Bubblewrap

==========

Many container runtime tools like `systemd-nspawn`, `docker`,

etc. focus on providing infrastructure for system administrators and

orchestration tools (e.g. Kubernetes) to run containers.

These tools are not suitable to give to unprivileged users, because it

is trivial to turn such access into to a fully privileged root shell

on the host.

User namespaces

---------------

There is an effort in the Linux kernel called

[user namespaces](https://www.google.com/search?q=user+namespaces+site%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Flwn.net)

which attempts to allow unprivileged users to use container features.

While significant progress has been made, there are

[still concerns](https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/) about it, and

it is not available to unprivileged users in several production distributions

such as CentOS/Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, Debian Jessie, etc.

See for example

[CVE-2016-3135](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3135)

which is a local root vulnerability introduced by userns.

[This March 2016 post](https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/3/9/555) has some

more discussion.

Bubblewrap could be viewed as setuid implementation of a *subset* of

user namespaces.  Emphasis on subset - specifically relevant to the

above CVE, bubblewrap does not allow control over iptables.

The original bubblewrap code existed before user namespaces - it inherits code from

[xdg-app helper](https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xdg-app/xdg-app/tree/common/xdg-app-helper.c)

which in turn distantly derives from

[linux-user-chroot](https://git.gnome.org/browse/linux-user-chroot).

Security

--------

The maintainers of this tool believe that it does not, even when used

in combination with typical software installed on that distribution,

allow privilege escalation.  It may increase the ability of a logged

in user to perform denial of service attacks, however.

In particular, bubblewrap uses `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` to turn off

setuid binaries, which is the [traditional way](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chroot#Limitations) to get out of things

like chroots.

Users

-----

This program can be shared by all container tools which perform

non-root operation, such as:

 - [Flatpak](http://www.flatpak.org)

 - [rpm-ostree unprivileged](https://github.com/projectatomic/rpm-ostree/pull/209)

 - [bwrap-oci](https://github.com/projectatomic/bwrap-oci)

We would also like to see this be available in Kubernetes/OpenShift

clusters.  Having the ability for unprivileged users to use container

features would make it significantly easier to do interactive

debugging scenarios and the like.

Usage

-----

bubblewrap works by creating a new, completely empty, mount

namespace where the root is on a tmpfs that is invisible from the

host, and will be automatically cleaned up when the last process

exits. You can then use commandline options to construct the root

filesystem and process environment and command to run in the

namespace.

There's a larger [demo script](./demos/bubblewrap-shell.sh) in the

source code, but here's a trimmed down version which runs

a new shell reusing the host's `/usr`.

```

bwrap --ro-bind /usr /usr --symlink usr/lib64 /lib64 --proc /proc --dev /dev --unshare-pid bash

```

This is an incomplete example, but useful for purposes of

illustration.  More often, rather than creating a container using the

host's filesystem tree, you want to target a chroot.  There, rather

than creating the symlink `lib64 -> usr/lib64` in the tmpfs, you might

have already created it in the target rootfs.

Sandboxing

----------

The goal of bubblewrap is to run an application in a sandbox, where it

has restricted access to parts of the operating system or user data

such as the home directory.

bubblewrap always creates a new mount namespace, and the user can specify

exactly what parts of the filesystem should be visible in the sandbox.

Any such directories you specify mounted `nodev` by default, and can be made readonly.

Additionally you can use these kernel features:

User namespaces ([CLONE_NEWUSER](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): This hides all but the current uid and gid from the

sandbox. You can also change what the value of uid/gid should be in the sandbox.

IPC namespaces ([CLONE_NEWIPC](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will get its own copy of all the

different forms of IPCs, like SysV shared memory and semaphores.

PID namespaces ([CLONE_NEWPID](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will not see any processes outside the sandbox. Additionally, bubblewrap will run a trivial pid1 inside your container to handle the requirements of reaping children in the sandbox. This avoids what is known now as the [Docker pid 1 problem](https://blog.phusion.nl/2015/01/20/docker-and-the-pid-1-zombie-reaping-problem/).

Network namespaces ([CLONE_NEWNET](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will not see the network. Instead it will have its own network namespace with only a loopback device.

UTS namespace ([CLONE_NEWUTS](http://linux.die.net/man/2/clone)): The sandbox will have its own hostname.

Seccomp filters: You can pass in seccomp filters that limit which syscalls can be done in the sandbox. For more information, see [Seccomp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seccomp).

Related project comparison: Firejail

------------------------------------

[Firejail](https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/tree/master/src/firejail)

is similar to Flatpak before bubblewrap was split out in that it combines

a setuid tool with a lot of desktop-specific sandboxing features.  For

example, Firejail knows about Pulseaudio, whereas bubblewrap does not.

The bubblewrap authors believe it's much easier to audit a small

setuid program, and keep features such as Pulseaudio filtering as an

unprivileged process, as now occurs in Flatpak.

Also, @cgwalters thinks trying to

[whitelist file paths](https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/blob/37a5a3545ef6d8d03dad8bbd888f53e13274c9e5/src/firejail/fs_whitelist.c#L176)

is a bad idea given the myriad ways users have to manipulate paths,

and the myriad ways in which system administrators may configure a

system.  The bubblewrap approach is to only retain a few specific

Linux capabilities such as `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, but to always access the

filesystem as the invoking uid.  This entirely closes

[TOCTTOU attacks](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html) and

such.

Related project comparison: Sandstorm.io

----------------------------------------

[Sandstorm.io](https://sandstorm.io/) requires unprivileged user

namespaces to set up its sandbox, though it could easily be adapted

to operate in a setuid mode as well. @cgwalters believes their code is

fairly good, but it could still make sense to unify on bubblewrap.

However, @kentonv (of Sandstorm) feels that while this makes sense

in principle, the switching cost outweighs the practical benefits for

now. This decision could be re-evaluated in the future, but it is not

being actively pursued today.

Related project comparison: runc/binctr

----------------------------------------

[runC](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc) is currently working on

supporting [rootless containers](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/774),

without needing `setuid` or any other privileges during installation of

runC (using unprivileged user namespaces rather than `setuid`),

creation, and management of containers. However, the standard mode of

using runC is similar to [systemd nspawn](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-nspawn.html)

in that it is tooling intended to be invoked by root.

The bubblewrap authors believe that runc and systemd-nspawn are not

designed to be made setuid, and are distant from supporting such a mode.

However with rootless containers, runC will be able to fulfill certain usecases

that bubblewrap supports (with the added benefit of being a standardised and

complete OCI runtime).

[binctr](https://github.com/jfrazelle/binctr) is just a wrapper for

runC, so inherits all of its design tradeoffs.

What's with the name?!

----------------------

The name bubblewrap was chosen to convey that this

tool runs as the parent of the application (so wraps it in some sense) and creates

a protective layer (the sandbox) around it.

![](bubblewrap.jpg)

(Bubblewrap cat by [dancing_stupidity](https://www.flickr.com/photos/27549668@N03/))