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From cfc1a5da0a0f2273e0ce39da0c2fa81053ed0eaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2015 16:06:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ccpp: emulate selinux for creation of compat cores

This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.

http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.selinux/21842

Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
---
 configure.ac               |  1 +
 src/hooks/Makefile.am      |  4 ++-
 src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index d7e0ea5..430f23c 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([POLKIT], [polkit-gobject-1])
 PKG_CHECK_MODULES([GIO], [gio-2.0])
 PKG_CHECK_MODULES([SATYR], [satyr])
 PKG_CHECK_MODULES([SYSTEMD_JOURNAL], [libsystemd-journal])
+PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBSELINUX], [libselinux])
 
 PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
 AC_ARG_WITH([systemdsystemunitdir],
diff --git a/src/hooks/Makefile.am b/src/hooks/Makefile.am
index 13702b5..ff070cf 100644
--- a/src/hooks/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/hooks/Makefile.am
@@ -33,10 +33,12 @@ abrt_hook_ccpp_CPPFLAGS = \
     -DDEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE=$(DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE) \
     $(GLIB_CFLAGS) \
     $(LIBREPORT_CFLAGS) \
+    $(LIBSELINUX_CFLAGS) \
     -D_GNU_SOURCE
 abrt_hook_ccpp_LDADD = \
     ../lib/libabrt.la \
-    $(LIBREPORT_LIBS)
+    $(LIBREPORT_LIBS) \
+    $(LIBSELINUX_LIBS)
 
 # abrt-merge-pstoreoops
 abrt_merge_pstoreoops_SOURCES = \
diff --git a/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c b/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c
index 53700e4..9696423 100644
--- a/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c
+++ b/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 */
 #include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include "libabrt.h"
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_DUMP_TIME_UNWIND
 #include <satyr/abrt.h>
@@ -163,12 +164,68 @@ static DIR *open_cwd(pid_t pid)
     return cwd;
 }
 
+/* Computes a security context of new file created by the given process with
+ * pid in the given directory represented by file descriptor.
+ *
+ * On errors returns negative number. Returns 0 if the function succeeds and
+ * computes the context and returns positive number and assigns NULL to newcon
+ * if the security context is not needed (SELinux disabled).
+ */
+static int compute_selinux_con_for_new_file(pid_t pid, int dir_fd, security_context_t *newcon)
+{
+    security_context_t srccon;
+    security_context_t dstcon;
+
+    const int r = is_selinux_enabled();
+    if (r == 0)
+    {
+        *newcon = NULL;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    else if (r == -1)
+    {
+        perror_msg("Couldn't get state of SELinux");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    else if (r != 1)
+        error_msg_and_die("Unexpected SELinux return value: %d", r);
+
+
+    if (getpidcon_raw(pid, &srccon) < 0)
+    {
+        perror_msg("getpidcon_raw(%d)", pid);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (fgetfilecon_raw(dir_fd, &dstcon) < 0)
+    {
+        perror_msg("getfilecon_raw(%s)", user_pwd);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (security_compute_create_raw(srccon, dstcon, string_to_security_class("file"), newcon) < 0)
+    {
+        perror_msg("security_compute_create_raw(%s, %s, 'file')", srccon, dstcon);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static int open_user_core(uid_t uid, uid_t fsuid, gid_t fsgid, pid_t pid, char **percent_values)
 {
     proc_cwd = open_cwd(pid);
     if (proc_cwd == NULL)
         return -1;
 
+    /* http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.selinux/21842 */
+    security_context_t newcon;
+    if (compute_selinux_con_for_new_file(pid, dirfd(proc_cwd), &newcon) < 0)
+    {
+        log_notice("Not going to create a user core due to SELinux errors");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     xsetegid(fsgid);
     xseteuid(fsuid);
 
@@ -263,10 +320,25 @@ static int open_user_core(uid_t uid, uid_t fsuid, gid_t fsgid, pid_t pid, char *
      * (However, see the description of the prctl(2) PR_SET_DUMPABLE operation,
      * and the description of the /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable file in proc(5).)
      */
+
+    /* Set SELinux context like kernel when creating core dump file */
+    if (newcon != NULL && setfscreatecon_raw(newcon) < 0)
+    {
+        perror_msg("setfscreatecon_raw(%s)", newcon);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     struct stat sb;
     errno = 0;
     /* Do not O_TRUNC: if later checks fail, we do not want to have file already modified here */
     int user_core_fd = openat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW | g_user_core_flags, 0600); /* kernel makes 0600 too */
+
+    if (newcon != NULL && setfscreatecon_raw(NULL) < 0)
+    {
+        error_msg("setfscreatecon_raw(NULL)");
+        goto user_core_fail;
+    }
+
     xsetegid(0);
     xseteuid(0);
     if (user_core_fd < 0
@@ -279,16 +351,23 @@ static int open_user_core(uid_t uid, uid_t fsuid, gid_t fsgid, pid_t pid, char *
             perror_msg("Can't open '%s' at '%s'", core_basename, user_pwd);
         else
             perror_msg("'%s' at '%s' is not a regular file with link count 1 owned by UID(%d)", core_basename, user_pwd, fsuid);
-        return -1;
+        goto user_core_fail;
     }
     if (ftruncate(user_core_fd, 0) != 0) {
         /* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
         perror_msg("Can't truncate '%s' at '%s' to size 0", core_basename, user_pwd);
-        unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
-        return -1;
+        goto user_core_fail;
     }
 
     return user_core_fd;
+
+user_core_fail:
+    if (user_core_fd >= 0)
+    {
+        close(user_core_fd);
+        unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
+    }
+    return -1;
 }
 
 /* Like xopen, but on error, unlocks and deletes dd and user core */
-- 
2.1.0