/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
#include "OCSPRequestor.h"
#include "OCSPVerificationTrustDomain.h"
#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/Move.h"
#include "mozilla/PodOperations.h"
#include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "nsCRTGlue.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "nsNSSCertValidity.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "pkix/Result.h"
#include "pkix/pkix.h"
#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "TrustOverrideUtils.h"
#include "TrustOverride-StartComAndWoSignData.inc"
#include "TrustOverride-GlobalSignData.inc"
#include "TrustOverride-SymantecData.inc"
#include "TrustOverride-AppleGoogleDigiCertData.inc"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
extern LazyLogModule gCertVerifierLog;
static const uint64_t ServerFailureDelaySeconds = 5 * 60;
namespace mozilla {
namespace psm {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(
SECTrustType certDBTrustType, OCSPFetching ocspFetching,
OCSPCache& ocspCache,
/*optional but shouldn't be*/ void* pinArg,
CertVerifier::OcspGetConfig ocspGETConfig, TimeDuration ocspTimeoutSoft,
TimeDuration ocspTimeoutHard, uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays,
CertVerifier::PinningMode pinningMode, unsigned int minRSABits,
ValidityCheckingMode validityCheckingMode, CertVerifier::SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,
DistrustedCAPolicy distrustedCAPolicy,
const OriginAttributes& originAttributes, UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
/*optional*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo,
/*optional*/ const char* hostname)
: mCertDBTrustType(certDBTrustType),
mOCSPFetching(ocspFetching),
mOCSPCache(ocspCache),
mPinArg(pinArg),
mOCSPGetConfig(ocspGETConfig),
mOCSPTimeoutSoft(ocspTimeoutSoft),
mOCSPTimeoutHard(ocspTimeoutHard),
mCertShortLifetimeInDays(certShortLifetimeInDays),
mPinningMode(pinningMode),
mMinRSABits(minRSABits),
mValidityCheckingMode(validityCheckingMode),
mSHA1Mode(sha1Mode),
mNetscapeStepUpPolicy(netscapeStepUpPolicy),
mDistrustedCAPolicy(distrustedCAPolicy),
mSawDistrustedCAByPolicyError(false),
mOriginAttributes(originAttributes),
mBuiltChain(builtChain),
mPinningTelemetryInfo(pinningTelemetryInfo),
mHostname(hostname),
mCertBlocklist(do_GetService(NS_CERTBLOCKLIST_CONTRACTID)),
mOCSPStaplingStatus(CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED),
mSCTListFromCertificate(),
mSCTListFromOCSPStapling() {}
// If useRoots is true, we only use root certificates in the candidate list.
// If useRoots is false, we only use non-root certificates in the list.
static Result FindIssuerInner(const UniqueCERTCertList& candidates,
bool useRoots, Input encodedIssuerName,
TrustDomain::IssuerChecker& checker,
/*out*/ bool& keepGoing) {
keepGoing = true;
for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
!CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
bool candidateIsRoot = !!n->cert->isRoot;
if (candidateIsRoot != useRoots) {
continue;
}
Input certDER;
Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
if (rv != Success) {
continue; // probably too big
}
const SECItem encodedIssuerNameItem = {
siBuffer, const_cast<unsigned char*>(encodedIssuerName.UnsafeGetData()),
encodedIssuerName.GetLength()};
ScopedAutoSECItem nameConstraints;
SECStatus srv = CERT_GetImposedNameConstraints(&encodedIssuerNameItem,
&nameConstraints);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
if (PR_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// If no imposed name constraints were found, continue without them
rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr, keepGoing);
} else {
// Otherwise apply the constraints
Input nameConstraintsInput;
if (nameConstraintsInput.Init(nameConstraints.data,
nameConstraints.len) != Success) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
rv = checker.Check(certDER, &nameConstraintsInput, keepGoing);
}
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (!keepGoing) {
break;
}
}
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName,
IssuerChecker& checker, Time) {
// TODO: NSS seems to be ambiguous between "no potential issuers found" and
// "there was an error trying to retrieve the potential issuers."
