diff -up at-3.1.14/config.h.in.selinux at-3.1.14/config.h.in
--- at-3.1.14/config.h.in.selinux	2013-09-26 15:06:55.177049852 +0200
+++ at-3.1.14/config.h.in	2013-09-26 15:06:55.180049850 +0200
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@
 /* Define if you are building with_pam */
 #undef WITH_PAM
 
+/* Define if you are building with_selinux  */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat_getdynamic' function. */
 #undef HAVE_PSTAT_GETDYNAMIC
 
diff -up at-3.1.14/configure.ac.selinux at-3.1.14/configure.ac
--- at-3.1.14/configure.ac.selinux	2013-09-26 15:06:55.178049851 +0200
+++ at-3.1.14/configure.ac	2013-09-26 15:06:55.180049850 +0200
@@ -246,6 +246,14 @@ AC_DEFINE(WITH_PAM),
 AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start, PAMLIB='-lpam -lpam_misc')
 AC_SUBST(PAMLIB)
 
+AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+[ --with-selinux       Define to run with selinux],
+AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX),
+)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled, SELINUXLIB=-lselinux)
+AC_SUBST(SELINUXLIB)
+AC_SUBST(WITH_SELINUX)
+
 AC_MSG_CHECKING(groupname to run under)
 AC_ARG_WITH(daemon_groupname,
 [ --with-daemon_groupname=DAEMON_GROUPNAME	Groupname to run under (default daemon) ],
diff -up at-3.1.14/Makefile.in.selinux at-3.1.14/Makefile.in
--- at-3.1.14/Makefile.in.selinux	2013-09-26 15:06:55.175049853 +0200
+++ at-3.1.14/Makefile.in	2013-09-26 15:06:55.180049850 +0200
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ LIBS		= @LIBS@
 LIBOBJS		= @LIBOBJS@
 INSTALL		= @INSTALL@
 PAMLIB          = @PAMLIB@
+SELINUXLIB      = @SELINUXLIB@
 
 CLONES		= atq atrm
 ATOBJECTS	= at.o panic.o perm.o posixtm.o y.tab.o lex.yy.o
diff -up at-3.1.14/atd.c.selinux2 at-3.1.14/atd.c
--- at-3.1.14/atd.c.selinux2	2013-12-04 11:27:28.729005384 +0100
+++ at-3.1.14/atd.c	2013-12-04 11:30:17.709091150 +0100
@@ -83,6 +83,14 @@
 #include "getloadavg.h"
 #endif
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+int selinux_enabled=0;
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
+#endif
+
 #ifndef LOG_ATD
 #define LOG_ATD        LOG_DAEMON
 #endif
@@ -191,6 +199,68 @@ myfork()
 #define fork myfork
 #endif
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+static int set_selinux_context(const char *name, const char *filename) {
+       security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+       security_context_t  file_context=NULL;
+       struct av_decision avd;
+       int retval=-1;
+       char *seuser=NULL;
+       char *level=NULL;
+
+       if (getseuserbyname(name, &seuser, &level) == 0) {
+               retval=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, NULL, &user_context);
+               free(seuser);
+               free(level);
+               if (retval) {
+                       if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+                               perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", name);
+                       } else {
+                               syslog(LOG_ERR, "execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", name);
+                               return -1;
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+
+       /*
+       * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+       * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+       * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+       * the user cron job.  It performs an entrypoint
+       * permission check for this purpose.
+       */
+       if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+               perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+
+       retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+                                    file_context,
+                                    SECCLASS_FILE,
+                                    FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+                                    &avd);
+       freecon(file_context);
+       if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+               if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+                       perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,name);
+               } else {
+                       syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,name);
+                       retval = -1;
+                       goto err;
+               }
+       }
+       if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+               if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+                       perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,name);
+                       retval = -1;
+               } else {
+                       syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user  %s\n", user_context,name);
+               }
+       }
+  err:
+       freecon(user_context);
+       return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 static void
 run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 {
@@ -419,6 +489,13 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
 
 	    nice((tolower((int) queue) - 'a' + 1) * 2);
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	    if (selinux_enabled > 0) {
+	        if (set_selinux_context(pentry->pw_name, filename) < 0)
+	               perr("SELinux Failed to set context\n");
+	    }
+#endif
+
 	    if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
 		perr("Cannot initialize the supplementary group access list");
 
@@ -712,6 +789,10 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
     struct passwd *pwe;
     struct group *ge;
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+    selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
 /* We don't need root privileges all the time; running under uid and gid
  * daemon is fine.
  */