Blame crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c

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/*
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 * Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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 *
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 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
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 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
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 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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 */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include "rsa_local.h"
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static const unsigned char zeroes[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
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#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_)
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# pragma optimize("g", off)
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#endif
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int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
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                         const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
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                         int sLen)
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{
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    return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
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}
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int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
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                              const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
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                              const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
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{
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    int i;
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    int ret = 0;
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    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
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    const unsigned char *H;
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    unsigned char *DB = NULL;
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    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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    unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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    if (ctx == NULL)
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        goto err;
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    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
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        mgf1Hash = Hash;
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    hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
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    if (hLen < 0)
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        goto err;
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    /*-
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     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
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     *      -1      sLen == hLen
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     *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
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     *      -3      salt length is maximized
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     *      -N      reserved
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     */
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    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
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        sLen = hLen;
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    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
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    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
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    if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (MSBits == 0) {
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        EM++;
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        emLen--;
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    }
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    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
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        sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
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    } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
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    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
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    DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
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    if (DB == NULL) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
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        goto err;
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    for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
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        DB[i] ^= EM[i];
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    if (MSBits)
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        DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
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    for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) ;
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    if (DB[i++] != 0x1) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
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        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
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        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
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        goto err;
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    if (maskedDBLen - i) {
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        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
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            goto err;
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    }
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    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H_, NULL))
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        goto err;
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    if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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        ret = 0;
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    } else {
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        ret = 1;
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    }
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 err:
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    OPENSSL_free(DB);
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    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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    return ret;
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}
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int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
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                              const unsigned char *mHash,
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                              const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
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{
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    return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
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}
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int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
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                                   const unsigned char *mHash,
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                                   const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
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                                   int sLen)
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{
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    int i;
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    int ret = 0;
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    int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
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    unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
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    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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    if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
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        mgf1Hash = Hash;
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    hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
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    if (hLen < 0)
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        goto err;
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    /*-
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     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
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     *      -1      sLen == hLen
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     *      -2      salt length is maximized
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     *      -3      same as above (on signing)
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     *      -N      reserved
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     */
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    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
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        sLen = hLen;
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    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN) {
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        sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
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    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
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    emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
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    if (MSBits == 0) {
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        *EM++ = 0;
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        emLen--;
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    }
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    if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
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               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
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        sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
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    } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
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        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
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               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
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        goto err;
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    }
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    if (sLen > 0) {
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        salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
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        if (salt == NULL) {
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            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
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                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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            goto err;
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        }
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        if (RAND_bytes(salt, sLen) <= 0)
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            goto err;
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    }
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    maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
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    H = EM + maskedDBLen;
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    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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    if (ctx == NULL)
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        goto err;
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    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
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        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
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        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
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        goto err;
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    if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, sLen))
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        goto err;
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    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H, NULL))
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        goto err;
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    /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
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    if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
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        goto err;
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    p = EM;
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    /*
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     * Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update pointer.
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     * Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to be non-negative.
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     */
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    p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
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    *p++ ^= 0x1;
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    if (sLen > 0) {
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        for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++)
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            *p++ ^= salt[i];
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    }
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    if (MSBits)
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        EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
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    /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
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    EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
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    ret = 1;
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 err:
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    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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    OPENSSL_clear_free(salt, (size_t)sLen); /* salt != NULL implies sLen > 0 */
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    return ret;
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}
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#if defined(_MSC_VER)
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# pragma optimize("",on)
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#endif