} else if (opts->dh_min_bits <= 4096) {
algId = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (algId == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[1] = NULL;
algId[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (algId[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
algId[0]->parameters.data = malloc(buf3_len);
if (algId[0]->parameters.data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(algId[0]->parameters.data, buf3, buf3_len);
algId[0]->parameters.length = buf3_len;
algId[0]->algorithm = dh_oid;
}
retval = k5int_encode_krb5_td_dh_parameters((krb5_algorithm_identifier *const *)algId, &encoded_algId);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin((unsigned char *)encoded_algId->data,
encoded_algId->length, "/tmp/kdc_td_dh_params");
#endif
pa_data = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_pa_data *));
if (pa_data == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
pa_data[1] = NULL;
pa_data[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (pa_data[0] == NULL) {
free(pa_data);
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
pa_data[0]->pa_type = TD_DH_PARAMETERS;
pa_data[0]->length = encoded_algId->length;
pa_data[0]->contents = (krb5_octet *)encoded_algId->data;
*e_data_out = pa_data;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
free(buf1);
free(buf2);
free(buf3);
free(encoded_algId);
if (algId != NULL) {
while(algId[i] != NULL) {
free(algId[i]->parameters.data);
free(algId[i]);
i++;
}
free(algId);
}
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return 0;
}
/* Check parameters against a well-known DH group. */
static int
pkinit_check_dh_params(DH *dh1, DH *dh2)
{
const BIGNUM *p1, *p2, *g1, *g2;
DH_get0_pqg(dh1, &p1, NULL, &g1);
DH_get0_pqg(dh2, &p2, NULL, &g2);
if (BN_cmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
pkiDebug("p is not well-known group dhparameter\n");
return -1;
}
if (BN_cmp(g1, g2) != 0) {
pkiDebug("bad g dhparameter\n");
return -1;
}
pkiDebug("good %d dhparams\n", BN_num_bits(p1));
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_process_td_dh_params(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_algorithm_identifier **algId,
int *new_dh_size)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
int i = 0, use_sent_dh = 0, ok = 0;
pkiDebug("dh parameters\n");
while (algId[i] != NULL) {
DH *dh = NULL;
const BIGNUM *p;
int dh_prime_bits = 0;
if (algId[i]->algorithm.length != dh_oid.length ||
memcmp(algId[i]->algorithm.data, dh_oid.data, dh_oid.length))
goto cleanup;
dh = decode_dh_params((uint8_t *)algId[i]->parameters.data,
algId[i]->parameters.length);
if (dh == NULL)
goto cleanup;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, NULL);
dh_prime_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
pkiDebug("client sent %d DH bits server prefers %d DH bits\n",
*new_dh_size, dh_prime_bits);
ok = check_dh_wellknown(cryptoctx, dh, dh_prime_bits);
if (ok) {
*new_dh_size = dh_prime_bits;
}
if (!ok) {
DH_check(dh, &retval);
if (retval != 0) {
pkiDebug("DH parameters provided by server are unacceptable\n");
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DH_KEY_PARAMETERS_NOT_ACCEPTED;
}
else {
use_sent_dh = 1;
ok = 1;
}
}
if (!use_sent_dh)
DH_free(dh);
if (ok) {
if (req_cryptoctx->dh != NULL) {
DH_free(req_cryptoctx->dh);
req_cryptoctx->dh = NULL;
}
if (use_sent_dh)
req_cryptoctx->dh = dh;
break;
}
i++;
}
if (ok)
retval = 0;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
static int
openssl_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
if (!ok) {
X509 *cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
const char *errmsg = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert = %s\n", buf);
pkiDebug("callback function: %d (%s)\n", err, errmsg);
}
#endif
return ok;
}
static int
openssl_callback_ignore_crls(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
if (ok)
return ok;
return X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
}
static ASN1_OBJECT *
pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(pkinit_plg_crypto_context cryptoctx, int pkcs7_type)
{
switch (pkcs7_type) {
case CMS_SIGN_CLIENT:
return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_authData;
case CMS_SIGN_SERVER:
return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_DHKeyData;
case CMS_ENVEL_SERVER:
return cryptoctx->id_pkinit_rkeyData;
default:
return NULL;
}
}
static int
wrap_signeddata(unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **out, unsigned int *out_len)
{
unsigned int orig_len = 0, oid_len = 0, tot_len = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
/* Get length to wrap the original data with SEQUENCE tag */
tot_len = orig_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)data_len, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
/* Add the signedData OID and adjust lengths */
oid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
oid_len = i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, NULL);
tot_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
p = *out = malloc(tot_len);
if (p == NULL) return -1;
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)(orig_len+oid_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(oid, &p);
ASN1_put_object(&p, 1, (int)data_len, 0, V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
memcpy(p, data, data_len);
*out_len = tot_len;
return 0;
}
static int
prepare_enc_data(const uint8_t *indata, int indata_len, uint8_t **outdata,
int *outdata_len)
{
int tag, class;
long tlen, slen;
const uint8_t *p = indata, *oldp;
if (ASN1_get_object(&p, &slen, &tag, &class, indata_len) & 0x80)
return EINVAL;
if (tag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
return EINVAL;
oldp = p;
if (ASN1_get_object(&p, &tlen, &tag, &class, slen) & 0x80)
return EINVAL;
p += tlen;
slen -= (p - oldp);
if (ASN1_get_object(&p, &tlen, &tag, &class, slen) & 0x80)
return EINVAL;
*outdata = malloc(tlen);
if (*outdata == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memcpy(*outdata, p, tlen);
*outdata_len = tlen;
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
static void *
pkinit_C_LoadModule(const char *modname, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR p11p)
{
void *handle;
CK_RV (*getflist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
pkiDebug("loading module \"%s\"... ", modname);
handle = dlopen(modname, RTLD_NOW);
if (handle == NULL) {
pkiDebug("not found\n");
return NULL;
}
getflist = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR)) dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList");
if (getflist == NULL || (*getflist)(p11p) != CKR_OK) {
dlclose(handle);
pkiDebug("failed\n");
return NULL;
}
pkiDebug("ok\n");
return handle;
}
static CK_RV
pkinit_C_UnloadModule(void *handle)
{
dlclose(handle);
