Blob Blame History Raw
--- at-3.1.10/atd.c.pam	2006-09-12 15:01:55.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atd.c	2006-09-12 15:26:49.000000000 +0200
@@ -73,6 +73,42 @@
 #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
 #include <syslog.h>
 #endif
+#ifdef  WITH_PAM
+/*
+ *  We must check if the atd daemon userid will be allowed to gain the job owner user's
+ *  credentials with PAM . If not, the user has been denied at(1) usage, eg. with pam_access.
+ */
+  setreuid(daemon_uid, daemon_uid);
+  setregid(daemon_gid, daemon_gid);
+
+# define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+                              fprintf(stderr,"PAM authentication failure: %s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+                              pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+                              pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT); \
+                              pam_end(pamh, retcode); \
+                              setregid(gid,egid); \
+                              setreuid(uid,euid); \
+                              return(0); \
+                           }
+  retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+
+  pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT);
+  pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+
+  setregid(gid,egid);
+  setreuid(uid,euid);
+
+#endif
+
 
 /* Local headers */
 
@@ -83,6 +119,10 @@
 #include "getloadavg.h"
 #endif
 
+#ifndef LOG_ATD
+#define LOG_ATD        LOG_DAEMON
+#endif
+
 /* Macros */
 
 #define BATCH_INTERVAL_DEFAULT 60
@@ -196,6 +236,19 @@
 #define fork myfork
 #endif
 
+#undef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
+#undef ATD_MAIL_NAME
+#if defined(SENDMAIL)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM SENDMAIL
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME    "sendmail"
+#elif  defined(MAILC)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILC
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME    "mail"
+#elif  defined(MAILX)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILX
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME    "mailx"
+#endif
+
 static void
 run_file(char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 {
@@ -420,6 +473,8 @@
     PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
     retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
     PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+    closelog();
+    openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
     PRIV_END
 #endif
 
@@ -434,6 +489,14 @@
     else if (pid == 0) {
 	char *nul = NULL;
 	char **nenvp = &nul;
+	char **pam_envp=0L;
+	
+	       PRIV_START
+	#ifdef WITH_PAM
+	       pam_envp = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
+	       if ( ( pam_envp != 0L ) && (pam_envp[0] != 0L) )
+	           nenvp = pam_envp;
+	#endif
 
 	/* Set up things for the child; we want standard input from the
 	 * input file, and standard output and error sent to our output file.
@@ -455,8 +518,6 @@
 	if (chdir(ATJOB_DIR) < 0)
 	    perr("Cannot chdir to " ATJOB_DIR);
 
-	PRIV_START
-
 	    nice((tolower((int) queue) - 'a' + 1) * 2);
 
 	    if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
@@ -472,10 +533,93 @@
 		perr("Cannot reset signal handler to default");
 
 	    chdir("/");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+           if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+                   security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+                   security_context_t  file_context=NULL;
+                   int retval=0;
+                   struct av_decision avd;
+                   char *seuser=NULL;
+                   char *level=NULL;
+    
+                   if (getseuserbyname(pentry->pw_name, &seuser, &level) == 0) {
+		       retval=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, NULL, &user_context);
+	                  free(seuser);
+	                  free(level);
+	                  if (retval) {
+	                       if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+		                       perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+		                    } else {
+		                                syslog(LOG_ERR, "execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+		                               goto out;
+		                        }
+		                      }
+		                   }
+		    
+		                 /*
+		                  * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+		                  * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+		                  * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+		                  * the user cron job.  It performs an entrypoint
+		                  * permission check for this purpose.
+		                  */
+		                 if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+		                  perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+		    
+		                 retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+		                                              file_context,
+		                                              SECCLASS_FILE,
+		                                              FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+		                                              &avd);
+		                 freecon(file_context);
+		                 if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+				    if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+					perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+			            } else {
+					syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+				        goto out;
+				    }
+				 }
+				
+				            if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+				                   if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+
+     perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+                    } else {
+	                    syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+	                }
+	             }
+	             out:
+	                  freecon(user_context);
+	            }
+#endif
+	 
+
 
 	    if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", (char *) NULL, nenvp) != 0)
+
 		perr("Exec failed for /bin/sh");
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+       if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+           if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+               if (security_getenforce()==1)
+                   perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+           }
+       }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+       if ( ( nenvp != &nul ) && (pam_envp != 0L)  && (*pam_envp != 0L))
+       {
+           for( nenvp = pam_envp; *nenvp != 0L; nenvp++)
+               free(*nenvp);
+           free( pam_envp );
+           nenvp = &nul;
+           pam_envp=0L;
+       }
+#endif
+
 	PRIV_END
     }
     /* We're the parent.  Let's wait.
@@ -507,14 +651,43 @@
         unlink(filename);
     }
 
+#ifdef  WITH_PAM
+    pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+    pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+    pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+    closelog();
+    openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+
     /* The job is now finished.  We can delete its input file.
      */
     chdir(ATJOB_DIR);
     unlink(newname);
 
+#ifdef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
     if (((send_mail != -1) && (buf.st_size != size)) || (send_mail == 1)) {
-
-	PRIV_START
+	int mail_pid = -1;
+#ifdef  WITH_PAM
+       retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+       PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+       retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+       PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+       retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+       PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+       retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+       PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+       retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+       PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+        /* PAM has now re-opened our log to auth.info ! */
+       closelog();
+       openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+
+       mail_pid = fork();
+
+       if ( mail_pid == 0 )
+       {
+                PRIV_START
 
 	    if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
 		perr("Cannot delete saved userids");
@@ -527,16 +700,81 @@
 
 	    chdir ("/");
 
