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From 28ce40d8db91c1926a95f21ef19a980a8af88471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2015 14:43:59 +0200
Subject: [ABRT PATCH] ccpp: check for overflow in abrt coredump path creation

This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
---
 src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c b/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c
index d9f1f5e..81f9349 100644
--- a/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c
+++ b/src/hooks/abrt-hook-ccpp.c
@@ -669,7 +669,9 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
          * and maybe crash again...
          * Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
          */
-        snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash);
+        if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
+            error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
+
         int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
         off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
         if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
-- 
1.8.3.1