return CKR_OK;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_login(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_TOKEN_INFO *tip, const char *password)
{
krb5_data rdat;
char *prompt;
const char *warning;
krb5_prompt kprompt;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
int r = 0;
if (tip->flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) {
rdat.data = NULL;
rdat.length = 0;
} else if (password != NULL) {
rdat.data = strdup(password);
rdat.length = strlen(password);
} else if (id_cryptoctx->prompter == NULL) {
r = KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
rdat.data = NULL;
} else {
if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED)
warning = " (Warning: PIN locked)";
else if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY)
warning = " (Warning: PIN final try)";
else if (tip->flags & CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW)
warning = " (Warning: PIN count low)";
else
warning = "";
if (asprintf(&prompt, "%.*s PIN%s", (int) sizeof (tip->label),
tip->label, warning) < 0)
return ENOMEM;
rdat.data = malloc(tip->ulMaxPinLen + 2);
rdat.length = tip->ulMaxPinLen + 1;
kprompt.prompt = prompt;
kprompt.hidden = 1;
kprompt.reply = &rdat;
prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, 0);
free(prompt);
}
if (r == 0) {
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Login(id_cryptoctx->session, CKU_USER,
(u_char *) rdat.data, rdat.length);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_Login: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
r = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
}
free(rdat.data);
return r;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_open_session(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context cctx)
{
CK_ULONG i, r;
unsigned char *cp;
size_t label_len;
CK_ULONG count = 0;
CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slotlist;
CK_TOKEN_INFO tinfo;
char *p11name;
const char *password;
if (cctx->p11_module != NULL)
return 0; /* session already open */
/* Load module */
cctx->p11_module =
pkinit_C_LoadModule(cctx->p11_module_name, &cctx->p11);
if (cctx->p11_module == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
/* Init */
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_Initialize: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
/* Get the list of available slots */
if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, NULL, &count) != CKR_OK)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (count == 0)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
slotlist = calloc(count, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
if (slotlist == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if (cctx->p11->C_GetSlotList(TRUE, slotlist, &count) != CKR_OK)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
/* Look for the given token label, or if none given take the first one */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
/* Skip slots that don't match the specified slotid, if given. */
if (cctx->slotid != PK_NOSLOT && cctx->slotid != slotlist[i])
continue;
/* Open session */
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_OpenSession(slotlist[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
NULL, NULL, &cctx->session)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_OpenSession: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
/* Get token info */
if ((r = cctx->p11->C_GetTokenInfo(slotlist[i], &tinfo)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_GetTokenInfo: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
/* tinfo.label is zero-filled but not necessarily zero-terminated.
* Find the length, ignoring any trailing spaces. */
for (cp = tinfo.label + sizeof(tinfo.label); cp > tinfo.label; cp--) {
if (cp[-1] != '\0' && cp[-1] != ' ')
break;
}
label_len = cp - tinfo.label;
pkiDebug("open_session: slotid %d token \"%.*s\"\n",
(int)slotlist[i], (int)label_len, tinfo.label);
if (cctx->token_label == NULL ||
(strlen(cctx->token_label) == label_len &&
memcmp(cctx->token_label, tinfo.label, label_len) == 0))
break;
cctx->p11->C_CloseSession(cctx->session);
}
if (i >= count) {
free(slotlist);
pkiDebug("open_session: no matching token found\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
cctx->slotid = slotlist[i];
free(slotlist);
pkiDebug("open_session: slotid %d (%lu of %d)\n", (int)cctx->slotid,
i + 1, (int) count);
/* Login if needed */
if (tinfo.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) {
if (cctx->p11_module_name != NULL) {
if (cctx->slotid != PK_NOSLOT) {
if (asprintf(&p11name,
"PKCS11:module_name=%s:slotid=%ld:token=%.*s",
cctx->p11_module_name, (long)cctx->slotid,
(int)label_len, tinfo.label) < 0)
p11name = NULL;
} else {
if (asprintf(&p11name,
"PKCS11:module_name=%s,token=%.*s",
cctx->p11_module_name,
(int)label_len, tinfo.label) < 0)
p11name = NULL;
}
} else {
p11name = NULL;
}
if (cctx->defer_id_prompt) {
/* Supply the identity name to be passed to the responder. */
pkinit_set_deferred_id(&cctx->deferred_ids,
p11name, tinfo.flags, NULL);
free(p11name);
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
/* Look up a responder-supplied password for the token. */
password = pkinit_find_deferred_id(cctx->deferred_ids, p11name);
free(p11name);
r = pkinit_login(context, cctx, &tinfo, password);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Look for a key that's:
* 1. private
* 2. capable of the specified operation (usually signing or decrypting)
* 3. RSA (this may be wrong but it's all we can do for now)
* 4. matches the id of the cert we chose
*
* You must call pkinit_get_certs before calling pkinit_find_private_key
* (that's because we need the ID of the private key)
*
* pkcs11 says the id of the key doesn't have to match that of the cert, but
* I can't figure out any other way to decide which key to use.
*
* We should only find one key that fits all the requirements.
* If there are more than one, we just take the first one.
*/
krb5_error_code
pkinit_find_private_key(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE usage,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *objp)
{
CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4];
CK_ULONG count;
CK_KEY_TYPE keytype;
unsigned int nattrs = 0;
int r;
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE
CK_BBOOL true_false;
#endif
cls = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_CLASS;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &cls;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof cls;
nattrs++;
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_KEY_USAGE
/*
* Some cards get confused if you try to specify a key usage,
* so don't, and hope for the best. This will fail if you have
* several keys with the same id and different usages but I have
* not seen this on real cards.