SECItem encodedIssuerNameItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
UniqueCERTCertList candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(
nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &encodedIssuerNameItem, 0, false));
if (candidates) {
// First, try all the root certs; then try all the non-root certs.
bool keepGoing;
Result rv = FindIssuerInner(candidates, true, encodedIssuerName, checker,
keepGoing);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (keepGoing) {
rv = FindIssuerInner(candidates, false, encodedIssuerName, checker,
keepGoing);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
}
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertPolicyId& policy,
Input candidateCertDER,
/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel) {
// XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
// information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
// expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion. The use of
// CERT_NewTempCertificate to get a CERTCertificate shouldn't be a
// performance problem because NSS will just find the existing
// CERTCertificate in its in-memory cache and return it.
SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
UniqueCERTCertificate candidateCert(CERT_NewTempCertificate(
CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem, nullptr, false, true));
if (!candidateCert) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
// Check the certificate against the OneCRL cert blocklist
if (!mCertBlocklist) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// The certificate blocklist currently only applies to TLS server
// certificates.
if (mCertDBTrustType == trustSSL) {
bool isCertRevoked;
nsresult nsrv = mCertBlocklist->IsCertRevoked(
candidateCert->derIssuer.data, candidateCert->derIssuer.len,
candidateCert->serialNumber.data, candidateCert->serialNumber.len,
candidateCert->derSubject.data, candidateCert->derSubject.len,
candidateCert->derPublicKey.data, candidateCert->derPublicKey.len,
&isCertRevoked);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (isCertRevoked) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: certificate is in blocklist"));
return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
}
}
// XXX: CERT_GetCertTrust seems to be abusing SECStatus as a boolean, where
// SECSuccess means that there is a trust record and SECFailure means there
// is not a trust record. I looked at NSS's internal uses of
// CERT_GetCertTrust, and all that code uses the result as a boolean meaning
// "We have a trust record."
CERTCertTrust trust;
if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, mCertDBTrustType);
// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
// distrusted.
uint32_t relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA
? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD))) ==
CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
return Success;
}
// For TRUST, we only use the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit, because Gecko hasn't
// needed to consider end-entity certs to be their own trust anchors since
// Gecko implemented nsICertOverrideService.
// Of course, for this to work as expected, we need to make sure we're
// inquiring about the trust of a CA and not an end-entity. If an end-entity
// has the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit set, Gecko does not consider it to be a
// trust anchor; it must inherit its trust.
if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA && endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) {
if (policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
return Success;
}
if (CertIsAuthoritativeForEVPolicy(candidateCert, policy)) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
return Success;
}
}
}
trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item, DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
/*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
size_t digestBufLen) {
return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
}
TimeDuration NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetOCSPTimeout() const {
switch (mOCSPFetching) {
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail:
return mOCSPTimeoutSoft;
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV:
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail:
return mOCSPTimeoutHard;
// The rest of these are error cases. Assert in debug builds, but return
// the soft timeout value in release builds.
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP:
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("we should never see this OCSPFetching type here");
break;
}
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("we're not handling every OCSPFetching type");
return mOCSPTimeoutSoft;
}
// Copied and modified from CERT_GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation and
// CERT_GetGeneralNameByType. Returns a non-Result::Success result on error,
// Success with url == nullptr when an OCSP URI was not found, and Success with
// url != nullptr when an OCSP URI was found. The output url will be owned
// by the arena.
static Result GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(const UniquePLArenaPool& arena,
Input aiaExtension,
/*out*/ char const*& url) {
MOZ_ASSERT(arena.get());
if (!arena.get()) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
}
url = nullptr;
SECItem aiaExtensionSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(aiaExtension);
CERTAuthInfoAccess** aia =
CERT_DecodeAuthInfoAccessExtension(arena.get(), &aiaExtensionSECItem);
if (!aia) {
return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
}
for (size_t i = 0; aia[i]; ++i) {
if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&aia[i]->method) == SEC_OID_PKIX_OCSP) {
// NSS chooses the **last** OCSP URL; we choose the **first**
CERTGeneralName* current = aia[i]->location;
if (!current) {
continue;
}
do {
if (current->type == certURI) {
const SECItem& location = current->name.other;
// (location.len + 1) must be small enough to fit into a uint32_t,
// but we limit it to a smaller bound to reduce OOM risk.
if (location.len > 1024 || memchr(location.data, 0, location.len)) {
// Reject embedded nulls. (NSS doesn't do this)
return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
}
// Copy the non-null-terminated SECItem into a null-terminated string.
char* nullTerminatedURL(static_cast<char*>(
PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena.get(), location.len + 1)));
if (!nullTerminatedURL) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
memcpy(nullTerminatedURL, location.data, location.len);
nullTerminatedURL[location.len] = 0;
url = nullTerminatedURL;
return Success;
}
current = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(current);
} while (current != aia[i]->location);
}
}
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, const CertID& certID, Time time,
Duration validityDuration,
/*optional*/ const Input* stapledOCSPResponse,
/*optional*/ const Input* aiaExtension) {
// Actively distrusted certificates will have already been blocked by
// GetCertTrust.
