/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
/*
* Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
*/
#include "nm-default.h"
#include "nm-setting-macsec.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "nm-glib-aux/nm-secret-utils.h"
#include "nm-utils.h"
#include "nm-core-types-internal.h"
#include "nm-setting-connection.h"
#include "nm-setting-private.h"
#include "nm-setting-wired.h"
#include "nm-connection-private.h"
/**
* SECTION:nm-setting-macsec
* @short_description: Describes connection properties for MACSEC interfaces
*
* The #NMSettingMacsec object is a #NMSetting subclass that describes properties
* necessary for connection to MACsec (IEEE 802.1AE) interfaces.
**/
/*****************************************************************************/
NM_GOBJECT_PROPERTIES_DEFINE_BASE(PROP_PARENT,
PROP_MODE,
PROP_ENCRYPT,
PROP_MKA_CAK,
PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
PROP_MKA_CKN,
PROP_PORT,
PROP_VALIDATION,
PROP_SEND_SCI, );
typedef struct {
char * parent;
char * mka_cak;
char * mka_ckn;
int port;
NMSettingMacsecMode mode;
NMSettingSecretFlags mka_cak_flags;
NMSettingMacsecValidation validation;
bool encrypt : 1;
bool send_sci : 1;
} NMSettingMacsecPrivate;
G_DEFINE_TYPE(NMSettingMacsec, nm_setting_macsec, NM_TYPE_SETTING)
#define NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(o) \
(G_TYPE_INSTANCE_GET_PRIVATE((o), NM_TYPE_SETTING_MACSEC, NMSettingMacsecPrivate))
/*****************************************************************************/
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_parent:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:parent property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
const char *
nm_setting_macsec_get_parent(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->parent;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mode:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mode property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSettingMacsecMode
nm_setting_macsec_get_mode(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mode;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:encrypt property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
gboolean
nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), TRUE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->encrypt;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
const char *
nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_cak;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSettingSecretFlags
nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_cak_flags;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
const char *
nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_ckn;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_port:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:port property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
int
nm_setting_macsec_get_port(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), 1);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->port;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_validation:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:validation property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSettingMacsecValidation
nm_setting_macsec_get_validation(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_DISABLE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->validation;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:send-sci property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.12
**/
gboolean
nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), TRUE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->send_sci;
}
static GPtrArray *
need_secrets(NMSetting *setting)
{
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
GPtrArray * secrets = NULL;
if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
if (!priv->mka_cak
&& !NM_FLAGS_HAS(priv->mka_cak_flags, NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED)) {
secrets = g_ptr_array_sized_new(1);
g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK);
}
}
return secrets;
}
/*********************************************************************/
static gboolean
verify_macsec_key(const char *key, gboolean cak, GError **error)
{
int req_len;
/* CAK is a connection secret and can be NULL for various
* reasons (agent-owned, no permissions to get secrets, etc.)
*/
if (cak && !key)
return TRUE;
if (!key || !key[0]) {
g_set_error_literal(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("the key is empty"));
return FALSE;
}
req_len = cak ? NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_LENGTH : NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN_LENGTH;
if (strlen(key) != (gsize) req_len) {
g_set_error(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("the key must be %d characters"),
req_len);
return FALSE;
}
if (!NM_STRCHAR_ALL(key, ch, g_ascii_isxdigit(ch))) {
g_set_error_literal(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("the key contains non-hexadecimal characters"));
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
static gboolean
verify(NMSetting *setting, NMConnection *connection, GError **error)
{
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
NMSettingConnection * s_con = NULL;
NMSettingWired * s_wired = NULL;
NMSetting8021x * s_8021x = NULL;
if (connection) {
s_con = nm_connection_get_setting_connection(connection);
s_wired = nm_connection_get_setting_wired(connection);
s_8021x = nm_connection_get_setting_802_1x(connection);
}
if (priv->parent) {
if (nm_utils_is_uuid(priv->parent)) {
/* If we have an NMSettingConnection:master with slave-type="macsec",
* then it must be the same UUID.
*/
if (s_con) {
const char *master = NULL, *slave_type = NULL;
slave_type = nm_setting_connection_get_slave_type(s_con);
if (!g_strcmp0(slave_type, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME))
master = nm_setting_connection_get_master(s_con);
if (master && g_strcmp0(priv->parent, master) != 0) {
g_set_error(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("'%s' value doesn't match '%s=%s'"),
priv->parent,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_MASTER,
master);
g_prefix_error(error,
"%s.%s: ",
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
return FALSE;
}
}
} else if (!nm_utils_iface_valid_name(priv->parent)) {
/* parent must be either a UUID or an interface name */
g_set_error(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("'%s' is neither an UUID nor an interface name"),
priv->parent);
g_prefix_error(error,
"%s.%s: ",
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
return FALSE;
}
} else {
/* If parent is NULL, the parent must be specified via
* NMSettingWired:mac-address.