*/
true_false = TRUE;
attrs[nattrs].type = usage;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &true_false;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof true_false;
nattrs++;
#endif
keytype = CKK_RSA;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = &keytype;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = sizeof keytype;
nattrs++;
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_id;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len;
nattrs++;
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("krb5_pkinit_sign_data: C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n",
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session, objp, 1, &count);
id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session);
pkiDebug("found %d private keys (%s)\n", (int) count, pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
if (r != CKR_OK || count < 1)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
return 0;
}
#endif
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_decode_data_fs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len,
uint8_t **decoded_data, unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
{
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs,
id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
EVP_PKEY *pkey = id_cryptoctx->my_key;
uint8_t *buf;
int buf_len, decrypt_len;
*decoded_data = NULL;
*decoded_data_len = 0;
if (cert != NULL && !X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) {
pkiDebug("private key does not match certificate\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
buf_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
buf = malloc(buf_len + 10);
if (buf == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
decrypt_len = EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(buf, data, data_len, pkey);
if (decrypt_len <= 0) {
pkiDebug("unable to decrypt received data (len=%d)\n", data_len);
free(buf);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
*decoded_data = buf;
*decoded_data_len = decrypt_len;
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
/*
* When using the ActivCard Linux pkcs11 library (v2.0.1), the decrypt function
* fails. By inserting an extra function call, which serves nothing but to
* change the stack, we were able to work around the issue. If the ActivCard
* library is fixed in the future, this function can be inlined back into the
* caller.
*/
static CK_RV
pkinit_C_Decrypt(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
rv = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx->session, pEncryptedData,
ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("pData %p *pulDataLen %d\n", (void *) pData,
(int) *pulDataLen);
}
return rv;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len,
uint8_t **decoded_data,
unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
{
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG len;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
uint8_t *cp;
int r;
*decoded_data = NULL;
*decoded_data_len = 0;
if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_DECRYPT, &obj);
mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_DecryptInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech,
obj)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_DecryptInit: 0x%x\n", (int) r);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("data_len = %d\n", data_len);
cp = malloc((size_t) data_len);
if (cp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
len = data_len;
pkiDebug("session %p edata %p edata_len %d data %p datalen @%p %d\n",
(void *) id_cryptoctx->session, (void *) data, (int) data_len,
(void *) cp, (void *) &len, (int) len);
r = pkinit_C_Decrypt(id_cryptoctx, (CK_BYTE_PTR) data, (CK_ULONG) data_len,
cp, &len);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_Decrypt: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
pkiDebug("decrypt %d needs %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("decrypt %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
*decoded_data_len = len;
*decoded_data = cp;
return 0;
}
#endif
krb5_error_code
pkinit_decode_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len,
uint8_t **decoded_data, unsigned int *decoded_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
*decoded_data = NULL;
*decoded_data_len = 0;
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1)
retval = pkinit_decode_data_fs(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len,
decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else
retval = pkinit_decode_data_pkcs11(context, id_cryptoctx, data,
data_len, decoded_data, decoded_data_len);
#endif
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_sign_data_fs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig,
unsigned int *sig_len)
{
if (create_signature(sig, sig_len, data, data_len,
id_cryptoctx->my_key) != 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to create the signature\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig,
unsigned int *sig_len)
{
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG len;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
unsigned char *cp;
int r;
if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkinit_find_private_key(id_cryptoctx, CKA_SIGN, &obj);
mech.mechanism = id_cryptoctx->mech;
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_SignInit(id_cryptoctx->session, &mech,
obj)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_SignInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
/*
* Key len would give an upper bound on sig size, but there's no way to
* get that. So guess, and if it's too small, re-malloc.
*/
len = PK_SIGLEN_GUESS;
cp = malloc((size_t) len);
if (cp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Sign(id_cryptoctx->session, data,
(CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len);
if (r == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || (r == CKR_OK && len >= PK_SIGLEN_GUESS)) {
free(cp);
pkiDebug("C_Sign realloc %d\n", (int) len);
cp = malloc((size_t) len);
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_Sign(id_cryptoctx->session, data,
(CK_ULONG) data_len, cp, &len);
}
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_Sign: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("sign %d -> %d\n", (int) data_len, (int) len);
*sig_len = len;
*sig = cp;
return 0;
}
#endif
krb5_error_code
pkinit_sign_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **sig,
unsigned int *sig_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1)
retval = pkinit_sign_data_fs(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len,
sig, sig_len);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else
retval = pkinit_sign_data_pkcs11(context, id_cryptoctx, data, data_len,
sig, sig_len);
#endif
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
create_signature(unsigned char **sig, unsigned int *sig_len,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int data_len, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
if (pkey == NULL)
return retval;
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
EVP_SignInit(ctx, EVP_sha1());
EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, data_len);
*sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((*sig = malloc(*sig_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
EVP_SignFinal(ctx, *sig, sig_len, pkey);
retval = 0;
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
return retval;
}
/*
* Note:
* This is not the routine the KDC uses to get its certificate.
* This routine is intended to be called by the client
* to obtain the KDC's certificate from some local storage
* to be sent as a hint in its request to the KDC.
*/
krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_kdc_cert(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
req_cryptoctx->received_cert = NULL;
retval = 0;
return retval;
}
static char *
reassemble_pkcs12_name(const char *filename)
{
char *ret;
if (asprintf(&ret, "PKCS12:%s", filename) < 0)
return NULL;
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
char *prompt_string = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
int ret;
FILE *fp;
EVP_PKEY *y = NULL;
if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's cert location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
if (idopts->key_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's private key location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
fp = fopen(idopts->cert_filename, "rb");
if (fp == NULL) {
TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS_OPEN_FAIL(context, idopts->cert_filename, errno);
goto cleanup;
}
set_cloexec_file(fp);
p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL);
fclose(fp);
if (p12 == NULL) {
TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS_DECODE_FAIL(context, idopts->cert_filename);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Try parsing with no pass phrase first. If that fails,
* prompt for the pass phrase and try again.