// TODO: need to verify that IsRevoked isn't called for trust anchors AND
// that that fact is documented in mozillapkix.
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of CheckRevocation\n"));
// Bug 991815: The BR allow OCSP for intermediates to be up to one year old.
// Since this affects EV there is no reason why DV should be more strict
// so all intermediatates are allowed to have OCSP responses up to one year
// old.
uint16_t maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 10;
if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) {
maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 365;
}
// If we have a stapled OCSP response then the verification of that response
// determines the result unless the OCSP response is expired. We make an
// exception for expired responses because some servers, nginx in particular,
// are known to serve expired responses due to bugs.
// We keep track of the result of verifying the stapled response but don't
// immediately return failure if the response has expired.
//
// We only set the OCSP stapling status if we're validating the end-entity
// certificate. Non-end-entity certificates would always be
// OCSP_STAPLING_NONE unless/until we implement multi-stapling.
Result stapledOCSPResponseResult = Success;
if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
MOZ_ASSERT(endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity);
bool expired;
stapledOCSPResponseResult = VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(
certID, time, maxOCSPLifetimeInDays, *stapledOCSPResponse,
ResponseWasStapled, expired);
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Success) {
// stapled OCSP response present and good
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_GOOD;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: good"));
return Success;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE ||
expired) {
// stapled OCSP response present but expired
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_EXPIRED;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: expired stapled OCSP response"));
} else if (stapledOCSPResponseResult ==
Result::ERROR_OCSP_TRY_SERVER_LATER ||
stapledOCSPResponseResult ==
Result::ERROR_OCSP_INVALID_SIGNING_CERT) {
// Stapled OCSP response present but invalid for a small number of reasons
// CAs/servers commonly get wrong. This will be treated similarly to an
// expired stapled response.
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_INVALID;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: "
"failure (whitelisted for compatibility)"));
} else {
// stapled OCSP response present but invalid for some reason
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_INVALID;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: failure"));
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
} else if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity) {
// no stapled OCSP response
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NONE;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no stapled OCSP response"));
}
Result cachedResponseResult = Success;
Time cachedResponseValidThrough(Time::uninitialized);
bool cachedResponsePresent =
mOCSPCache.Get(certID, mOriginAttributes, cachedResponseResult,
cachedResponseValidThrough);
if (cachedResponsePresent) {
if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough >= time) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: good"));
return Success;
}
// If we have a cached revoked response, use it.
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: revoked"));
return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
}
// The cached response may indicate an unknown certificate or it may be
// expired. Don't return with either of these statuses yet - we may be
// able to fetch a more recent one.
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: error %d",
static_cast<int>(cachedResponseResult)));
// When a good cached response has expired, it is more convenient
// to convert that to an error code and just deal with
// cachedResponseResult from here on out.
if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
cachedResponseResult = Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
}
// We may have a cached indication of server failure. Ignore it if
// it has expired.
if (cachedResponseResult != Success &&
cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT &&
cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE &&
cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
cachedResponseResult = Success;
cachedResponsePresent = false;
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no cached OCSP response"));
}
// At this point, if and only if cachedErrorResult is Success, there was no
// cached response.
MOZ_ASSERT((!cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult == Success) ||
(cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult != Success));
// If we have a fresh OneCRL Blocklist we can skip OCSP for CA certs
bool blocklistIsFresh;
nsresult nsrv = mCertBlocklist->IsBlocklistFresh(&blocklistIsFresh);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// TODO: We still need to handle the fallback for invalid stapled responses.
// But, if/when we disable OCSP fetching by default, it would be ambiguous
// whether security.OCSP.enable==0 means "I want the default" or "I really
// never want you to ever fetch OCSP."
// Additionally, this doesn't properly handle OCSP-must-staple when OCSP
// fetching is disabled.