*/
if (connection && (!s_wired || !nm_setting_wired_get_mac_address(s_wired))) {
g_set_error(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY,
_("property is not specified and neither is '%s:%s'"),
NM_SETTING_WIRED_SETTING_NAME,
NM_SETTING_WIRED_MAC_ADDRESS);
g_prefix_error(error,
"%s.%s: ",
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
if (!verify_macsec_key(priv->mka_ckn, FALSE, error)) {
g_prefix_error(error,
"%s.%s: ",
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN);
return FALSE;
}
if (!verify_macsec_key(priv->mka_cak, TRUE, error)) {
g_prefix_error(error,
"%s.%s: ",
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK);
return FALSE;
}
} else if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_EAP) {
if (!s_8021x) {
g_set_error(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_SETTING,
_("EAP key management requires '%s' setting presence"),
NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME);
g_prefix_error(error, "%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME);
return FALSE;
}
} else {
g_set_error_literal(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("must be either psk (0) or eap (1)"));
g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE);
return FALSE;
}
if (priv->port <= 0 || priv->port > 65534) {
g_set_error(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY,
_("invalid port %d"),
priv->port);
g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PORT);
return FALSE;
}
if (priv->mode != NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK && (priv->mka_cak || priv->mka_ckn)) {
g_set_error_literal(error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("only valid for psk mode"));
g_prefix_error(error,
"%s.%s: ",
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
priv->mka_cak ? NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK : NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN);
return NM_SETTING_VERIFY_NORMALIZABLE;
}
return TRUE;
}
/*****************************************************************************/
static void
get_property(GObject *object, guint prop_id, GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec)
{
NMSettingMacsec * setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC(object);
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
switch (prop_id) {
case PROP_PARENT:
g_value_set_string(value, priv->parent);
break;
case PROP_MODE:
g_value_set_int(value, priv->mode);
break;
case PROP_ENCRYPT:
g_value_set_boolean(value, priv->encrypt);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK:
g_value_set_string(value, priv->mka_cak);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS:
g_value_set_flags(value, priv->mka_cak_flags);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CKN:
g_value_set_string(value, priv->mka_ckn);
break;
case PROP_PORT:
g_value_set_int(value, priv->port);
break;
case PROP_VALIDATION:
g_value_set_int(value, priv->validation);
break;
case PROP_SEND_SCI:
g_value_set_boolean(value, priv->send_sci);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
static void
set_property(GObject *object, guint prop_id, const GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec)
{
NMSettingMacsec * setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC(object);
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
switch (prop_id) {
case PROP_PARENT:
g_free(priv->parent);
priv->parent = g_value_dup_string(value);
break;
case PROP_MODE:
priv->mode = g_value_get_int(value);
break;
case PROP_ENCRYPT:
priv->encrypt = g_value_get_boolean(value);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK:
nm_free_secret(priv->mka_cak);
priv->mka_cak = g_value_dup_string(value);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS:
priv->mka_cak_flags = g_value_get_flags(value);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CKN:
g_free(priv->mka_ckn);
priv->mka_ckn = g_value_dup_string(value);
break;
case PROP_PORT:
priv->port = g_value_get_int(value);
break;
case PROP_VALIDATION:
priv->validation = g_value_get_int(value);
break;
case PROP_SEND_SCI:
priv->send_sci = g_value_get_boolean(value);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID(object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
/*****************************************************************************/
static void
nm_setting_macsec_init(NMSettingMacsec *self)
{
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(self);
nm_assert(priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK);
priv->encrypt = TRUE;
priv->port = 1;
priv->send_sci = TRUE;
priv->validation = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_STRICT;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_new:
*
* Creates a new #NMSettingMacsec object with default values.
*
* Returns: (transfer full): the new empty #NMSettingMacsec object
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSetting *
nm_setting_macsec_new(void)
{
return g_object_new(NM_TYPE_SETTING_MACSEC, NULL);
}
static void
finalize(GObject *object)
{
NMSettingMacsec * setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC(object);
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
g_free(priv->parent);
nm_free_secret(priv->mka_cak);
g_free(priv->mka_ckn);
G_OBJECT_CLASS(nm_setting_macsec_parent_class)->finalize(object);
}
static void
nm_setting_macsec_class_init(NMSettingMacsecClass *klass)
{
GObjectClass * object_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS(klass);
NMSettingClass *setting_class = NM_SETTING_CLASS(klass);
g_type_class_add_private(klass, sizeof(NMSettingMacsecPrivate));
object_class->get_property = get_property;
object_class->set_property = set_property;
object_class->finalize = finalize;
setting_class->verify = verify;
setting_class->need_secrets = need_secrets;
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:parent:
*
* If given, specifies the parent interface name or parent connection UUID
* from which this MACSEC interface should be created. If this property is
* not specified, the connection must contain an #NMSettingWired setting
* with a #NMSettingWired:mac-address property.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_PARENT] = g_param_spec_string(
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT,
"",
"",
NULL,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mode:
*
* Specifies how the CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MKA (MACsec Key
* Agreement) is obtained.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MODE] =
g_param_spec_int(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE,
"",
"",
G_MININT,
G_MAXINT,
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:encrypt:
*
* Whether the transmitted traffic must be encrypted.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_ENCRYPT] = g_param_spec_boolean(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_ENCRYPT,
"",
"",
TRUE,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak:
*
* The pre-shared CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MACsec
* Key Agreement.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CAK] =
g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK,
"",
"",
NULL,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak-flags:
*
* Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
* property.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS] =
g_param_spec_flags(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
"",
"",
NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS,
NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn:
*
* The pre-shared CKN (Connectivity-association Key Name) for
* MACsec Key Agreement.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CKN] = g_param_spec_string(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN,
"",
"",
NULL,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:port:
*
* The port component of the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier), between 1 and 65534.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_PORT] =
g_param_spec_int(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PORT,
"",
"",
1,
65534,
1,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:validation:
*
* Specifies the validation mode for incoming frames.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_VALIDATION] =
g_param_spec_int(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
"",
"",
G_MININT,
G_MAXINT,
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_STRICT,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:send-sci:
*
* Specifies whether the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier) is included
* in every packet.
*
* Since: 1.12
**/
obj_properties[PROP_SEND_SCI] =
g_param_spec_boolean(NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SEND_SCI,
"",
"",
TRUE,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
g_object_class_install_properties(object_class, _PROPERTY_ENUMS_LAST, obj_properties);
_nm_setting_class_commit(setting_class, NM_META_SETTING_TYPE_MACSEC);
}