*/
ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, NULL, &y, &x, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
krb5_data rdat;
krb5_prompt kprompt;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
krb5_error_code r;
char prompt_reply[128];
char *prompt_prefix = _("Pass phrase for");
char *p12name = reassemble_pkcs12_name(idopts->cert_filename);
const char *tmp;
TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS_PARSE_FAIL_FIRST(context);
if (id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt) {
/* Supply the identity name to be passed to the responder. */
pkinit_set_deferred_id(&id_cryptoctx->deferred_ids, p12name, 0,
NULL);
free(p12name);
retval = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Try to read a responder-supplied password. */
tmp = pkinit_find_deferred_id(id_cryptoctx->deferred_ids, p12name);
free(p12name);
if (tmp != NULL) {
/* Try using the responder-supplied password. */
rdat.data = (char *)tmp;
rdat.length = strlen(tmp);
} else if (id_cryptoctx->prompter == NULL) {
/* We can't use a prompter. */
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* Ask using a prompter. */
memset(prompt_reply, '\0', sizeof(prompt_reply));
rdat.data = prompt_reply;
rdat.length = sizeof(prompt_reply);
if (asprintf(&prompt_string, "%s %s", prompt_prefix,
idopts->cert_filename) < 0) {
prompt_string = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
kprompt.prompt = prompt_string;
kprompt.hidden = 1;
kprompt.reply = &rdat;
prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, 0);
if (r) {
TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS_PROMPT_FAIL(context);
goto cleanup;
}
}
ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, rdat.data, &y, &x, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
TRACE_PKINIT_PKCS_PARSE_FAIL_SECOND(context);
goto cleanup;
}
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[0] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name =
reassemble_pkcs12_name(idopts->cert_filename);
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = x;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len = 0;
#endif
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = y;
id_cryptoctx->creds[1] = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
free(prompt_string);
if (p12)
PKCS12_free(p12);
if (retval) {
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (y != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(y);
}
return retval;
}
static char *
reassemble_files_name(const char *certfile, const char *keyfile)
{
char *ret;
if (keyfile != NULL) {
if (asprintf(&ret, "FILE:%s,%s", certfile, keyfile) < 0)
return NULL;
} else {
if (asprintf(&ret, "FILE:%s", certfile) < 0)
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
char *certname,
char *keyname,
int cindex)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
X509 *x = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *y = NULL;
char *fsname = NULL;
const char *password;
fsname = reassemble_files_name(certname, keyname);
/* Try to read a responder-supplied password. */
password = pkinit_find_deferred_id(id_cryptoctx->deferred_ids, fsname);
/* Load the certificate. */
retval = get_cert(certname, &x);
if (retval != 0 || x == NULL) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Cannot read certificate file '%s'"),
certname);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Load the key. */
retval = get_key(context, id_cryptoctx, keyname, fsname, &y, password);
if (retval != 0 || y == NULL) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Cannot read key file '%s'"), fsname);
goto cleanup;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex] == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->name = reassemble_files_name(certname,
keyname);
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert = x;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->cert_id_len = 0;
#endif
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex]->key = y;
id_cryptoctx->creds[cindex+1] = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
free(fsname);
if (retval != 0 || y == NULL) {
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (y != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(y);
}
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_fs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's cert location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
if (idopts->key_filename == NULL) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_PRIVKEY(context);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(context, id_cryptoctx,
idopts->cert_filename,
idopts->key_filename, 0);
cleanup:
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_dir(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
DIR *d = NULL;
struct dirent *dentry = NULL;
char certname[1024];
char keyname[1024];
int i = 0, len;
char *dirname, *suf;
if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_CERT(context);
return ENOENT;
}
dirname = idopts->cert_filename;
d = opendir(dirname);
if (d == NULL)
return errno;
/*
* We'll assume that certs are named XXX.crt and the corresponding
* key is named XXX.key
*/
while ((i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED) && (dentry = readdir(d)) != NULL) {
/* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */
#ifdef DT_DIR
if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR)
continue;
#endif
if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.')
continue;
len = strlen(dentry->d_name);
if (len < 5)
continue;
suf = dentry->d_name + (len - 4);
if (strncmp(suf, ".crt", 4) != 0)
continue;
/* Checked length */
if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(certname)) {
pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name);
continue;
}
snprintf(certname, sizeof(certname), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
snprintf(keyname, sizeof(keyname), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
len = strlen(keyname);
keyname[len - 3] = 'k';
keyname[len - 2] = 'e';
keyname[len - 1] = 'y';
retval = pkinit_load_fs_cert_and_key(context, id_cryptoctx,
certname, keyname, i);
if (retval == 0) {
TRACE_PKINIT_LOADED_CERT(context, dentry->d_name);
i++;
}
else
continue;
}
if (!id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt && i == 0) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_CERT_AND_KEY(context, idopts->cert_filename);
retval = ENOENT;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (d)
closedir(d);
return retval;
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
static char *
reassemble_pkcs11_name(pkinit_identity_opts *idopts)
{
struct k5buf buf;
int n = 0;
char *ret;
k5_buf_init_dynamic(&buf);
k5_buf_add(&buf, "PKCS11:");
n = 0;
if (idopts->p11_module_name != NULL) {
k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%smodule_name=%s", n++ ? ":" : "",
idopts->p11_module_name);
}
if (idopts->token_label != NULL) {
k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%stoken=%s", n++ ? ":" : "",
idopts->token_label);
}
if (idopts->cert_label != NULL) {
k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%scertlabel=%s", n++ ? ":" : "",
idopts->cert_label);
}
if (idopts->cert_id_string != NULL) {
k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%scertid=%s", n++ ? ":" : "",
idopts->cert_id_string);
}
if (idopts->slotid != PK_NOSLOT) {
k5_buf_add_fmt(&buf, "%sslotid=%ld", n++ ? ":" : "",
(long)idopts->slotid);
}
if (k5_buf_status(&buf) == 0)
ret = strdup(buf.data);
else
ret = NULL;
k5_buf_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
#ifdef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR mechp;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
#endif
CK_OBJECT_CLASS cls;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[4];
CK_ULONG count;
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE certtype;
CK_BYTE_PTR cert = NULL, cert_id;
const unsigned char *cp;
int i, r;
unsigned int nattrs;
X509 *x = NULL;
/* Copy stuff from idopts -> id_cryptoctx */
if (idopts->p11_module_name != NULL) {
free(id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name);
id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name = strdup(idopts->p11_module_name);
if (id_cryptoctx->p11_module_name == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
if (idopts->token_label != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->token_label = strdup(idopts->token_label);
if (id_cryptoctx->token_label == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
if (idopts->cert_label != NULL) {
id_cryptoctx->cert_label = strdup(idopts->cert_label);
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
/* Convert the ascii cert_id string into a binary blob */
if (idopts->cert_id_string != NULL) {
r = k5_hex_decode(idopts->cert_id_string,
&id_cryptoctx->cert_id, &id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len);
if (r != 0) {
pkiDebug("Failed to convert certid string [%s]\n",
idopts->cert_id_string);
return r;
}
}
id_cryptoctx->slotid = idopts->slotid;
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method = 1;
if (pkinit_open_session(context, id_cryptoctx)) {
pkiDebug("can't open pkcs11 session\n");
if (!id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
if (id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt) {
/*
* We need to reset all of the PKCS#11 state, so that the next time we
* poke at it, it'll be in as close to the state it was in after we
* loaded it the first time as we can make it.