Duration shortLifetime(mCertShortLifetimeInDays * Time::ONE_DAY_IN_SECONDS);
if ((mOCSPFetching == NeverFetchOCSP) || (validityDuration < shortLifetime) ||
(endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA &&
(mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail ||
mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail || blocklistIsFresh))) {
// We're not going to be doing any fetching, so if there was a cached
// "unknown" response, say so.
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
}
// If we're doing hard-fail, we want to know if we have a cached response
// that has expired.
if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail &&
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
}
return Success;
}
if (mOCSPFetching == LocalOnlyOCSPForEV) {
if (cachedResponseResult != Success) {
return cachedResponseResult;
}
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
Result rv;
const char* url = nullptr; // owned by the arena
if (aiaExtension) {
rv = GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(arena, *aiaExtension, url);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
if (!url) {
if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForEV ||
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
}
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
// Nothing to do if we don't have an OCSP responder URI for the cert; just
// assume it is good. Note that this is the confusing, but intended,
// interpretation of "strict" revocation checking in the face of a
// certificate that lacks an OCSP responder URI.
return Success;
}
// Only request a response if we didn't have a cached indication of failure
// (don't keep requesting responses from a failing server).
Input response;
bool attemptedRequest;
if (cachedResponseResult == Success ||
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
uint8_t ocspRequest[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t ocspRequestLength;
rv =
CreateEncodedOCSPRequest(*this, certID, ocspRequest, ocspRequestLength);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
SECItem ocspRequestItem = {siBuffer, ocspRequest,
static_cast<unsigned int>(ocspRequestLength)};
// Owned by arena
SECItem* responseSECItem = nullptr;
Result tempRV = DoOCSPRequest(
arena, url, mOriginAttributes, &ocspRequestItem, GetOCSPTimeout(),
mOCSPGetConfig == CertVerifier::ocspGetEnabled, responseSECItem);
MOZ_ASSERT((tempRV != Success) || responseSECItem);
if (tempRV != Success) {
rv = tempRV;
} else if (response.Init(responseSECItem->data, responseSECItem->len) !=
Success) {
rv = Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE; // too big
}
attemptedRequest = true;
} else {
rv = cachedResponseResult;
attemptedRequest = false;
}
if (response.GetLength() == 0) {
Result error = rv;
if (attemptedRequest) {
Time timeout(time);
if (timeout.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
}
rv = mOCSPCache.Put(certID, mOriginAttributes, error, time, timeout);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
if (mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure after "
"OCSP request failure"));
return error;
}
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from cached "
"response after OCSP request failure"));
return cachedResponseResult;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
MOZ_LOG(
gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired/invalid "
"stapled response after OCSP request failure"));
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECSuccess after "
"OCSP request failure"));
return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
}
// If the response from the network has expired but indicates a revoked
// or unknown certificate, PR_GetError() will return the appropriate error.
// We actually ignore expired here.
bool expired;
rv = VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(certID, time,
maxOCSPLifetimeInDays, response,
ResponseIsFromNetwork, expired);
if (rv == Success || mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
MOZ_LOG(
gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning after VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse"));
return rv;
}
if (rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
return rv;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired/invalid "
"stapled response after OCSP request verification failure"));
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: end of CheckRevocation"));
return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(
const CertID& certID, Time time, uint16_t maxLifetimeInDays,
Input encodedResponse, EncodedResponseSource responseSource,
/*out*/ bool& expired) {
Time thisUpdate(Time::uninitialized);
Time validThrough(Time::uninitialized);
// We use a try and fallback approach which first mandates good signature
// digest algorithms, then falls back to SHA-1 if this fails. If a delegated
// OCSP response signing certificate was issued with a SHA-1 signature,
// verification initially fails. We cache the failure and then re-use that
// result even when doing fallback (i.e. when weak signature digest algorithms
// should succeed). To address this we use an OCSPVerificationTrustDomain
// here, rather than using *this, to ensure verification succeeds for all
// allowed signature digest algorithms.
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain trustDomain(*this);
Result rv = VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse(trustDomain, certID, time,
maxLifetimeInDays, encodedResponse,
expired, &thisUpdate, &validThrough);
// If a response was stapled and expired, we don't want to cache it. Return
// early to simplify the logic here.
if (responseSource == ResponseWasStapled && expired) {
MOZ_ASSERT(rv != Success);
return rv;
}
// validThrough is only trustworthy if the response successfully verifies
// or it indicates a revoked or unknown certificate.