-#if defined(SENDMAIL)
-	    execl(SENDMAIL, "sendmail", mailname, (char *) NULL);
-#else
-/*#error      "No mail command specified."*/
-	perr("No mail command specified.");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+           if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+                 security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+                 security_context_t  file_context=NULL;
+                 int retval=0;
+                 struct av_decision avd;
+    
+                 if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
+                   perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+                 /*
+                  * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+                  * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+                  * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+                  * the user cron job.  It performs an entrypoint
+                  * permission check for this purpose.
+                  */
+                 if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+                   perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+    
+                 retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+                                              file_context,
+                                              SECCLASS_FILE,
+                                              FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+                                              &avd);
+                 freecon(file_context);
+                 if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+	                 if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+	                         perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+	                 } else {
+		                 syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+		                 goto out;
+		         }
+		 }
+		
+		 if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+		         if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+				perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+			 } else {
+			        syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+			 }
+		 }
+		 freecon(user_context);
+	    }
+#endif
+			    
+      execl(ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM, ATD_MAIL_NAME, mailname, (char *) NULL);
+      perr("Exec failed for mail command");
+      exit(-1);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+        if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+               if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+                     if (security_getenforce()==1)
+                       perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+        }
+   }
 #endif
-	    perr("Exec failed for mail command");
 
-	PRIV_END
+    PRIV_END
+    } else
+	if ( mail_pid == -1 ) {
+	    perr("fork of mailer failed");
+	} else {
+	/* Parent */
+	    waitpid(mail_pid, (int *) NULL, 0);
+	
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+	       pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+	       pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+	       pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+	       closelog();
+	       openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+	}
     }
+#endif
     exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
 }
 
@@ -736,6 +974,10 @@
     struct passwd *pwe;
     struct group *ge;
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
 /* We don't need root privileges all the time; running under uid and gid
  * daemon is fine.
  */
@@ -752,11 +994,7 @@
 
     RELINQUISH_PRIVS_ROOT(daemon_uid, daemon_gid)
 
-#ifndef LOG_CRON
-#define LOG_CRON	LOG_DAEMON
-#endif
-
-    openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_CRON);
+    openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
 
     opterr = 0;
     errno = 0;
--- at-3.1.10/perm.c.pam	2005-08-05 05:16:01.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/perm.c	2006-09-12 15:06:30.000000000 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@
 #define PRIV_END while(0)
 #endif
 
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+static const struct pam_conv conv = {
+       NULL
+};
+#endif
+
 /* Structures and unions */
 
 
@@ -109,18 +117,58 @@
 int
 check_permission()
 {
-  uid_t uid = geteuid();
+  uid_t euid = geteuid(), uid=getuid(), egid=getegid(), gid=getgid();
   struct passwd *pentry;
   int    allow = 0, deny = 1;
 
-  if (uid == 0)
+  int    retcode=0;
+
+  if (euid == 0)
     return 1;
 
-  if ((pentry = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+  if ((pentry = getpwuid(euid)) == NULL) {
     perror("Cannot access user database");
     exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
   }
 
+#ifdef  WITH_PAM
+/*
+ *  We must check if the atd daemon userid will be allowed to gain the job owner user's
+ *  credentials with PAM . If not, the user has been denied at(1) usage, eg. with pam_access.
+ */
+  setreuid(daemon_uid, daemon_uid);
+  setregid(daemon_gid, daemon_gid);
+
+# define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+                              fprintf(stderr,"PAM authentication failure: %s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+                             pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+                             pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT); \
+                              pam_end(pamh, retcode); \
+                              setregid(gid,egid); \
+                              setreuid(uid,euid); \
+                              return(0); \
+                           }
+  retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+  retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+  PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+
+  pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT);
+  pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+
+  setregid(gid,egid);
+  setreuid(uid,euid);
+
+#endif
+
+
+
   allow = user_in_file(ETCDIR "/at.allow", pentry->pw_name);
   if (allow==0 || allow==1)
     return allow;
--- at-3.1.8/pam_atd.pam        2005-01-25 16:16:41.842416000 -0500
+++ at-3.1.8/pam_atd    2005-01-25 16:01:10.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the at daemon
+#
+#
+auth      sufficient /lib/security/$ISA/pam_rootok.so
+auth       required  /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+auth       required  pam_env.so
+account    required  /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+session    required  /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+# Sets up user limits, please uncomment and read /etc/security/limits.conf
+# to enable this functionality.
+# session    required   pam_limits.so
+#
--- at-3.1.10/config.h.in.__	2006-09-07 18:47:06.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/config.h.in	2006-09-07 18:48:12.000000000 +0200
@@ -181,3 +181,9 @@
 
 #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN
 #undef HAVE_PAM
+
+/* Define if you are building with_selinux  */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
+/* Define if you are building with_pam */
+#undef WITH_PAM
--- at-3.1.10/configure.in._	2005-08-05 05:16:02.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/configure.in	2006-09-07 16:21:19.000000000 +0200
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@
 if test "$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL" != "" ; then
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SENDMAIL,"$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL")
 MAIL_CMD="$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL"
+#AC_PATH_PROG(GETOPT, getopt, , $PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin )
+#if test "$ac_cv_path_GETOPT" != "" ; then
+#AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GETOPT,"$ac_cv_path_GETOPT")
 fi
 
 AC_SUBST(MAIL_CMD)