*/
pkinit_fini_pkcs11(id_cryptoctx);
pkinit_init_pkcs11(id_cryptoctx);
return 0;
}
#ifndef PKINIT_USE_MECH_LIST
/*
* We'd like to use CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS for signing if it's available, but
* many cards seems to be confused about whether they are capable of
* this or not. The safe thing seems to be to ignore the mechanism list,
* always use CKM_RSA_PKCS and calculate the sha1 digest ourselves.
*/
id_cryptoctx->mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
#else
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid, NULL,
&count)) != CKR_OK || count <= 0) {
pkiDebug("C_GetMechanismList: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
mechp = malloc(count * sizeof (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
if (mechp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismList(id_cryptoctx->slotid,
mechp, &count)) != CKR_OK)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetMechanismInfo(id_cryptoctx->slotid,
mechp[i], &info)) != CKR_OK)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
#ifdef DEBUG_MECHINFO
pkiDebug("mech %x flags %x\n", (int) mechp[i], (int) info.flags);
if ((info.flags & (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT)) == (CKF_SIGN|CKF_DECRYPT))
pkiDebug(" this mech is good for sign & decrypt\n");
#endif
if (mechp[i] == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
/* This seems backwards... */
id_cryptoctx->mech =
(info.flags & CKF_SIGN) ? CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS : CKM_RSA_PKCS;
}
}
free(mechp);
pkiDebug("got %d mechs from card\n", (int) count);
#endif
cls = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
attrs[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
attrs[0].pValue = &cls;
attrs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof cls;
certtype = CKC_X_509;
attrs[1].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
attrs[1].pValue = &certtype;
attrs[1].ulValueLen = sizeof certtype;
nattrs = 2;
/* If a cert id and/or label were given, use them too */
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len > 0) {
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_id;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len;
nattrs++;
}
if (id_cryptoctx->cert_label != NULL) {
attrs[nattrs].type = CKA_LABEL;
attrs[nattrs].pValue = id_cryptoctx->cert_label;
attrs[nattrs].ulValueLen = strlen(id_cryptoctx->cert_label);
nattrs++;
}
r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsInit(id_cryptoctx->session, attrs, nattrs);
if (r != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_FindObjectsInit: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (i >= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
/* Look for x.509 cert */
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjects(id_cryptoctx->session,
&obj, 1, &count)) != CKR_OK || count <= 0) {
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL;
break;
}
/* Get cert and id len */
attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE;
attrs[0].pValue = NULL;
attrs[0].ulValueLen = 0;
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = NULL;
attrs[1].ulValueLen = 0;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(id_cryptoctx->session,
obj, attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK && r != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
cert = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc((size_t) attrs[0].ulValueLen + 1);
cert_id = (CK_BYTE_PTR) malloc((size_t) attrs[1].ulValueLen + 1);
if (cert == NULL || cert_id == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
/* Read the cert and id off the card */
attrs[0].type = CKA_VALUE;
attrs[0].pValue = cert;
attrs[1].type = CKA_ID;
attrs[1].pValue = cert_id;
if ((r = id_cryptoctx->p11->C_GetAttributeValue(id_cryptoctx->session,
obj, attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK) {
pkiDebug("C_GetAttributeValue: %s\n", pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(r));
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
pkiDebug("cert %d size %d id %d idlen %d\n", i,
(int) attrs[0].ulValueLen, (int) cert_id[0],
(int) attrs[1].ulValueLen);
cp = (unsigned char *) cert;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int) attrs[0].ulValueLen);
if (x == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->name = reassemble_pkcs11_name(idopts);
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert = x;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->key = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id = cert_id;
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert_id_len = attrs[1].ulValueLen;
free(cert);
}
id_cryptoctx->p11->C_FindObjectsFinal(id_cryptoctx->session);
if (cert == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
return 0;
}
#endif
static void
free_cred_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
struct _pkinit_cred_info *cred)
{
if (cred != NULL) {
if (cred->cert != NULL)
X509_free(cred->cert);
if (cred->key != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(cred->key);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
free(cred->cert_id);
#endif
free(cred->name);
free(cred);
}
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_free_cert_info(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
int i;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++) {
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[i] != NULL) {
free_cred_info(context, id_cryptoctx, id_cryptoctx->creds[i]);
id_cryptoctx->creds[i] = NULL;
}
}
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_load_certs(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ,
krb5_boolean defer_id_prompts)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
id_cryptoctx->defer_id_prompt = defer_id_prompts;
switch(idopts->idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_fs(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
case IDTYPE_DIR:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
case IDTYPE_PKCS11:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs11(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
#endif
case IDTYPE_PKCS12:
retval = pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, idopts,
id_cryptoctx, princ);
break;
default:
retval = EINVAL;
}
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
/*
* Get certificate Key Usage and Extended Key Usage
*/
static krb5_error_code
crypto_retrieve_X509_key_usage(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgcctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqcctx,
X509 *x,
unsigned int *ret_ku_bits,
unsigned int *ret_eku_bits)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int i;
unsigned int eku_bits = 0, ku_bits = 0;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
if (ret_ku_bits == NULL && ret_eku_bits == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (ret_eku_bits)
*ret_eku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: EKUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto check_kus;
}
/* Start with Extended Key usage */
i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
if (i >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *eku;
eku = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (eku) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(eku); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *certoid;
certoid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(eku, i);
if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, plgcctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth)) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_PKINIT;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ms_smartcard_login))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_MSSCLOGIN;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_client_auth))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_CLIENTAUTH;
else if ((OBJ_cmp(certoid, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_email_protect))) == 0)
eku_bits |= PKINIT_EKU_EMAILPROTECTION;
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(eku);
}
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning eku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, eku_bits);
*ret_eku_bits = eku_bits;
check_kus:
/* Now the Key Usage bits */
if (ret_ku_bits)
*ret_ku_bits = 0;
else {
pkiDebug("%s: KUs not requested, not checking\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto out;
}
/* Make sure usage exists before checking bits */
X509_check_ca(x);
usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL);
if (usage) {
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_DIGITALSIGNATURE;
if (!ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
ku_bits |= PKINIT_KU_KEYENCIPHERMENT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