// If this isn't the case, store an indication of failure (to prevent
// repeatedly requesting a response from a failing server).
if (rv != Success && rv != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
rv != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
validThrough = time;
if (validThrough.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
}
}
if (responseSource == ResponseIsFromNetwork || rv == Success ||
rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE ||
rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: caching OCSP response"));
Result putRV =
mOCSPCache.Put(certID, mOriginAttributes, rv, thisUpdate, validThrough);
if (putRV != Success) {
return putRV;
}
}
return rv;
}
// If a certificate in the given chain appears to have been issued by one of
// seven roots operated by StartCom and WoSign that are not trusted to issue new
// certificates, verify that the end-entity has a notBefore date before 21
// October 2016. If the value of notBefore is after this time, the chain is not
// valid.
// (NB: While there are seven distinct roots being checked for, two of them
// share distinguished names, resulting in six distinct distinguished names to
// actually look for.)
static Result CheckForStartComOrWoSign(const UniqueCERTCertList& certChain) {
if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certChain)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
const CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certChain);
if (!endEntityNode || !endEntityNode->cert) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
PRTime notBefore;
PRTime notAfter;
if (CERT_GetCertTimes(endEntityNode->cert, ¬Before, ¬After) !=
SECSuccess) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// PRTime is microseconds since the epoch, whereas JS time is milliseconds.
// (new Date("2016-10-21T00:00:00Z")).getTime() * 1000
static const PRTime OCTOBER_21_2016 = 1477008000000000;
if (notBefore <= OCTOBER_21_2016) {
return Success;
}
for (const CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certChain);
!CERT_LIST_END(node, certChain); node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
if (!node || !node->cert) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (CertDNIsInList(node->cert, StartComAndWoSignDNs)) {
return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
}
}
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certArray, Time time,
const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: IsChainValid"));
UniqueCERTCertList certList;
SECStatus srv =
ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certArray, certList);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certList)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
Result rv = CheckForStartComOrWoSign(certList);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// Modernization in-progress: Keep certList as a CERTCertList for storage into
// the mBuiltChain variable at the end, but let's use nsNSSCertList for the
// validity calculations.
UniqueCERTCertList certListCopy = nsNSSCertList::DupCertList(certList);
// This adopts the list
RefPtr<nsNSSCertList> nssCertList = new nsNSSCertList(Move(certListCopy));
if (!nssCertList) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> rootCert;
nsresult nsrv = nssCertList->GetRootCertificate(rootCert);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
UniqueCERTCertificate root(rootCert->GetCert());
if (!root) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
nsrv = rootCert->GetIsBuiltInRoot(&isBuiltInRoot);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
bool skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode =
(!isBuiltInRoot && mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningAllowUserCAMITM);
// If mHostname isn't set, we're not verifying in the context of a TLS
// handshake, so don't verify HPKP in those cases.
if (mHostname && (mPinningMode != CertVerifier::pinningDisabled) &&
!skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode) {
bool enforceTestMode =
(mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningEnforceTestMode);
bool chainHasValidPins;
nsrv = PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(
nssCertList, mHostname, time, enforceTestMode, mOriginAttributes,
chainHasValidPins, mPinningTelemetryInfo);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (!chainHasValidPins) {
return Result::ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE;
}
}
// See bug 1349762. If the root is "GlobalSign Root CA - R2", don't consider
// the end-entity valid for EV unless the
// "GlobalSign Extended Validation CA - SHA256 - G2" intermediate is in the
// chain as well. It should be possible to remove this workaround after
// January 2019 as per bug 1349727 comment 17.
if (requiredPolicy == sGlobalSignEVPolicy &&
CertMatchesStaticData(root.get(), sGlobalSignRootCAR2SubjectBytes,
sGlobalSignRootCAR2SPKIBytes)) {
rootCert = nullptr; // Clear the state for Segment...
