pam_keyinit — Kernel session keyring initialiser module

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DESCRIPTION

The pam_keyinit PAM module ensures that the invoking process has a session

keyring other than the user default session keyring.

The session component of the module checks to see if the process's session

keyring is the user default, and, if it is, creates a new anonymous session

keyring with which to replace it.

If a new session keyring is created, it will install a link to the user common

keyring in the session keyring so that keys common to the user will be

automatically accessible through it.

The session keyring of the invoking process will thenceforth be inherited by

all its children unless they override it.

This module is intended primarily for use by login processes. Be aware that

after the session keyring has been replaced, the old session keyring and the

keys it contains will no longer be accessible.

This module should not, generally, be invoked by programs like su, since it is

usually desirable for the key set to percolate through to the alternate

context. The keys have their own permissions system to manage this.

This module should be included as early as possible in a PAM configuration, so

that other PAM modules can attach tokens to the keyring.

The keyutils package is used to manipulate keys more directly. This can be

obtained from:

Keyutils

OPTIONS

debug

    Log debug information with syslog(3).

force

    Causes the session keyring of the invoking process to be replaced

    unconditionally.

revoke

    Causes the session keyring of the invoking process to be revoked when the

    invoking process exits if the session keyring was created for this process

    in the first place.

EXAMPLES

Add this line to your login entries to start each login session with its own

session keyring:

session  required  pam_keyinit.so

This will prevent keys from one session leaking into another session for the

same user.

AUTHOR

pam_keyinit was written by David Howells, <dhowells@redhat.com>.