--- at-3.1.10/perm.c.pam 2005-08-05 05:16:01.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/perm.c 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@
#define PRIV_END while(0)
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+static const struct pam_conv conv = {
+ NULL
+};
+#endif
+
/* Structures and unions */
@@ -109,18 +117,54 @@
int
check_permission()
{
- uid_t uid = geteuid();
+ uid_t euid = geteuid(), uid=getuid(), egid=getegid(), gid=getgid();
struct passwd *pentry;
int allow = 0, deny = 1;
-
- if (uid == 0)
+ int retcode = 0;
+ if (euid == 0)
return 1;
- if ((pentry = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+ if ((pentry = getpwuid(euid)) == NULL) {
perror("Cannot access user database");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+/*
+ * We must check if the atd daemon userid will be allowed to gain the job owner user's
+ * credentials with PAM . If not, the user has been denied at(1) usage, eg. with pam_access.
+ */
+ setreuid(daemon_uid, daemon_uid);
+ setregid(daemon_gid, daemon_gid);
+
+# define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ fprintf(stderr,"PAM authentication failure: %s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT); \
+ pam_end(pamh, retcode); \
+ setregid(gid,egid); \
+ setreuid(uid,euid); \
+ return(0); \
+ }
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+
+ setregid(gid,egid);
+ setreuid(uid,euid);
+
+#endif
+
allow = user_in_file(ETCDIR "/at.allow", pentry->pw_name);
if (allow==0 || allow==1)
return allow;
--- at-3.1.10/config.h.in.pam 2005-08-05 05:16:02.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/config.h.in 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
@@ -181,3 +181,10 @@
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN
#undef HAVE_PAM
+
+/* Define if you are building with_pam */
+#undef WITH_PAM
+
+/* Define if you are building with_selinux */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
--- at-3.1.10/configure.in.pam 2005-08-05 05:16:02.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/configure.in 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
@@ -316,4 +316,19 @@
)
AC_SUBST(DAEMON_GROUPNAME)
+AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+[ --with-selinux Define to run with selinux],
+AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX),
+)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled, SELINUXLIB=-lselinux)
+AC_SUBST(SELINUXLIB)
+AC_SUBST(WITH_SELINUX)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
+[ --with-pam Define to enable pam support ],
+AC_DEFINE(WITH_PAM),
+)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, PAMLIB='-lpam -lpam_misc')
+AC_SUBST(PAMLIB)
+
AC_OUTPUT(Makefile atrun atd.8 atrun.8 at.1 batch)
--- at-3.1.10/atd.c.pam 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atd.c 2007-07-03 13:52:38.000000000 +0200
@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@
#include <syslog.h>
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+int selinux_enabled=0;
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
+#endif
+
/* Local headers */
#include "privs.h"
@@ -83,6 +91,10 @@
#include "getloadavg.h"
#endif
+#ifndef LOG_ATD
+#define LOG_ATD LOG_DAEMON
+#endif
+
/* Macros */
#define BATCH_INTERVAL_DEFAULT 60
@@ -121,6 +133,7 @@
#define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
fprintf(stderr,"\n%s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
syslog(LOG_ERR,"%s",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT); \
pam_end(pamh, retcode); exit(1); \
}
#define PAM_END { retcode = pam_close_session(pamh,0); \
@@ -196,6 +209,19 @@
#define fork myfork
#endif
+#undef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
+#undef ATD_MAIL_NAME
+#if defined(SENDMAIL)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM SENDMAIL
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "sendmail"
+#elif defined(MAILC)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILC
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mail"
+#elif defined(MAILX)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILX
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mailx"
+#endif
+
static void
run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
@@ -378,18 +404,22 @@
fstat(fd_out, &buf);
size = buf.st_size;
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
- PRIV_START
+//add for fedora, removed HAVE_PAM
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
- PRIV_END
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
#endif
+//end
close(STDIN_FILENO);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
@@ -402,6 +432,14 @@
else if (pid == 0) {
char *nul = NULL;
char **nenvp = &nul;
+ char **pam_envp=0L;
+
+ PRIV_START
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_envp = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
+ if ( ( pam_envp != 0L ) && (pam_envp[0] != 0L) )
+ nenvp = pam_envp;
+#endif
/* Set up things for the child; we want standard input from the
* input file, and standard output and error sent to our output file.
@@ -423,8 +461,6 @@
if (chdir(ATJOB_DIR) < 0)
perr("Cannot chdir to " ATJOB_DIR);
- PRIV_START
-
nice((tolower((int) queue) - 'a' + 1) * 2);
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
@@ -441,10 +477,90 @@
chdir("/");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
+ int retval=0;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ char *seuser=NULL;
+ char *level=NULL;
+
+ if (getseuserbyname(pentry->pw_name, &seuser, &level) == 0) {
+ retval=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, NULL, &user_context);
+ free(seuser);
+ free(level);
+ if (retval) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
+ * permission check for this purpose.