pkiDebug("%s: returning ku 0x%08x\n", __FUNCTION__, ku_bits);
*ret_ku_bits = ku_bits;
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
rfc2253_name(X509_NAME *name, char **str_out)
{
BIO *b = NULL;
char *str;
*str_out = NULL;
b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (b == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if (X509_NAME_print_ex(b, name, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS) < 0)
goto error;
str = calloc(BIO_number_written(b) + 1, 1);
if (str == NULL)
goto error;
BIO_read(b, str, BIO_number_written(b));
BIO_free(b);
*str_out = str;
return 0;
error:
BIO_free(b);
return ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Get number of certificates available after crypto_load_certs()
*/
static krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_get_count(pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int *cert_count)
{
int count;
*cert_count = 0;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL)
return EINVAL;
for (count = 0;
count <= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED && id_cryptoctx->creds[count] != NULL;
count++);
*cert_count = count;
return 0;
}
void
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md)
{
int i;
if (md == NULL)
return;
free(md->subject_dn);
free(md->issuer_dn);
for (i = 0; md->sans != NULL && md->sans[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_principal(context, md->sans[i]);
free(md->sans);
for (i = 0; md->upns != NULL && md->upns[i] != NULL; i++)
free(md->upns[i]);
free(md->upns);
free(md);
}
/*
* Free certificate matching data.
*/
void
crypto_cert_free_matching_data_list(krb5_context context,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **list)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; list != NULL && list[i] != NULL; i++)
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, list[i]);
free(list);
}
/*
* Get certificate matching data for cert.
*/
static krb5_error_code
get_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, X509 *cert,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **md_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret = ENOMEM;
pkinit_cert_matching_data *md = NULL;
*md_out = NULL;
md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md));
if (md == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ret = rfc2253_name(X509_get_subject_name(cert), &md->subject_dn);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = rfc2253_name(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), &md->issuer_dn);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Get the SAN data. */
ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
cert, &md->sans, &md->upns, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Get the KU and EKU data. */
ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_key_usage(context, plg_cryptoctx,
req_cryptoctx, cert, &md->ku_bits,
&md->eku_bits);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
*md_out = md;
md = NULL;
cleanup:
crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_get_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
pkinit_cert_matching_data ***md_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
pkinit_cert_matching_data **md_list = NULL;
int count, i;
ret = crypto_cert_get_count(id_cryptoctx, &count);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
md_list = calloc(count + 1, sizeof(*md_list));
if (md_list == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
ret = get_matching_data(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx->creds[i]->cert, &md_list[i]);
if (ret) {
pkiDebug("%s: crypto_cert_get_matching_data error %d, %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, ret, error_message(ret));
goto cleanup;
}
}
*md_out = md_list;
md_list = NULL;
cleanup:
crypto_cert_free_matching_data_list(context, md_list);
return ret;
}
/*
* Set the certificate in idctx->creds[cred_index] as the selected certificate.
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_select(krb5_context context, pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
size_t cred_index)
{
pkinit_cred_info ci = NULL;
if (cred_index >= MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED || idctx->creds[cred_index] == NULL)
return ENOENT;
ci = idctx->creds[cred_index];
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (idctx->my_certs != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(idctx->my_certs, X509_free);
idctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(idctx->my_certs, ci->cert);
free(idctx->identity);
/* hang on to the selected credential name */
if (ci->name != NULL)
idctx->identity = strdup(ci->name);
else
idctx->identity = NULL;
ci->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
idctx->cert_index = 0;
if (idctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
idctx->my_key = ci->key;
ci->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
idctx->cert_id = ci->cert_id;
ci->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
idctx->cert_id_len = ci->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Choose the default certificate as "the chosen one"
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_cert_select_default(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int cert_count;
retval = crypto_cert_get_count(id_cryptoctx, &cert_count);
if (retval)
goto errout;
if (cert_count != 1) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_DEFAULT_CERT(context, cert_count);
retval = EINVAL;
goto errout;
}
/* copy the selected cert into our id_cryptoctx */
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, X509_free);
}
id_cryptoctx->my_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert);
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_index = 0;
/* hang on to the selected credential name */
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name != NULL)
id_cryptoctx->identity = strdup(id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name);
else
id_cryptoctx->identity = NULL;
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method != 1) {
id_cryptoctx->my_key = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
}
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
else {
id_cryptoctx->cert_id = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL; /* Don't free it twice */
id_cryptoctx->cert_id_len = id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len;
}
#endif
retval = 0;
errout:
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *filename)
{
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *ca_crls = NULL;
BIO *in = NULL;
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i = 0;
/* If there isn't already a stack in the context,
* create a temporary one now */
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs != NULL)
ca_certs = id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs;
else {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked != NULL)
ca_crls = id_cryptoctx->revoked;
else {
ca_crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
if (ca_crls == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
}
break;
default:
return ENOTSUP;
}
if (!(in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"))) {
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Cannot open file '%s'"), filename);
goto cleanup;
}
/* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */
if ((sk = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: error reading file '%s'\n", __FUNCTION__, filename);
retval = oerr(context, 0, _("Cannot read file '%s'"), filename);
goto cleanup;
}
/* scan over the stack created from loading the file contents,
* weed out duplicates, and push new ones onto the return stack
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(sk); i++) {
X509_INFO *xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(sk, i);
if (xi != NULL && xi->x509 != NULL && catype != CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_num(ca_certs), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, xi->x509);
xi->x509 = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, j);
flag = X509_cmp(x, xi->x509);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_push(ca_certs, X509_dup(xi->x509));
}
} else if (xi != NULL && xi->crl != NULL && catype == CATYPE_CRLS) {
int j = 0, size = sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls), flag = 0;
if (!size) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, xi->crl);
xi->crl = NULL;
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < size; j++) {
X509_CRL *x = sk_X509_CRL_value(ca_crls, j);
flag = X509_CRL_cmp(x, xi->crl);
if (flag == 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
if (flag != 0) {
sk_X509_CRL_push(ca_crls, X509_CRL_dup(xi->crl));
}
}
}
/* If we added something and there wasn't a stack in the
* context before, add the temporary stack to the context.