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertList> intCerts;
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> eeCert;
nsrv = nssCertList->SegmentCertificateChain(rootCert, intCerts, eeCert);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
// This chain is supposed to be complete, so this is an error. There
// are no intermediates, so return before searching just as if the
// search failed.
return Result::ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED;
}
bool foundRequiredIntermediate = false;
RefPtr<nsNSSCertList> intCertList = intCerts->GetCertList();
nsrv = intCertList->ForEachCertificateInChain(
[&foundRequiredIntermediate](nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> aCert, bool aHasMore,
/* out */ bool& aContinue) {
// We need an owning handle when calling nsIX509Cert::GetCert().
UniqueCERTCertificate nssCert(aCert->GetCert());
if (CertMatchesStaticData(
nssCert.get(),
sGlobalSignExtendedValidationCASHA256G2SubjectBytes,
sGlobalSignExtendedValidationCASHA256G2SPKIBytes)) {
foundRequiredIntermediate = true;
aContinue = false;
}
return NS_OK;
});
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (!foundRequiredIntermediate) {
return Result::ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED;
}
}
// See bug 1434300. If the root is a Symantec root, see if we distrust this
// path. Since we already have the root available, we can check that cheaply
// here before proceeding with the rest of the algorithm.
// This algorithm only applies if we are verifying in the context of a TLS
// handshake. To determine this, we check mHostname: If it isn't set, this is
// not TLS, so don't run the algorithm.
if (mHostname && CertDNIsInList(root.get(), RootSymantecDNs) &&
mDistrustedCAPolicy == DistrustedCAPolicy::DistrustSymantecRoots) {
rootCert = nullptr; // Clear the state for Segment...
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertList> intCerts;
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> eeCert;
nsrv = nssCertList->SegmentCertificateChain(rootCert, intCerts, eeCert);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
// This chain is supposed to be complete, so this is an error.
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// PRTime is microseconds since the epoch, whereas JS time is milliseconds.
// (new Date("2016-06-01T00:00:00Z")).getTime() * 1000
static const PRTime JUNE_1_2016 = 1464739200000000;
bool isDistrusted = false;
nsrv = CheckForSymantecDistrust(intCerts, eeCert, JUNE_1_2016,
RootAppleAndGoogleSPKIs, isDistrusted);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (isDistrusted) {
mSawDistrustedCAByPolicyError = true;
return Result::ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED;
}
}
mBuiltChain = Move(certList);
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(
DigestAlgorithm aAlg, EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA, Time notBefore) {
// (new Date("2016-01-01T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
static const Time JANUARY_FIRST_2016 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1451606400);
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm"));
if (aAlg == DigestAlgorithm::sha1) {
switch (mSHA1Mode) {
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016:
if (JANUARY_FIRST_2016 <= notBefore) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Post-2015 SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
}
break;
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Allowed:
// Enforcing that the resulting chain uses an imported root is only
// possible at a higher level. This is done in CertVerifier::VerifyCert.
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot:
default:
break;
// MSVC warns unless we explicitly handle this now-unused option.
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unexpected SHA1Mode type");
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
}
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits) {
if (modulusSizeInBits < mMinRSABits) {
return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
}
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(
const SignedDigest& signedDigest, Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) {
return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mPinArg);
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(
EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, NamedCurve curve) {
switch (curve) {
case NamedCurve::secp256r1: // fall through
case NamedCurve::secp384r1: // fall through
case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
return Success;
}
return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(
const SignedDigest& signedDigest, Input subjectPublicKeyInfo) {
return VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mPinArg);
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(
Time notBefore, Time notAfter, EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
KeyPurposeId keyPurpose) {
if (endEntityOrCA != EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity) {
return Success;
}
if (keyPurpose == KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning) {
return Success;
}
Duration DURATION_27_MONTHS_PLUS_SLOP((2 * 365 + 3 * 31 + 7) *
Time::ONE_DAY_IN_SECONDS);
Duration maxValidityDuration(UINT64_MAX);
Duration validityDuration(notBefore, notAfter);
switch (mValidityCheckingMode) {
case ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff:
return Success;
case ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV:
// The EV Guidelines say the maximum is 27 months, but we use a slightly
// higher limit here to (hopefully) minimize compatibility breakage.