+ */
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce() > 0) {
+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+ file_context,
+ SECCLASS_FILE,
+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+ &avd);
+ freecon(file_context);
+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+ freecon(user_context);
+ }
+#endif
+
if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", (char *) NULL, nenvp) != 0)
perr("Exec failed for /bin/sh");
-
+//add for fedora
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0)
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+
+#endif
+//end
+//add for fedora
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ if ( ( nenvp != &nul ) && (pam_envp != 0L) && (*pam_envp != 0L))
+ {
+ for( nenvp = pam_envp; *nenvp != 0L; nenvp++)
+ free(*nenvp);
+ free( pam_envp );
+ nenvp = &nul;
+ pam_envp=0L;
+ }
+#endif
PRIV_END
+//end
}
/* We're the parent. Let's wait.
*/
@@ -456,7 +572,7 @@
return with an ECHILD error.
*/
waitpid(pid, (int *) NULL, 0);
-
+/* remove because WITH_PAM
#ifdef HAVE_PAM
PRIV_START
pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
@@ -464,7 +580,7 @@
pam_end(pamh, retcode);
PRIV_END
#endif
-
+*/
/* Send mail. Unlink the output file after opening it, so it
* doesn't hang around after the run.
*/
@@ -472,6 +588,13 @@
if (open(filename, O_RDONLY) != STDIN_FILENO)
perr("Open of jobfile failed");
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
unlink(filename);
/* The job is now finished. We can delete its input file.
@@ -480,8 +603,30 @@
unlink(newname);
free(newname);
+#ifdef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
if (((send_mail != -1) && (buf.st_size != size)) || (send_mail == 1)) {
+ int mail_pid = -1;
+//add for fedora
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ /* PAM has now re-opened our log to auth.info ! */
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+//end
+ mail_pid = fork();
+ if ( mail_pid == 0 )
+ {
PRIV_START
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
@@ -495,16 +640,80 @@
chdir ("/");
-#if defined(SENDMAIL)
- execl(SENDMAIL, "sendmail", mailname, (char *) NULL);
-#else
-/*#error "No mail command specified."*/
- perr("No mail command specified.");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
+ int retval=0;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+
+ if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ /*
+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
+ * permission check for this purpose.
+ */
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+
+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+ file_context,
+ SECCLASS_FILE,
+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+ &avd);
+ freecon(file_context);
+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+ out:
+ freecon(user_context);
+ }
+#endif
+ execl(ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM, ATD_MAIL_NAME, mailname, (char *) NULL);
+ perr("Exec faile for mail command");
+ exit(-1);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0)
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
#endif
- perr("Exec failed for mail command");
PRIV_END
+ }
+ else if ( mail_pid == -1 ) {
+ perr("fork of mailer failed");
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Parent */
+ waitpid(mail_pid, (int *) NULL, 0);
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
}
+#endif
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
@@ -702,6 +911,10 @@
struct passwd *pwe;
struct group *ge;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
/* We don't need root privileges all the time; running under uid and gid
* daemon is fine.
*/
@@ -718,18 +931,13 @@
RELINQUISH_PRIVS_ROOT(daemon_uid, daemon_gid)
-#ifndef LOG_CRON
-#define LOG_CRON LOG_DAEMON
-#endif
-
- openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_CRON);
-
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
opterr = 0;
errno = 0;
run_as_daemon = 1;
batch_interval = BATCH_INTERVAL_DEFAULT;
- while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "sdl:b:")) != EOF) {
+ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "sdl:b:n:")) != EOF) {
switch (c) {
case 'l':
if (sscanf(optarg, "%lf", &load_avg) != 1)
@@ -742,10 +950,15 @@
if (sscanf(optarg, "%ud", &batch_interval) != 1)
pabort("garbled option -b");
break;
+
case 'd':
daemon_debug++;
+ /* go through another option*/
+
+ case 'n':
+ daemon_nofork++;
break;
-
+
case 's':
run_as_daemon = 0;
break;
--- at-3.1.10/Makefile.in.pam 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/Makefile.in 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@
INSTALL = @INSTALL@
PAMLIB = @PAMLIB@
+SELINUXLIB = @SELINUXLIB@
CLONES = atq atrm
ATOBJECTS = at.o panic.o perm.o y.tab.o lex.yy.o
@@ -67,13 +68,13 @@
all: at atd atrun
at: $(ATOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at -pie $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at -pie $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB) $(PAMLIB)
rm -f $(CLONES)
$(LN_S) -f at atq
$(LN_S) -f at atrm
atd: $(RUNOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd -pie $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(PAMLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd -pie $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(SELINUXLIB) $(PAMLIB)
y.tab.c y.tab.h: parsetime.y
$(YACC) -d parsetime.y
--- at-3.1.10/pam_atd.pam 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/pam_atd 2007-07-03 13:29:24.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the at daemon
+#
+#
+auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
+auth include system-auth
+auth required pam_env.so
+account include system-auth
+session required pam_loginuid.so
+session include system-auth
+# Sets up user limits, please uncomment and read /etc/security/limits.conf
+# to enable this functionality.
+# session required pam_limits.so
+#