*/
switch(catype) {
case CATYPE_ANCHORS:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_CA_ANCHOR(context, filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_INTERMEDIATES:
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) == 0) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_CA_INTERMEDIATE(context, filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs = ca_certs;
}
break;
case CATYPE_CRLS:
if (sk_X509_CRL_num(ca_crls) == 0) {
TRACE_PKINIT_NO_CRL(context, filename);
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
sk_X509_CRL_free(ca_crls);
} else {
if (id_cryptoctx->revoked == NULL)
id_cryptoctx->revoked = ca_crls;
}
break;
default:
/* Should have been caught above! */
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if (sk != NULL)
sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(sk, X509_INFO_free);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
load_cas_and_crls_dir(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int catype,
char *dirname)
{
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
DIR *d = NULL;
struct dirent *dentry = NULL;
char filename[1024];
if (dirname == NULL)
return EINVAL;
d = opendir(dirname);
if (d == NULL)
return ENOENT;
while ((dentry = readdir(d))) {
if (strlen(dirname) + strlen(dentry->d_name) + 2 > sizeof(filename)) {
pkiDebug("%s: Path too long -- directory '%s' and file '%s'\n",
__FUNCTION__, dirname, dentry->d_name);
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore subdirectories and anything starting with a dot */
#ifdef DT_DIR
if (dentry->d_type == DT_DIR)
continue;
#endif
if (dentry->d_name[0] == '.')
continue;
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s", dirname, dentry->d_name);
retval = load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, filename);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (d != NULL)
closedir(d);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
crypto_load_cas_and_crls(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int idtype,
int catype,
char *id)
{
switch (idtype) {
case IDTYPE_FILE:
TRACE_PKINIT_LOAD_FROM_FILE(context);
return load_cas_and_crls(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
break;
case IDTYPE_DIR:
TRACE_PKINIT_LOAD_FROM_DIR(context);
return load_cas_and_crls_dir(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx,
id_cryptoctx, catype, id);
break;
default:
return ENOTSUP;
break;
}
}
static krb5_error_code
create_identifiers_from_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
int i = 0, sk_size = sk_X509_num(sk);
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_cas = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int len = 0;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
*ids = NULL;
krb5_cas = calloc(sk_size + 1, sizeof(*krb5_cas));
if (krb5_cas == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < sk_size; i++) {
krb5_cas[i] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_external_principal_identifier));
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("#%d cert= %s\n", i, buf);
/* fill-in subjectName */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = NULL;
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
len = i2d_X509_NAME(xn, NULL);
if ((p = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto oom;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.data = (char *)p;
i2d_X509_NAME(xn, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectName.length = len;
/* fill-in issuerAndSerialNumber */
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = NULL;
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
if (is == NULL)
goto oom;
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(x));
if (is->serial == NULL)
goto oom;
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
p = malloc(len);
if (p == NULL)
goto oom;
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data = (char *)p;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length = len;
/* fill-in subjectKeyIdentifier */
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.magic = 0;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = NULL;
if (X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, -1) >= 0) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ikeyid;
ikeyid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL,
NULL);
if (ikeyid != NULL) {
len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, NULL);
p = malloc(len);
if (p == NULL)
goto oom;
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data = (char *)p;
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(ikeyid, &p);
krb5_cas[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length = len;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ikeyid);
}
}
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free(is);
is = NULL;
}
*ids = krb5_cas;
return 0;
oom:
free_krb5_external_principal_identifier(&krb5_cas);
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free(is);
return ENOMEM;
}
static krb5_error_code
create_krb5_invalidCertificates(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
*ids = NULL;
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
sk = sk_X509_new_null();
if (sk == NULL)
goto cleanup;
sk_X509_push(sk, req_cryptoctx->received_cert);
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(sk, ids);
sk_X509_free(sk);
cleanup:
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
create_krb5_supportedCMSTypes(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_algorithm_identifier ***oids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
krb5_algorithm_identifier **loids = NULL;
krb5_data des3oid = {0, 8, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x03\x07" };
*oids = NULL;
loids = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier *));
if (loids == NULL)
goto cleanup;
loids[1] = NULL;
loids[0] = malloc(sizeof(krb5_algorithm_identifier));
if (loids[0] == NULL) {
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = pkinit_copy_krb5_data(&loids[0]->algorithm, &des3oid);
if (retval) {
free(loids[0]);
free(loids);
goto cleanup;
}
loids[0]->parameters.length = 0;
loids[0]->parameters.data = NULL;
*oids = loids;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
create_krb5_trustedCertifiers(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier *** ids)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs;
*ids = NULL;
if (id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs == NULL)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
retval = create_identifiers_from_stack(sk, ids);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
create_issuerAndSerial(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char **out,
unsigned int *out_len)
{
unsigned char *p = NULL;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
int len = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
X509 *cert = req_cryptoctx->received_cert;
*out = NULL;
*out_len = 0;
if (req_cryptoctx->received_cert == NULL)
return 0;
is = PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new();
X509_NAME_set(&is->issuer, X509_get_issuer_name(cert));
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
is->serial = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert));
len = i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, NULL);
if ((p = *out = malloc((size_t) len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(is, &p);
*out_len = len;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
pkinit_process_td_trusted_certifiers(
krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_external_principal_identifier **krb5_trusted_certifiers,
int td_type)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk_xn = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int i = 0;
if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS)
pkiDebug("received trusted certifiers\n");
else
pkiDebug("received invalid certificate\n");
sk_xn = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
while(krb5_trusted_certifiers[i] != NULL) {