maxValidityDuration = DURATION_27_MONTHS_PLUS_SLOP;
break;
default:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(
"We're not handling every ValidityCheckingMode type");
}
if (validityDuration > maxValidityDuration) {
return Result::ERROR_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG;
}
return Success;
}
Result NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NetscapeStepUpMatchesServerAuth(
Time notBefore,
/*out*/ bool& matches) {
// (new Date("2015-08-23T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
static const Time AUGUST_23_2015 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1440288000);
// (new Date("2016-08-23T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
static const Time AUGUST_23_2016 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1471910400);
switch (mNetscapeStepUpPolicy) {
case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::AlwaysMatch:
matches = true;
return Success;
case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::MatchBefore23August2016:
matches = notBefore < AUGUST_23_2016;
return Success;
case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::MatchBefore23August2015:
matches = notBefore < AUGUST_23_2015;
return Success;
case NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch:
matches = false;
return Success;
default:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled NetscapeStepUpPolicy type");
}
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
void NSSCertDBTrustDomain::ResetAccumulatedState() {
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
mSCTListFromOCSPStapling = nullptr;
mSCTListFromCertificate = nullptr;
mSawDistrustedCAByPolicyError = false;
}
static Input SECItemToInput(const UniqueSECItem& item) {
Input result;
if (item) {
MOZ_ASSERT(item->type == siBuffer);
Result rv = result.Init(item->data, item->len);
// As used here, |item| originally comes from an Input,
// so there should be no issues converting it back.
MOZ_ASSERT(rv == Success);
Unused << rv; // suppresses warnings in release builds
}
return result;
}
Input NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetSCTListFromCertificate() const {
return SECItemToInput(mSCTListFromCertificate);
}
Input NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetSCTListFromOCSPStapling() const {
return SECItemToInput(mSCTListFromOCSPStapling);
}
bool NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetIsErrorDueToDistrustedCAPolicy() const {
return mSawDistrustedCAByPolicyError;
}
void NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NoteAuxiliaryExtension(AuxiliaryExtension extension,
Input extensionData) {
UniqueSECItem* out = nullptr;
switch (extension) {
case AuxiliaryExtension::EmbeddedSCTList:
out = &mSCTListFromCertificate;
break;
case AuxiliaryExtension::SCTListFromOCSPResponse:
out = &mSCTListFromOCSPStapling;
break;
default:
MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("unhandled AuxiliaryExtension");
}
if (out) {
SECItem extensionDataItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(extensionData);
out->reset(SECITEM_DupItem(&extensionDataItem));
}
}
SECStatus InitializeNSS(const nsACString& dir, bool readOnly,
bool loadPKCS11Modules) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// The NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT flag turns off the loading of the root certs
// module by NSS_Initialize because we will load it in InstallLoadableRoots
// later. It also allows us to work around a bug in the system NSS in
// Ubuntu 8.04, which loads any nonexistent "<configdir>/libnssckbi.so" as
// "/usr/lib/nss/libnssckbi.so".
uint32_t flags = NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE;
if (readOnly) {
flags |= NSS_INIT_READONLY;
}
if (!loadPKCS11Modules) {
flags |= NSS_INIT_NOMODDB;
}
nsAutoCString dbTypeAndDirectory("sql:");
dbTypeAndDirectory.Append(dir);
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("InitializeNSS(%s, %d, %d)", dbTypeAndDirectory.get(), readOnly,
loadPKCS11Modules));
SECStatus srv =
NSS_Initialize(dbTypeAndDirectory.get(), "", "", SECMOD_DB, flags);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return srv;
}
if (!readOnly) {
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
if (!slot) {
return SECFailure;
}
// If the key DB doesn't have a password set, PK11_NeedUserInit will return
// true. For the SQL DB, we need to set a password or we won't be able to
// import any certificates or change trust settings.
if (PK11_NeedUserInit(slot.get())) {
srv = PK11_InitPin(slot.get(), nullptr, nullptr);
MOZ_ASSERT(srv == SECSuccess);
Unused << srv;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
void DisableMD5() {
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(
SEC_OID_MD5, 0,
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(
SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION, 0,
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(
SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC, 0,
NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
}
bool LoadLoadableRoots(const nsCString& dir, const nsCString& modNameUTF8) {
// If a module exists with the same name, make a best effort attempt to delete
// it. Note that it isn't possible to delete the internal module, so checking
// the return value would be detrimental in that case.
int unusedModType;
Unused << SECMOD_DeleteModule(modNameUTF8.get(), &unusedModType);
// Some NSS command-line utilities will load a roots module under the name
// "Root Certs" if there happens to be a `DLL_PREFIX "nssckbi" DLL_SUFFIX`
// file in the directory being operated on. In some cases this can cause us to
// fail to load our roots module. In these cases, deleting the "Root Certs"
// module allows us to load the correct one. See bug 1406396.
