| To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they allow: |
| |
| - /proc/kmsg allows: |
| - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive |
| single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ). |
| - everything, after an open. |
| |
| - syslog syscall allows: |
| - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG. |
| - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if dmesg_restrict==0. |
| - nothing else (EPERM). |
| |
| The use-cases were: |
| - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs. |
| - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the |
| destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs. |
| |
| AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't |
| clear the ring buffer. |
| |
| Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides |
| reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e. SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), |
| so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive syslog syscall actions. |
| |
| To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the constants |
| to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and |
| SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC). SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows |
| non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC allows destructive actions |
| after a capabilities-constrained SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check. |
| |
| - /dev/kmsg allows: |
| - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0 |
| - reading/polling, after open |
| |
| Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
| Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de> |
| Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> |
| Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org> |
| Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org |
| |
| fs/proc/kmsg.c | 10 +++--- |
| include/linux/syslog.h | 4 +-- |
| kernel/printk.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- |
| 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) |
| |
| diff --git a/fs/proc/kmsg.c b/fs/proc/kmsg.c |
| index bd4b5a7..bdfabda 100644 |
| |
| |
| @@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ extern wait_queue_head_t log_wait; |
| |
| static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file) |
| { |
| - return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE); |
| + return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); |
| } |
| |
| static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file) |
| { |
| - (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE); |
| + (void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| @@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, |
| size_t count, loff_t *ppos) |
| { |
| if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && |
| - !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE)) |
| + !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC)) |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| - return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE); |
| + return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC); |
| } |
| |
| static unsigned int kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) |
| { |
| poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait); |
| - if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE)) |
| + if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC)) |
| return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| diff --git a/include/linux/syslog.h b/include/linux/syslog.h |
| index 3891139..98a3153 100644 |
| |
| |
| @@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ |
| /* Return size of the log buffer */ |
| #define SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER 10 |
| |
| -#define SYSLOG_FROM_CALL 0 |
| -#define SYSLOG_FROM_FILE 1 |
| +#define SYSLOG_FROM_READER 0 |
| +#define SYSLOG_FROM_PROC 1 |
| |
| int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int count, bool from_file); |
| |
| diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c |
| index abbdd9e..53b5c5e 100644 |
| |
| |
| @@ -368,6 +368,53 @@ static void log_store(int facility, int level, |
| log_next_seq++; |
| } |
| |
| +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT |
| +int dmesg_restrict = 1; |
| +#else |
| +int dmesg_restrict; |
| +#endif |
| + |
| +static int syslog_action_restricted(int type) |
| +{ |
| + if (dmesg_restrict) |
| + return 1; |
| + /* |
| + * Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" |
| + * for everybody. |
| + */ |
| + return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && |
| + type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER; |
| +} |
| + |
| +static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file) |
| +{ |
| + /* |
| + * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've |
| + * already done the capabilities checks at open time. |
| + */ |
| + if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) |
| + return 0; |
| + |
| + if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) { |
| + if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) |
| + return 0; |
| + /* |
| + * For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with |
| + * a warning. |
| + */ |
| + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
| + printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): " |
| + "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN " |
| + "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n", |
| + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); |
| + return 0; |
| + } |
| + return -EPERM; |
| + } |
| + return security_syslog(type); |
| +} |
| + |
| + |
| /* /dev/kmsg - userspace message inject/listen interface */ |
| struct devkmsg_user { |
| u64 seq; |
| @@ -624,7 +671,8 @@ static int devkmsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) |
| if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) |
| return 0; |
| |
| - err = security_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL); |
| + err = check_syslog_permissions(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL, |
| + SYSLOG_FROM_READER); |
| if (err) |
| return err; |
| |
| @@ -817,45 +865,6 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(int level) |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT |
| -int dmesg_restrict = 1; |
| -#else |
| -int dmesg_restrict; |
| -#endif |
| - |
| -static int syslog_action_restricted(int type) |
| -{ |
| - if (dmesg_restrict) |
| - return 1; |
| - /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for everybody */ |
| - return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER; |
| -} |
| - |
| -static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file) |
| -{ |
| - /* |
| - * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've |
| - * already done the capabilities checks at open time. |
| - */ |
| - if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) |
| - return 0; |
| - |
| - if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) { |
| - if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) |
| - return 0; |
| - /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */ |
| - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
| - printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): " |
| - "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN " |
| - "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n", |
| - current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); |
| - return 0; |
| - } |
| - return -EPERM; |
| - } |
| - return 0; |
| -} |
| - |
| #if defined(CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME) |
| static bool printk_time = 1; |
| #else |
| @@ -1253,7 +1262,7 @@ out: |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len) |
| { |
| - return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_CALL); |
| + return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_READER); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| -- |
| 1.7.9.5 |
| |
| |
| -- |
| Kees Cook |
| Chrome OS Security |