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.data != NULL) {
p = (unsigned char *)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.data;
xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &p,
(int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectName.length);
if (xn == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_NAME_oneline(xn, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS)
pkiDebug("#%d cert = %s is trusted by kdc\n", i, buf);
else
pkiDebug("#%d cert = %s is invalid\n", i, buf);
sk_X509_NAME_push(sk_xn, xn);
}
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data != NULL) {
p = (unsigned char *)
krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.data;
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p,
(int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->issuerAndSerialNumber.length);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_NAME_oneline(is->issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (td_type == TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS)
pkiDebug("#%d issuer = %s serial = %ld is trusted bu kdc\n", i,
buf, ASN1_INTEGER_get(is->serial));
else
pkiDebug("#%d issuer = %s serial = %ld is invalid\n", i, buf,
ASN1_INTEGER_get(is->serial));
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free(is);
}
if (krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data != NULL) {
p = (unsigned char *)
krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.data;
id = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &p,
(int)krb5_trusted_certifiers[i]->subjectKeyIdentifier.length);
if (id == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* XXX */
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(id);
}
i++;
}
/* XXX Since we not doing anything with received trusted certifiers
* return an error. this is the place where we can pick a different
* client certificate based on the information in td_trusted_certifiers
*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
cleanup:
if (sk_xn != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk_xn, X509_NAME_free);
return retval;
}
/* Originally based on OpenSSL's PKCS7_dataDecode(), now modified to remove the
* use of BIO objects and to fit the PKINIT internal interfaces. */
static int
pkcs7_decrypt(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx, PKCS7 *p7,
unsigned char **data_out, unsigned int *len_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int ok = 0, plaintext_len = 0, final_len;
unsigned int keylen = 0, eklen = 0, blocksize;
unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL, *plaintext = NULL, *use_key;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
X509_ALGOR *enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
*data_out = NULL;
*len_out = 0;
p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
/* RFC 4556 section 3.2.3.2 requires that there be exactly one
* recipientInfo. */
if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) != 1) {
pkiDebug("invalid number of EnvelopedData RecipientInfos\n");
return 0;
}
ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, 0);
evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
if (evp_cipher == NULL)
goto cleanup;
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher);
blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher);
evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (evp_ctx == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!EVP_DecryptInit(evp_ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL) ||
EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx, enc_alg->parameter) <= 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Generate a random symmetric key to avoid exposing timing data if RSA
* decryption fails the padding check. */
tkey = malloc(keylen);
if (tkey == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey))
goto cleanup;
/* Decrypt the secret key with the private key. */
ret = pkinit_decode_data(context, id_cryptoctx,
ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ri->enc_key),
ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), &ek, &eklen);
use_key = (ret || eklen != keylen) ? tkey : ek;
/* Allocate a plaintext buffer and decrypt data_body into it. */
plaintext = malloc(data_body->length + blocksize);
if (plaintext == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!EVP_DecryptInit(evp_ctx, NULL, use_key, NULL))
goto cleanup;
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(evp_ctx, plaintext, &plaintext_len,
data_body->data, data_body->length))
goto cleanup;
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal(evp_ctx, plaintext + plaintext_len, &final_len))
goto cleanup;
plaintext_len += final_len;
*len_out = plaintext_len;
*data_out = plaintext;
plaintext = NULL;
ok = 1;
cleanup:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
zapfree(plaintext, plaintext_len);
zapfree(ek, eklen);
zapfree(tkey, keylen);
return ok;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
static void
print_dh(DH * dh, char *msg)
{
BIO *bio_err = NULL;
bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
if (msg)
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)msg);
if (dh)
DHparams_print(bio_err, dh);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "private key: ");
BN_print(bio_err, dh->priv_key);
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)"\n");
BIO_free(bio_err);
}
static void
print_pubkey(BIGNUM * key, char *msg)
{
BIO *bio_err = NULL;
bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
if (msg)
BIO_puts(bio_err, (const char *)msg);
if (key)
BN_print(bio_err, key);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
BIO_free(bio_err);
}
#endif
static char *
pkinit_pkcs11_code_to_text(int err)
{
int i;
static char uc[32];
for (i = 0; pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL; i++)
if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].code == err)
break;
if (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text != NULL)
return (pkcs11_errstrings[i].text);
snprintf(uc, sizeof(uc), _("unknown code 0x%x"), err);
return (uc);
}
/*
* Add an item to the pkinit_identity_crypto_context's list of deferred
* identities.
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_set_deferred_id(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const char *identity, const char *password)
{
unsigned long ck_flags;
ck_flags = pkinit_get_deferred_id_flags(id_cryptoctx->deferred_ids,
identity);
return pkinit_set_deferred_id(&id_cryptoctx->deferred_ids,
identity, ck_flags, password);
}
/*
* Retrieve a read-only copy of the pkinit_identity_crypto_context's list of
* deferred identities, sure to be valid only until the next time someone calls
* either pkinit_set_deferred_id() or crypto_set_deferred_id().
*/
const pkinit_deferred_id *
crypto_get_deferred_ids(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx)
{
pkinit_deferred_id *deferred;
const pkinit_deferred_id *ret;
deferred = id_cryptoctx->deferred_ids;
ret = (const pkinit_deferred_id *)deferred;
return ret;
}
/* Return the received certificate as DER-encoded data. */
krb5_error_code
crypto_encode_der_cert(krb5_context context, pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
uint8_t **der_out, size_t *der_len)
{
int len;
unsigned char *der, *p;
*der_out = NULL;
*der_len = 0;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
return EINVAL;
p = NULL;
len = i2d_X509(reqctx->received_cert, NULL);
if (len <= 0)
return EINVAL;
p = der = malloc(len);
if (der == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if (i2d_X509(reqctx->received_cert, &p) <= 0) {
free(der);
return EINVAL;
}
*der_out = der;
*der_len = len;
return 0;
}
/*
* Get the certificate matching data from the request certificate.
*/
krb5_error_code
crypto_req_cert_matching_data(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_cert_matching_data **md_out)
{
*md_out = NULL;
if (reqctx == NULL || reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
return ENOENT;
return get_matching_data(context, plgctx, reqctx, reqctx->received_cert,
md_out);
}