Unused << SECMOD_DeleteModule("Root Certs", &unusedModType);
nsAutoCString fullLibraryPath;
if (!dir.IsEmpty()) {
fullLibraryPath.Assign(dir);
fullLibraryPath.AppendLiteral(FILE_PATH_SEPARATOR);
}
fullLibraryPath.Append(DLL_PREFIX "nssckbi" DLL_SUFFIX);
// Escape the \ and " characters.
fullLibraryPath.ReplaceSubstring("\\", "\\\\");
fullLibraryPath.ReplaceSubstring("\"", "\\\"");
nsAutoCString pkcs11ModuleSpec("name=\"");
pkcs11ModuleSpec.Append(modNameUTF8);
pkcs11ModuleSpec.AppendLiteral("\" library=\"");
pkcs11ModuleSpec.Append(fullLibraryPath);
pkcs11ModuleSpec.AppendLiteral("\"");
UniqueSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_LoadUserModule(
const_cast<char*>(pkcs11ModuleSpec.get()), nullptr, false));
if (!rootsModule) {
return false;
}
if (!rootsModule->loaded) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
void UnloadLoadableRoots(const char* modNameUTF8) {
MOZ_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
UniqueSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_FindModule(modNameUTF8));
if (rootsModule) {
SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(rootsModule.get());
}
}
nsresult DefaultServerNicknameForCert(const CERTCertificate* cert,
/*out*/ nsCString& nickname) {
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(cert);
UniquePORTString baseName(CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject));
if (!baseName) {
baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetOrgUnitName(&cert->subject));
}
if (!baseName) {
baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetOrgName(&cert->subject));
}
if (!baseName) {
baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetLocalityName(&cert->subject));
}
if (!baseName) {
baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetStateName(&cert->subject));
}
if (!baseName) {
baseName = UniquePORTString(CERT_GetCountryName(&cert->subject));
}
if (!baseName) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// This function is only used in contexts where a failure to find a suitable
// nickname does not block the overall task from succeeding.
// As such, we use an arbitrary limit to prevent this nickname searching
// process from taking forever.
static const uint32_t ARBITRARY_LIMIT = 500;
for (uint32_t count = 1; count < ARBITRARY_LIMIT; count++) {
nickname = baseName.get();
if (count != 1) {
nickname.AppendPrintf(" #%u", count);
}
if (nickname.IsEmpty()) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
bool conflict = SEC_CertNicknameConflict(nickname.get(), &cert->derSubject,
cert->dbhandle);
if (!conflict) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
/**
* Given a list of certificates representing a verified certificate path from an
* end-entity certificate to a trust anchor, imports the intermediate
* certificates into the permanent certificate database. This is an attempt to
* cope with misconfigured servers that don't include the appropriate
* intermediate certificates in the TLS handshake.
*
* @param certList the verified certificate list
*/
void SaveIntermediateCerts(const UniqueCERTCertList& certList) {
if (!certList) {
return;
}
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
if (!slot) {
return;
}
bool isEndEntity = true;
for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList); node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
if (isEndEntity) {
// Skip the end-entity; we only want to store intermediates
isEndEntity = false;
continue;
}
if (node->cert->slot) {
// This cert was found on a token; no need to remember it in the permanent
// database.
continue;
}
if (node->cert->isperm) {
// We don't need to remember certs already stored in perm db.
continue;
}
// No need to save the trust anchor - it's either already a permanent
// certificate or it's the Microsoft Family Safety root or an enterprise
// root temporarily imported via the child mode or enterprise root features.
// We don't want to import these because they're intended to be temporary
// (and because importing them happens to reset their trust settings, which
// breaks these features).
if (node == CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList)) {
continue;
}
nsAutoCString nickname;
nsresult rv = DefaultServerNicknameForCert(node->cert, nickname);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
continue;
}
// As mentioned in the documentation of this function, we're importing only
// to cope with misconfigured servers. As such, we ignore the return value
// below, since it doesn't really matter if the import fails.
Unused << PK11_ImportCert(slot.get(), node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
nickname.get(), false);
}
}
} // namespace psm
} // namespace mozilla